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The Society

U.S.S.R.

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NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE SURVEY

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U.S.S.R.

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The Society

A. Introduction (U/OU)

The character of Soviet society derives from the forcible imposition of revolutionary theories and programs, Western in their dynamism and materialistic in their assumptions, on profoundly religious groups of peoples who for centuries had lived in tradition-bound ethnic communities isolated from the Western world. Impelled by a dynamic philosophy of history and with a formidable territorial base of operations, the Communist rulers of the U.S.S.R. have succeeded in a period of some 50 years in pushing forward the industrialization of a nation that was largely agrarian and technically backward. This, however, has been achieved at the price of creating a state that controls and represses the individual.

Many of the tensions in Soviet society arise from the fact that the regime has forced upon its citizens ways that are foreign not only to their traditions but also to their character. By nature, the Russians are a frank and open people, free in the display of their emotions within defined limits of social control, gregarious and argumentative, and given to passionate discussions of broad abstractions. They value group membership highly and are dependent upon the group, especially its leaders, but seek personal, particularistic relationships. Veering between extremes of work and idleness, deprivation and indulgence, delight and despair, Russians have never been remarkable for the individual orderliness of their lives.

It was such a people that the Communists had to regiment. Rapid industrialization required order and discipline, and the Communist ideology demanded single-minded acceptance of its principles. Resistance led to compulsion and suspicion. Religion was seen as

a dangerous force that had to be counteracted. The huge bureaucracy erected by the regime was not geared to offer personal attention. Communist insistence that the individual had and must fulfill responsibilities to the abstract ideas of the state and the Communist Party destroyed the traditional linkage between subject and ruler. Cut off from many traditional sources of personal strength, the Russian was forced to hide his emotions, curb his curiosity, work efficiently and consistently, and be very careful about his talk and his associations.

The problems created by the revolution—primarily those of industrialization and the practical application by centralized power of an often inexact and loosely drawn social theory—are still being worked out, and consequently the society is still in flux. According to some Western scholars, the traditional model of a dynamic totalitarian Soviet society pushing forward has been replaced with one of a society stagnating under the rule of a conservative bureaucracy and elite bent on resisting change for the sake of preserving vested interests.

But whether "dynamic" or "stagnant," Soviet society remains closely controlled. Yet, even though control is in the hands of a relatively small group which is capable of drastically changing policy or its implementation at a given moment, there are limits upon the power of the state over the individual. The sources of these limits are found not only in current ideology and political practice but also in prerevolutionary Russian culture and tradition and in the imperatives of technological progress. No system of government can control a society and remain untouched by the cultural context within which that society functions. Thus, the Soviet regime is a Russian

entity and has had to work with the culture it inherited. Indeed, its ability to use the nation's cultural heritage has been a major source of strength.

This Russian cultural heritage originated in an agricultural society, considerably influenced by Byzantium, that was a universe unto itself, relatively untouched by the scientific, rational, and industrial currents that swept through the Western world. The Bolsheviks took power over a European people who had broken with serfdom later than any major Western nation, who had maintained a system of absolutist government reinforced by a highly centralized state church, and who had been bypassed by the Renaissance and the Reformation. The isolation of Russia from the West has been an important element in Russian history, just as today the isolation enforced by the regime promotes the goal of forcing revolutionary development on the Russian people.

The inward-turning attitude of the people is fostered not only by the policies of the regime but also by geography. The vast plains of central Russia have always been an object of awe and pride to the people. The harsh climate and few roads in the great stretches of plain caused men to gather in tight, lonely communities. Survival was for the hardy and for those who learned that their only hope lay in the physical warmth and social protection offered by the group. An individual counted for nothing against the limitless and formless plain. Yet those who survived reveled in the breadth of the land they occupied, and Russians continue even today to call themselves a "broad" people.

The land and the immutable forces of nature were treated as sacred long before the introduction of Christianity. This pagan belief was fused with Christianity and respect for the state. For the mass of the people, God, the motherland, and the tsar became a triumvirate of powers, all of whom would come to the aid of the individual if they could be reached. Reverence for the motherland was effectively used by the regime during World War II, when political, specifically Soviet appeals did not meet with the desired response. The inviolability of the motherland has been a source of strength for any regime seeking to defend Russia against invasion.

The primary units of allegiance in prerevolutionary Russia, apart from the country and the tsar, were the household, and the communal village or *mir*. The household was headed by a patriarch whose rule was absolute. The village elder, along with the *mir* council, was responsible for the periodic redistribution of the

land, which was allotted to the household units on the basis of need. The elder's power derived from the community. Leadership was not sought; it was considered a burden. All decisions were made unanimously, on the basis of consensus without a vote, and once reached had the moral force of law and an aura of sanctity. Since decisionmaking depended on the absence of open disagreement, there was tremendous social pressure upon individuals to go along with the group. No provision was made in the *mir* for a dissenting minority or a loyal opposition. The origins of the present-day Soviet stress on "mass participation" may be traced in part to the councils of the *mir*.

Lenin and the Bolsheviks sought to remake the Russian people according to the theories of Karl Marx, but Marx had envisaged the socialist revolution taking place in a society with a developed capitalist industrial economy. The main necessity in Lenin's plan for a direct transition to socialism, therefore, was industrial development. Indeed, the Bolsheviks displayed a simplistic faith in the liberating and rationalizing power of secular industrial society once it was rid of the "fetters" of private property. With this faith went a corresponding contempt for what Marx and Engels in the *Communist Manifesto* called the "idiotry of rural life." The peasant was to be recast in the mold of the urban worker. Rationality, science, and progress, defined in material terms, were to replace the static and traditionalist bias of the peasant world with its reliance on magic and religion.

According to Marx, all social and cultural phenomena were seen as a "superstructure" dependent on and largely shaped by the economic base of society. The government itself, literature, the arts, science, the means of communication, morality, religion, and the family all were either products of this base or the servants of those who controlled the means of production. In conformity with this doctrine, all existing institutions would either disappear or have to be radically changed as the economic base itself changed from a system of capitalist exploitation to one controlled by the proletariat.

As interpreted by Lenin, revolutionary Marxism held the promise of a paradise on earth. The new regime, as the precursor of a worldwide proletarian revolution, was "in step with history" and would lead the Soviet people to new greatness. Once the society was fully industrialized and all vestiges of capitalism were destroyed, the people would take over the going industrial plant and, as there would no longer be a need for repressive political controls, the state itself

would "wither away." A classless society would emerge, operating under the slogan "From each according to his ability, to each according to his needs."

The planning that became an essential part of the scheme of things after 1928 followed a period of much trial and error. Centralization of production inevitably brought into being a complex bureaucratic machinery. Rapid industrialization required broad integration of the economy and forced sacrifices on the part of the masses, who were considered not yet able or willing to think in terms of ultimate, common goals. Moreover, support of the new order was not universal and spontaneous, and resistance was not limited just to those who had been "in control of the means of production." Even "backward elements" among the industrial workers resisted. The real masses, the peasantry, were left relatively free at first but, as a result of the forced collectivization drive initiated by the First Five-Year Plan, they found themselves being reduced to a state as miserable as that from which they had begun to emerge.

Proceeding on the premise that its program must be pushed, whatever the resistance and the human toll, the regime developed an extensive police system to eliminate any possible disaffection or subversion. The political police enjoyed arbitrary and extralegal powers of arrest and conviction and thus became a source of terror for the majority of the people, despite their traditional acceptance of strong central authority. The regime also developed "mass participation" as a means of exerting constant social pressure on the people for increased industrial and agricultural production and for positive support of their policies. The withholding of approval because of apathy or indifference was interpreted by the authorities as hostility or even subversion.

Following the death of Stalin, a gradual relaxation of internal controls and pressures on the individual ensued, particularly after Khrushchev's denunciation at a closed party meeting of Stalin's excesses. The demands of an industrial society for order and predictability in life, as well as the emergence of an established upper class with a vested interest in the system and in the maintenance of its favored position, have tended to push the regime away from punitive, terroristic, and negative controls in favor of incentives, exhortation, and orderly legal procedures. The problem of when to have recourse to intimidation and when to adhere to legal methods has been a continual source of difficulty.

B. Structure and characteristics of the society (U/OU)

1. Ethnic composition

Although Russians comprise a majority of the Soviet population and are predominant in national life, the population of the U.S.S.R. is marked by striking ethnic and linguistic diversity. According to the Academy of Sciences, there are 169 different ethnic groups, or "nationalities," representing a number of basic racial or linguistic stocks. Twenty-two of these groups number in excess of 1 million (Figure 1). Most of the other groups are quite small, however, and are in the process, or face the eventual possibility, of being assimilated by a larger group, particularly the Russians.

Official regime policy has always been to enable all ethnic groups to achieve literacy in their own language and to promote their own culture within the framework laid down by the Communist Party. It has also been policy to convert all nationalities to Marxism and to attract members of all groups to the party. Cultural autonomy, as well as proportional representation for minorities in all-union political and social institutions, generally has served to alleviate tensions that could cause serious disruption within the nation. Moreover, potential leaders of the various ethnic communities continually are being lured by the advantages which conformity to Soviet norms offers, leaving the masses largely inarticulate.

The distribution of the various nationalities reveals that the Russians occupy primarily the heartland of the U.S.S.R., while the non-Russian groups are concentrated chiefly in borderland areas, primarily in union republics other than the R.S.F.S.R. (Figure 2). The western border area, from the Arctic coast southward, is inhabited mainly by Karelians, Estonians, Latvians, Lithuanians, Belorussians, Ukrainians, and Moldavians, with the major exception of Murmanskaya Oblast, the Lake Ladoga region, and Kaliningradskaya Oblast, which are predominantly Russian. The southern border region, from west to east, is occupied by Ukrainians along the northern coast of the Black Sea; Georgians, Armenians, Azerbaijani, and other smaller groups in the Caucasus region; and Turkmen, Uzbeks, Tadzhiks, Kirgiz, and Kazakhs in Central Asia. Along the Siberian-Chinese border, Russians predominate, but there are significant pockets of Altays, Tuvinians, and Buryats. Much of the Pacific coast area of Asiatic Russia and most of the Arctic littoral are inhabited,

FIGURE 1. Ethnic composition of the population (U/OU)

ETHNIC GROUP	POPULATION		PERCENT DISTRIBUTION		PERCENT CHANGE, 1959-70
	1959	1970	1959	1970	
--- Thousands ---					
Russian.....	114,114	129,015	54.6	53.4	13.1
Ukrainian.....	37,253	40,753	17.8	16.9	9.4
Uzbek.....	6,015	9,195	2.9	3.8	52.9
Belorussian.....	7,913	9,052	3.8	3.8	14.4
Tatar.....	4,968	5,931	2.4	2.4	19.4
Kazakh.....	3,622	5,299	1.7	2.2	46.3
Azerbaidzhani.....	2,940	4,380	1.4	1.8	49.0
Armenian.....	2,787	3,559	1.3	1.5	27.7
Georgian.....	2,692	3,245	1.3	1.3	20.5
Moldavian.....	2,214	2,698	1.0	1.1	21.9
Lithuanian.....	2,326	2,665	1.1	1.1	14.6
Jewish.....	2,268	2,151	1.1	0.9	-5.2
Tadzhik.....	1,397	2,136	0.7	0.9	52.9
German.....	1,620	1,846	0.8	0.8	14.0
Chuvash.....	1,470	1,694	0.7	0.7	15.2
Turkmen.....	1,002	1,525	0.5	0.6	52.2
Kirgiz.....	969	1,452	0.5	0.6	49.8
Latvian.....	1,400	1,430	0.7	0.6	2.1
Mordvin.....	1,285	1,263	0.6	0.5	-1.7
Bashkir.....	989	1,240	0.5	0.5	25.4
Polish.....	1,380	1,167	0.7	0.5	-15.4
Estonian.....	989	1,007	0.5	0.4	1.8
Other*.....	7,214	9,017	3.4	3.7	12.5
All groups.....	208,827	241,720	100.0	100.0	15.8

NOTE—A minus (-) sign denotes a decrease.

*Includes 147 officially distinct groups ranging in size in 1970 from 704,000 (Udmurts) down to a few hundred.

albeit sparsely, by the primitive peoples of the North, Siberia, and the Far East, interspersed with Russians.

Numbering 129 million in 1970, the Russians, or Great Russians, are by far the largest of Soviet ethnic groups. The second largest of the groups are the Ukrainians who, totaling nearly 41 million, are concentrated southwest of the Russians. North of the Ukrainians and west of the Russians are the Belorussians, or White Russians, who numbered slightly more than 9 million in 1970 and are the fourth largest ethnic community. The Russians, Ukrainians, and Belorussians are all of Slavic origin, speak closely related languages, were converted to Christianity in the 10th century, and trace their early history to the medieval principality known as Kiyevan Rus. All were overrun by the Mongol hordes in the 13th century, but thereafter the course of their histories diverged. Among Ukrainians in particular, this divergence has been reflected in a distinct national consciousness that separates them from the Russians and has not yet been erased despite continuing efforts of the regime. Other groups of Slavic peoples are also found in the U.S.S.R.

The largest of these are the Poles (1.2 million), of whom about half live in Lithuania or Belorussia and others in Kazakhstan. Additional Slavic peoples include Bulgars (351,000), Czechs (21,000), and Slovaks (12,000). All together, persons of Slavic origin accounted for three-fourths of the total Soviet population in 1970.

Aside from the Slavs, the largest bloc of nationalities is that comprised of Turkic-speaking peoples who, in the aggregate, make up about 13% of the population. These include, among others, the Uzbeks, Kazakhs, Kirgiz, and Turkmen of Central Asia; the Azerbaidzhani of the Caucasus; the Bashkirs, Chuvashes, and Tatars of the Volga valley; and the Tuvinians and Yakuts of Siberia. With few exceptions, e.g., the Chuvashes and the Yakuts, the Turkic-speaking peoples of the Soviet Union are Muslims. The Uzbeks, numbering 9.2 million in 1970, are the most numerous of the Turkic peoples and the third largest nationality in the country. Seven other Turkic groups number in excess of 1 million.




FIGURE 2. Location of ethnic groups (U/OU)

Unlike most of the other peoples of Central Asia, the Tadzhiks speak an Indo-European language that is akin to Persian. As of 1970, there were 2.1 million Tadzhiks, living in an area bordering on Afghanistan. Some other small related groups are found in the Pamirs and in the Caucasus.

A number of diverse peoples speaking languages that, with the exception of Armenian and Ossetian, have no known relationships to languages elsewhere in the world, inhabit part of the Caucasus, the region of hills and high mountains between the Black Sea and the Caspian Sea. Collectively, the term "Caucasian" has been applied to these peoples. The two most important Caucasian peoples are the Armenians and Georgians, who are culturally and racially but not linguistically related. Speaking an Indo-European tongue, the Armenians numbered 3.6 million persons in 1970 and are part of a larger group whose members live in other parts of the world, especially the United States and the Middle East. The Georgians totaled 3.2 million. Other Caucasian peoples include the Chechens, Ossetians (who speak an Indo-European tongue), Circassians (some known locally as Kabardians and others as Adighe), and Ingush, plus some 40 smaller groups living in the mountains, particularly in the remarkably diverse Dagestan, where there are no less than 30 different nationalities.

Among the non-Slavic peoples along the western border of the Soviet Union are the Moldavians, Lithuanians, Latvians, and Estonians. The Moldavians, who numbered 2.7 million in 1970, live in the area formerly known as Bessarabia, annexed from Romania in 1940. They are practically identical with Romanians and their language, a Romance tongue, is indistinguishable from Romanian except for the fact that it is now written in the Cyrillic alphabet rather than the Roman one. In 1970, an additional 119,000 persons identified themselves as Romanians.

Lithuanians and Latvians, numbering 2.7 million and 1.4 million, respectively, in 1970, comprise the majority ethnic communities in two of the three Baltic republics. They speak very old Indo-European languages. Along with Estonians, with whom they differ mainly linguistically, they are among the most Westernized of the Soviet peoples. The Estonians, totaling 1 million in 1970, occupy the northernmost of the Baltic republics. They speak a Uralic language akin to Finnish. Other Soviet peoples speaking Uralic tongues include the Mordvins (1.3 million), Udmurts (704,000), Mari (599,000), Komi (322,000), and such smaller groups as the Permyak, Karelians, and Finns. Most of these peoples live adjacent to or among the Russians, and most are rapidly being assimilated into the Russian majority.

A number of small groups speak Altaic tongues other than Turkic; these languages are believed to be distantly related to those of the Uralic peoples. Included among these small Altaic groups are the Kalmyks and Buryats, both Mongolian peoples. The former live in the steppes of the lower Volga, the latter in areas near Lake Baikal. Also classified as Altaic peoples are some of those whom Soviet authorities refer to as peoples of the North, Siberia, and the Far East. These include the Evenki, Eveny, Khanty, Mansi, Nentsy, and Nganasany. Other small groups of peoples of the North, Siberia, and the Far East are classified as Paleo-Siberian peoples and are among the least advanced of all Soviet residents. Principal among the Paleo-Siberians are the Chukchi, Koryak, and Nivkhi.

In addition to Poles, Bulgars, Moldavians (Romanians), and Finns, several other nationality groups are extensions of peoples residing in independent states outside the U.S.S.R. These include Germans, Jews, Greeks, and Hungarians. Within the Soviet Union, only the Germans and Jews are numerically important. The German community, numbering 1.8 million in 1970, represents the descendants of German immigrants of an earlier period. Prior to World War II, they were resident in the Ukraine, the North Caucasus, and along the Volga. Exiled to Central Asia and Siberia after the German attack in 1941, they now live scattered about the nation, but mainly in areas east of the Urals. The 2.1 million Jews reported in 1970 are mainly an urban people. Centers of Jewish population include Baku, Kharkov,¹ Kiev, Leningrad, Minsk, Moscow, Odessa, Riga, Rostov, Sverdlovsk, Tashkent, and Tiflis.

The total number of Russians increased slightly less rapidly during the 1959-70 intercensal period than the population as a whole and therefore the proportion of Russians in the total population declined. Nonetheless, Russians still constituted a majority (53.4%) of all Soviet peoples. The other two principal Slavic groups—the Ukrainians and Belorussians—also grew less rapidly than the total. Significant increases in the number and proportion of Kazakhs and other ethnic groups in the Central Asian republics bear witness to high growth rates in these areas.

Seven of the ethnic groups listed in the census results showed a decrease in number between 1959 and 1970. For five of these groups—Mordvins, Karelians, Finns, Czechs, and Slovaks—the numerical decrease was quite small and probably resulted from assimilation, high mortality among an aging group of people, or a

¹For diacritics on place names, see the list of names at the end of this chapter.

combination of these factors. The largest decrease shown was for Poles, who dropped by 213,000, or more than 15%. All the factors listed above, as well as emigration to Poland, probably were instrumental in this decline. The decline of 117,000, or 5.2%, in the number of Jews during the intercensal period is of particular note, given the continuing controversy over their status in Soviet society. Inasmuch as emigration of Jews during the 1950-69 period has been estimated at only 15,000, the most plausible explanation for the lower total in 1970 is assimilation or expediency.

An analysis of the 1970 ethnic composition of the constituent republics (Figure 3) shows that, with two exceptions, the basic group, i.e., the one for whom the republic is named, constituted a majority within the republic. In Kazakhstan and Kirgiziya, however, the basic group did not account for half the population, and in Kazakhstan there were more Russians than Kazakhs. The number of Russians increased during the intercensal period in all republics but Georgia. Outside the R.S.F.S.R., this increase was largest in the Ukraine (2,035,000), followed by that in Kazakhstan (1,550,000). Nonetheless, the proportion of the basic ethnic group decreased significantly in only two of the non-Russian republics. In Estonia, the proportion of Estonians in the total population declined from 74.6% in 1959 to 68.2% in 1970; in Latvia, the decline in the proportion of Latvians was from 62.0% to 56.8%. The decrease in both instances was the result not only of Russian in-migration, but also of the fact that the natural increase of the Russian minority in the two republics is higher than that of the indigenous ethnic group. Aside from these two exceptions, the proportion of the basic nationality in the various republics either declined by an insubstantial amount or actually increased. Even in the case of Kazakhstan, which experienced a heavy in-migration of Russians and other Slavs in the 1959-70 period, the proportion of Kazakhs in the population rose.

Two main factors explain the ability of most of the non-Russian republics to retain their ethnic identity in the face of in-migration by Slavs, especially Russians. The most important of these is the higher rate of natural increase among many non-Russian nationalities, as compared with that of the Russians. Even though large numbers of Russians have continued to migrate to republics other than the R.S.F.S.R., the frequently higher natural increase of the indigenous population, particularly the Turkic-speaking nationalities and the Armenians, has reduced or eliminated the effect of this in-migration. A second factor of importance in some republics has been the reinforcement of the basic ethnic group through

immigration from abroad. Since the 1959 census, for example, an estimated 75,000 to 100,000 Kazakhs and Uighurs have immigrated into Central Asia from the People's Republic of China, while 10,000 to 20,000 Armenians have moved into the Armenian S.S.R., primarily from the Middle East.

Russians are found in number in all of the union republics. The smaller ethnic groups in whose names republics have been established tend on the whole, to be less widely distributed. They are heavily concentrated, with one exception, in a single republic, sometimes lapping over into an adjacent republic. The Armenians, however, are remarkably dispersed for a nationality granted republic status. Whereas the other 14 such nationalities were listed in 1970 as having at least three-fourths of their numbers in their own national republic, only 62% of the U.S.S.R.'s Armenians lived in Armenia, with an additional 26% divided nearly evenly between Georgia and Azerbaijan, 8% living in the R.S.F.S.R., and smaller numbers in all other republics. Nonetheless, Armenia that year was far and away the most homogeneous republic in the Soviet Union, with 88.6% of its residents Armenian by nationality (Figure 4).

Most of the Russians who have migrated to traditionally non-Russian areas have moved to the major urban centers of these areas, as managerial, professional, and technical personnel or as trained industrial workers. In most non-Russian republics, Russians constitute a larger proportion of the population in the capital city than they do in the republic as a whole, reflecting the important administrative role Russians play throughout the U.S.S.R. Their position as the dominant nationality is particularly pointed up in Kazakhstan and the Central Asian republics, where in 1970 they comprised at least 48% of the population in each of the capitals.

Because ethnic identification usually is determined by mother tongue, it follows that the Soviet Union is a land of many languages, some of which are closely related and others totally dissimilar. Language families represented include Indo-European, Altaic, Uralic, and Caucasian. Despite the fact that two-fifths of the population speak a language other than Russian as their native tongue, Russian is by far the most important of Soviet languages. It is not only the language of the principal ethnic group, but it is also the official national language, the main language of higher education, and the language of communication between the various nationalities. Although most minority languages, under Soviet law, are granted equal status with Russian in areas where they are spoken, Russian has greater prestige and practical




FIGURE 3. Ethnic composition of the population, by republic, 1970 (U/OU)

importance. Nearly all well-educated minority persons speak it fluently, and a command of Russian is universally regarded as indispensable to political and social advancement. Among culturally developed minorities, such as the peoples of the Baltic republics, the Georgians, and the Armenians, wide use of Russian creates a certain friction, and even among less developed minorities, such as those of Central Asia, it has provoked a limited resistance. Minority languages are accorded equal status in many spheres, including law and public administration. Trials usually are conducted in the language spoken by the majority of the people of the area, and interpreters are supposed to be provided for those who cannot understand the language of the proceedings.

All together, 141.8 million Soviets claimed Russian as their mother tongue in 1970. Of these, 128.8 million were Russians and 13 million were members of other nationalities. Another 41.9 million persons were

reported as speaking the language "fluently," as a second tongue. Thus, Russian was the native language of 59% of the population and was spoken by 76%. The proportion of persons in the various non-Russian nationality groups who claimed Russian as their mother tongue provides some measure of the extent to which they have been assimilated into the Russian-dominated Soviet society. Using this criterion, the Jews are by far the most Russified, followed by the Poles. Knowledge of Russian as a second language varies substantially among the non-Russian minorities. In general, those peoples living near or among Russians are far more likely to know Russian than those in the more remote parts of the nation. Among the Kalmyks, for example, 81.1% of those for whom Russian was not their native tongue claimed in 1970 to speak it as a second language. In contrast, the proportion among Uzbeks was 14.5%.

FIGURE 4. Distribution of basic ethnic groups (U/OU)

ETHNIC GROUP	PERCENT OF TOTAL POPULATION OF OWN REPUBLIC	PERCENT OF TOTAL ETHNIC GROUP LIVING WITHIN OWN REPUBLIC
Russian.....	82.8	89.5
Ukrainian.....	74.9	87.0
Belorussian.....	81.0	80.5
Uzbek.....	64.7	84.1
Kazakh.....	52.4	78.5
Azerbaijani.....	73.3	86.2
Armenian.....	88.6	62.0
Georgian.....	66.8	96.5
Moldavian.....	64.6	85.4
Lithuanian.....	80.1	94.1
Tadzhik.....	56.2	76.3
Turkmen.....	65.6	92.9
Kirgiz.....	43.8	88.5
Latvian.....	56.8	98.8
Estonian.....	68.2	91.9

Although a knowledge of Russian is spreading throughout the population, the vitality of the minority languages is still strong. Among most of the large minority communities, at least 80% claimed the language of their nationality as their mother tongue. Major exceptions are the Jews and Poles and, to a lesser extent, the Germans and Bashkirs. Only 17.7% of the Jewish community in 1970 regarded Yiddish as their native language; only 32.5% of the Poles considered Polish as their mother tongue. In part, the low proportion among Jews reflects not only their assimilation to the Russian majority but also the refusal of Soviet authorities since 1948 to sanction the operation of Yiddish-language schools, notwithstanding constitutional stipulations guaranteeing each citizen the right to instruction in his native language. Primary schooling is provided in most indigenous languages, but secondary training is conducted only in the more important languages. The Soviet Government also supports the use of minority language by publishing newspapers, magazines, and books in these languages and by broadcasting in them. At the same time, almost all minority languages have undergone some degree of Russification. The Cyrillic alphabet is now used in all major languages except Estonian, Finnish, German, Latvian, Lithuanian, and Polish (which use Roman letters), Armenian and Georgian (which have unique scripts), and Yiddish (which uses Hebrew script). Words of foreign origin in minority languages have in many instances been purged and replaced with Russians words, and all minority languages have borrowed words from Russian.

Perhaps the most striking evidence of the ethnic and linguistic complexity of society is found in the marked physical diversity of the Soviet peoples. Long and complicated racial history has produced such diversity between and even within nationality groups, so that there is no such thing as a typical Soviet citizen or even a typical Russian. Representative inhabitants of the U.S.S.R. are shown in Figure 5.

2. Social structure

a. Social classes

In the early years of the Communist regime, the leadership called for the liquidation not only of the rich and the middle classes but also of all disparities ("contradictions") between urban and rural workers and economic differences and privileges which determine social classes. Although the ultimate goal of a "classless" society remains part of Communist theory, successive modifications concerning the means to achieve such a society have resulted in the continuation of disparities in the social structure. Thus, contemporary Soviet society tends to conform with other expanding, industrial societies, with social differentiations based on occupational groupings perpetuating the sort of distinction that traditionally has provided the basis for social classes.

A more distinctive feature of Soviet society is the existence of two additional social differentiations which cut across or merge with essentially occupational groupings. The more important of these is the unequal division of the population into party and nonparty members. The second is the distinction between Russians and non-Russians, which places Russians in the positions with the highest pay, privileges, and political power in all areas of the U.S.S.R.

The persistence of social classes has conflicted with the regime's ideological commitment to a classless society. Thus, the regime has repeatedly had to modify ideology to bring it into partial accord with reality. While its goal is a society guided by the principle "From each according to his ability, to each according to his needs," the regime claims that in building communism Soviet society must continue to be governed by the maxim "From each according to his ability, to each according to his work." As the work of various groups, such as peasants and urban workers, differs, so does their reward in terms of lifestyle, responsibility, and power.

Differences in society because of wages, membership in influential organizations, particular types of employment, education, native intelligence, ethnic

FIGURE 5. Representative Soviet citizens (U/OU)





Uzbek



Tadzhik



Kirgiz



Yakut

origin, or religion are not considered by Soviet theorists to be evidence of social exploitation or to be sufficient in themselves to demarcate "antagonistic" social classes. It is sufficient for them that all the traditional "exploiting" classes—that is, the nobility and bourgeoisie—have been eliminated. Communist theorists do, however, recognize two "nonantagonistic" classes, the workers and the peasants, and one "stratum," the intelligentsia. According to Communist theory, although each of these groups has a different status within the system, they are interconnected through coownership of the most important means of production. In terms of the three officially recognized groups in society, the Soviet population consists of 20% intelligentsia, including white-collar workers; 20% peasants, including state farm workers; and 60% workers. Figure 6 details the development of the new class structure of Soviet society, as interpreted by Soviet statistics.

The worker and peasant classes can each be subdivided into three groups. Those in the upper group of workers are the most highly skilled; they more or less consistently overproduce their quotas. Members of this group receive higher base pay, special awards from the regime, special vacation leave, and other bonuses. In terms of prestige and economic position, they overlap the lower reaches of the white-collar group in the intelligentsia. The majority of workers, however, are semiskilled. This large group shades off into the unskilled, a relatively unproductive group of workers estimated to make up 20% of the work force. Most of these, earning a minimal wage, are new

FIGURE 6. Class composition of the population (U/OU) (Percent)

CLASS	1913	1939	1959	1972
Workers.....	14.6	33.5	49.5	59.8
Employees.....	2.4	16.7	18.8	20.9
Collective farm peasants and members of craftsmen's cooperatives..	47.2	31.4	19.3	
Individual peasants and craftsmen.	66.7	2.6	0.8	...
Bourgeoisie, landowners, merchants, and large-scale farmers.....	16.3	
... Not pertinent.				

arrivals in the urban work force and frequently have completed only a minimum education.

At least a few peasants are relatively well-to-do and form the upper group of the peasantry. However, the per capita annual income for the collective farm peasantry ranks the more prosperous members of this group only slightly above the low-paid unskilled workers and not above the semiskilled. The more prosperous peasants have achieved their position through membership in a collective farm that has been exceptionally fortunate in terms of kind and amount of crops, fertility of land, and location. Some peasants on less favored farms may, through skill or development of "model farm practices," achieve the higher income and official recognition that will place them in the prosperous group. Transitional between the prosperous collective farm peasantry and the semiskilled industrial workers are the state farm peasants, who share the rural way of life with the collective farm workers but are paid wages by the state for their labor instead of depending on the vagaries of nature and consumer demand. The bulk of the rural work force, however, is lower on the social and economic scale than almost any industrial worker. Still further down the scale are the few remaining independent peasant farmers.

While the regime prefers to lump together a great many occupational and status positions under the rubric "intelligentsia," this group can be subdivided into an elite, a traditional intelligentsia, and a white-collar group. With the exception of the elite, which owes its position to the possession of political power, divisions within the intelligentsia are determined by such factors as income, education, type of employment, and a system of privileges and bureaucratic rank. Ethnic considerations are not of fundamental importance, although Russians are more heavily represented in the higher ranks. Nor are the 14.7 million Communist Party members guaranteed a privileged position in society, although party

membership is an important prerequisite for advancement.

White-collar workers comprise the largest group in the intelligentsia stratum; they include a variety of nonmanual workers, descending from petty bureaucrats, through accountants and bookkeepers, technicians and teachers, down to ordinary clerks and salesgirls. Although the regime, for internal propaganda purposes, persists in lumping the white-collar group with the political elite and the traditional intelligentsia as a means of blurring the privileged group within the general population, the workers and peasants generally distinguish between the two higher groups and the ordinary white-collar workers. This latter group is broad not only in diversity of occupation but also in range of salary. The average salary is only slightly above the industrial worker's level, but a few earn an income as much as 10 times that amount. Members of this group have little in common, save a desire to maintain their position in Soviet society; to do so many belong to the party or to the Komsomol, the official youth organization.

The traditional intelligentsia includes those occupying the upper and middle ranks in the party, government, economy, and military; most scientists, artists, and writers, engineers, managers of industrial enterprises, heads of collective and state farms, and others in responsible administrative positions; and those, regardless of their occupation, who are well educated. To some extent these groups form exclusive, strongly hierarchical castes along with some members of the white-collar group in the same line of employment. Thus, occupational group loyalties apart from general class distinction are engendered. Those belonging to the traditional intelligentsia are well paid, with earnings averaging five to 10 times the average worker's wage, but rank and privilege are probably even more important considerations. Within this group the proportion belonging to the Communist Party is high. Members of the traditional intelligentsia, a majority of whom have had a higher education, are well rewarded because their capabilities are in great demand and their allegiance is essential for the regime's continued existence. Yet members of this group are not free from censure in instances of poor performance or undesirable political tendencies, and they must bear the brunt of recurrent criticism in politics, the arts, and sciences.

The elite, numbering approximately 10,000 persons, is composed of the top party officials, senior government, economic, and military officials, and prominent scientists, artists, and writers. The elite is sharply differentiated from other Soviet groups, and

there is little overlapping with the traditional intelligentsia. Despite the elite's predominance in authority, rank, and responsibilities, however, its remuneration and privileges are not much greater than that of the traditional intelligentsia. The elite shares with the intelligentsia the various perquisites attached to their positions, such as priority in housing, medical care in special clinics and accommodations in the best sanatoriums, access to special stores and restaurants, and special opportunities for family members.

Entry into the elite is difficult. Entrants must combine ruthlessness, great drive and ambition, ability in some specialty, and at least some capacity for scheming and maneuvering. Connections are also important, as many individuals rise to the top as proteges of one high official or another. The educational level of the elite is high, usually consisting of technical training. This education, however, has not been sufficiently broad to provide less intellectually gifted members of the elite with the critical ability to distinguish dogma and stereotypes from reality when making decisions. Despite their different activities, members of the elite belong to the party—a fact which tends to insure uniformity of interest and outlook and deters the development of particularistic interests counter to those of the top party leaders.

Notwithstanding the leap which must be made to pass from the peasantry or working class into the intelligentsia, or from one layer in the intelligentsia into another, the Soviet social system is more fluid than that of prerevolutionary Russia. Individuals have greater opportunity to move up the social ladder on the basis of demonstrated political and technical merit. In the early days of the regime, this mobility derived from the fluid revolutionary situation and was continued by the rapid expansion and growth of the industrial sector of the economy. This social mobility proved a great source of strength to the regime, as people rising into the intelligentsia and the upper echelons of the working class had a stake in maintaining the system that provided them positions inconceivable under prerevolutionary conditions. The presence of officials, scientists, and artists of peasant and working-class background, even though their actual number is exaggerated by the regime, demonstrates to the Soviet citizenry that individual productive, political, and administrative abilities can receive recognition.

The higher the individual rises in the social structure, however, the greater the possibility that the current may suddenly reverse and drag him down, possibly below where he started. The vulnerability associated with high positions has been known to deter

some talented individuals from aspiring to them. Thus the party must actively seek out individuals with proficiency as technicians and leaders. This seeking out of potential leaders is a twofold process reinforcing the system. The capable are mobilized to serve the interests of the regime and are assured proper recognition, while those who are talented but refuse to join the party become suspect.

The early egalitarian philosophy of the party stressed equal opportunity for both men and women, another avenue for mobility opened by the Communists. On the basis of occupation, working women theoretically are accorded the same position in the social structure as men. There have been instances, however, where job ratings have been manipulated extralegally so that professional women are paid somewhat less than men engaged in the same work. Most working women are in agricultural, manufacturing, and other semiskilled or unskilled jobs. Nonmanual workers among women seem to be in relatively "safe" and lower paid jobs—as is the tradition in the United States—such as teaching, nursing, bookkeeping, and secretarial work. The major exception to this is in medicine, where nearly three-fourths of the physicians are women; even in this field, however, the top positions are usually held by men. Whether by their own choice or by official policy, women are generally excluded from superior party posts and other positions notably high in vulnerability.

While it is questionable that widespread class consciousness has taken root again in the U.S.S.R., there exists an awareness of and preoccupation with social differences among the population. Each class has its distinguishing marks which make it an identifiable target to others, and these visible distinctions reflect deeper differences in social viewpoint and lifestyle. Each class, in addition, has its own problems, and to some extent other classes in society are seen as either creating these problems or failing to mitigate them.

Since the death of Stalin, the regime has adopted a number of measures to counteract hardening class lines and to reduce growing economic differences. Thus, secondary school tuition fees have been abolished, taxes in the lower income brackets reduced, and the annual compulsory bond subscription drives eliminated. Minimum wages have risen, as have payments to collective farmers, while the wages of the upper income groups have risen less sharply. A general increase in pensions has benefited lower income groups chiefly. Yet, despite these measures, the gap between income extremes remains wide.

Education remains the principal means of surmounting social and occupational barriers. To avoid the danger of developing a permanent and closed elite, but at the same time to meet the need for an army of technicians to staff the ever larger and more complex economy, the regime has made several efforts to expand the educational opportunities available to the nation's youth. Khrushchev in particular attacked preferential schooling assignments based on parental influence rather than on merit and also the marked underrepresentation of students from worker and peasant families in higher educational institutions. The 1958 school reform, in addition to making available some financial aid, provided for an expansion of correspondence and part-time schools to give worker and peasant youths a better opportunity to continue their education. The academic standards in these schools were not equivalent to those in full-time schools, however, and their graduates remained at a disadvantage in competition with students from full-time schools for admission to higher educational institutions. The 1958 reform also made some effort to restore balance among applicants by requiring 2 years of work in production for all but the top fifth of applicants to higher educational institutions. After persistent criticism that these innovations lowered academic standards, the regime dropped the 2-year work requirement and substituted a percentage distribution in admissions among graduates of full-time secondary schools, production workers, and demobilized servicemen. Despite these efforts to increase social mobility, the children of the upper classes still enjoy an advantage by virtue of their parents' higher income, more cultured home background, favorable geographical location, and personal influence and connections.

b. Family

The most distinguishing feature of the Soviet family is its subordination to and circumscription by the state. Fostered materially by low living levels, such dependency also reflects a real need to remain on good terms with regime authorities, particularly in the areas of housing, employment, and higher education. Otherwise, the behavior patterns of most Soviet families resemble those of their counterparts in industrialized Western European countries.

Significant variations, however, occur in the relative values which the various Soviet peoples attach to the family as an institution. The Central Asian family, for example, with its respect for religious sanctions, emphasis on perpetuation of the male line, and extension of family relationships into political and

economic life, contrasts sharply with the modern Russified family among whom, as in Western countries, family ties have been attenuated and family influence has waned.

The regime follows a nationwide policy of remaking the family according to revolutionary theory which holds that members owe primary allegiance to the state rather than to each other. To achieve this objective the regime uses all the powers at its command, including legislation, police control, education, and propaganda. In many areas, rapid urbanization and industrialization have tended to accomplish the same end, drawing youths out of the family at an early age, reducing the family size, and splitting the family structure into its smallest unit, the nuclear family. In addition, because many women work outside the home to supplement a meager income, many child-rearing functions have been taken over by state nurseries, kindergartens, and schools.

Early Soviet legislation governing marriage and the family was motivated by the Marxist mandate to destroy the family as an instrument of "bourgeois exploitation," as well as by the practical consideration of minimizing parental influence potentially unsympathetic to regime control. Indeed, decrees altering marriage and divorce codes were issued before the Bolsheviks were firmly established and preceded the separation of church and state, the definition of the rights and duties of local soviets, and many other measures vitally important to a new government struggling for survival.

The most complete embodiment of early Soviet policy toward the family was contained in the 1926 code. Under this legislation, control of marriage and divorce was removed from the family and church and placed under the jurisdiction of the state. Marriage became a simple procedure of registering with the Government Civil Registry Office (ZAGS), while any change in family status could be reported to ZAGS by mail, a convenience that led to a rash of postcard divorces in European Russia. Furthermore, persons living together who wished to omit the formality of a registry marriage could do so without censure and could legalize their relationship retroactively at any time. Children born out of wedlock were granted the same rights as other children. Legal resources were provided the mother to establish paternity and to force the father to contribute to the child's support. In addition, the code legalized abortion, making it free of charge at government hospitals. Other provisions included the right of a wife to a joint interest in property accumulated during married life.

By the 1930's the regime perceived that its success in weakening family ties had resulted in a number of detrimental and unforeseen side effects, including a falling birth rate, a rising divorce rate, and disrespect among youth for all authority. Changing course, the state denounced the free, unbound socialist family as "leftist deviationism" and returned to the ideal of a disciplined, stable family. Marriage was declared a solemn affair. Registry offices were made more attractive, and the manufacture of wedding rings was revived.

By the same token, divorce was made more expensive and more difficult. In 1936, higher divorce fees were established, and penalties of up to 2 years' imprisonment for nonpayment of alimony were instituted. Abortion was outlawed. The 1944 family code introduced greater stringency. Divorce could no longer be obtained by simple registration but only through extended, expensive court action. Unregistered marriages were no longer recognized, and children born out of wedlock were not entitled to inherit on equal terms with legitimate children. Furthermore, a mother wishing to prove the paternity of an illegitimate child was denied the use of the courts, although the government supplied minimal assistance until the child reached age 12.

Following World War II, the wave of reaction against liberal family policies subsided, and the regime began to pursue a more moderate course. In 1955, in view of popular feeling favoring abortion, the 1936 law was repealed, and abortions for other than medical reasons were again legalized if performed in hospitals under state supervision. In 1965, following long years of public complaint the divorce laws were amended to make the proceedings less costly and less time consuming. Although unregistered marriages did not regain full legal status, in 1968 provision was made for children born to couples living together for an extended period to claim inheritance. Court paternity suits were again allowed and, if successful, the father was expected to contribute to the child's support.

Emphasis on the large, stable family remains, however. Since 1944 the regime has extended financial and social aid to the family, at the same time penalizing the childless, whether married or not, by taxation. With the birth of the third child, the family receives a lump-sum payment, and monthly allowances begin with the fourth child. Employed mothers receive liberal maternity benefits, and mothers of large families are honored with medals and orders glorifying motherhood. On the other hand, leading a loose moral life and shirking family responsibility are grounds for expulsion from the party.

According to the 1970 census, 72% of all Soviet men age 16 and older were married; the comparable proportion for women was 58%. Because of the shortage of men, sizable numbers of women over age 30 have been unable to marry; additionally, because women outlive men and because of huge losses of men during World War II, there are many widows in the older ages. As revealed by the census, the average woman marries between the ages of 20 and 25, while the average man weds between 25 and 30. In 1959, the latest date for which data are available, family size averaged 3.7 persons (3.5 in urban areas and 3.9 in rural areas). The 1970 census figures, when available, are expected to show a slight decrease in family size, despite regime efforts to encourage large families. Indeed, the number of children appears to vary inversely with family status, the more affluent families tending to restrict the number of children and use their resources to improve living levels. In 1970, the divorce rate was 2.6 per 1,000 population.

Within the family the parents' mandate to govern their children comes not from the fact of procreation but from the government, which assigns them responsibility for rearing citizens loyal to the state. Through its representatives in the party, trade unions, or schools, the regime may intervene in a child's upbringing and will hold the parents responsible if the child misbehaves, does not do well in school, or makes deviationist statements. As a result, instead of stressing religious principles and traditional virtues, parents are inclined to foster caution in social relations and actions and to point out the importance of a successful career and material rewards. Pragmatic adjustment to regime authority is considered prudent. Although ideological flexibility and political conformity are emphasized, blind obedience to authority, which the regime would like to have instilled, is not an objective of family training. It is considered enough to teach the child to stay out of trouble. Aware that school officials may elicit information on parental attitudes from their children, parents generally avoid political discussions in the home or any open expression of dissatisfaction with conditions or with regime policies.

Since the traditional authority of the father has been transferred to officials of the schools and the party, parents no longer seem to expect the obedience and solidarity that once characterized the Russian family. Despite regime propaganda that parents must be strict, they seem to have intensified loving relationships with their children as their authority has waned. Because parents are nevertheless responsible for the acts and thoughts of their offspring, greater emphasis is placed on the relationship between

husband and wife as the only refuge for the free, confidential expression of ideas.

3. Values and attitudes

The role of the individual in Soviet society is prescribed in detail by the party which establishes social norms, values, and standards of morality to be followed in all areas of life. The ideal citizen is the "new Soviet man" who, having shed all encumbering traditions, places the interests of the state above those of himself and his family. He is unquestioningly devoted to the tenets of Marxism-Leninism and gives unstintingly of his time and energy to further the Communist cause. At the same time he is disciplined, obedient, temperate, puritanical in conduct, and steady in mood.

Although the party has secured a measure of surface conformity to this ideal, personal interest often motivates actions contrary to the general welfare as defined by the regime. Laws restricting private enterprise are often violated, and workers and peasants frequently indulge in speculative buying and selling. The crime rate may be rising. A constant propaganda barrage exhorting the people to be patriotic and obey the law belies the party's assertion that the people wholeheartedly support its program.

The state discourages alternative loyalties to churches, geographic regions, and friendship groups, unless sanctioned by the party. Organizational ties allowed and encouraged are those to such instrumentalities of the state and party as the Komsomol, trade unions, cooperatives, civil defense and sports groups, and assorted cultural, professional, and technical societies. The general frustration of the Russians' natural gregariousness and the rigid control imposed by the state have left their mark. Despite outward conformity, many individuals struggle to preserve some shred of personal independence. Often the struggle is manifested by escapist and "antisocial" attitudes and behavior, including drunkenness, a liking for foreign clothes and fads, and attraction to "decadent" forms of entertainment. On a higher level, many are preoccupied with the past and with scientific and technical occupations as little concerned with politics and ideology as possible. In all segments of Soviet society most citizens want only to be left alone to live their lives in peace, rear their families, work at their jobs, and enjoy recreation and the company of friends with minimum involvement in state and party affairs.

Traditional values among Russians, Ukrainians, and Belorussians were formed historically under the strong influence of the teachings of the Orthodox

Church, a predominantly rural economy, and an authoritarian political system unsoftened by traditional West European humanistic values. Peasant mentality was marked by fatalism, patience, and obedience and was generally weak in the spirit of individual initiative and competitiveness. Upon this framework the Marxist-Leninist ethic has been imposed with widely differing degrees of success in rural and urban areas, among economic classes, and among different ethnic groups. Rural areas have been less affected by industrialization and official indoctrination through the years. Therefore, although the peasant seems to live the least satisfying life, usually below the economic level of the average industrial worker, old traditions continue to persist in the rural areas. He is the farthest removed from the system and the least concerned with the absence of civil liberties, material comforts, and job potential or satisfaction.

For generations the peasant had little hope of improving his position, and the wealthy person had little fear of losing his. Consequently there was no incentive for exceptional effort on the part of the individual. The state has set out to change these characteristics of lethargy and passivity by encouraging all to work diligently and demonstrate initiative in all fields but politics. Exhortation, education, economic and social rewards, contrived competition, and even legal penalties have been used to reshape the Soviet citizen into the "new Soviet man." Despite this effort, passive obedience, devoid largely of enthusiasm, characterizes the outlook of most Soviet people. Although they seem to have an extraordinary capacity for hardship, and take pride in the amount of personal discomfort they can bear, they have grown adept at avoiding cumbersome bureaucracy by *na levo* methods, meaning "to the left" or indirectly. They are painfully aware of the imperfections and inequalities in Soviet society, and yet they fundamentally do not seem to be opposed to authoritarian rule.

Although most workers accept the Communist ideology and the Soviet industrial system, there is a wide divergence in attitude among industrial workers as a result of the official policy of significant base pay differentials and other rewards. Those in positions of authority and responsibility within the regime demonstrate the greatest support, and those more distant from the source of power, the least. Skilled workers tend to be more favorably disposed to the regime, have more hopes and ambitions for self-improvement, and derive more satisfaction from their work than do unskilled workers.

Similarly the bulk of the intelligentsia reflects this group's generally favorable position in Soviet society. In return for secure material position, intellectuals, for the most part, are disposed to accept a system which subordinates the individual to the state. Yet it is in this privileged class that much of present-day Soviet dissatisfaction is concentrated. The regime has been successful in isolating dissenters from the rest of the population, but not in preventing new outbursts. Most recent were two brilliant indictments of the political system by Andrei Amalrik, "Will the Soviet Union Survive Until 1984" and "Involuntary Journey to Siberia." Amalrik has since been tried and imprisoned for "disseminating falsehoods derogatory to the Soviet state and social system."

What enthusiasm or devotion exists among national, as opposed to social, groupings seems confined largely to the dominant Russians. Occasionally, however, they may experience ambivalent feelings toward the regime, but they remain unequivocally loyal to the nation. Alienation in attitudes appears to proceed by degree from resentment among the culturally conservative, but less developed ethnic groups in Central Asia and Siberia, to ill-disguised hostility among the culturally developed non-Russian minorities in the Baltic republics and the Caucasus.

Ethnic tensions exist between the various nationalities of the Soviet Union, but except for anti-Semitism they are given little publicity and are usually kept under control. Nevertheless, these tensions present a serious problem to the regime. Among the more notable examples of hostility are the Balts' hatred for the Russians and the mutual antipathy between Georgians and Armenians. For their part, Russians tend to be condescending toward all other ethnic minorities, particularly the non-Slavic peoples. Proud of their culture, their mutual advances in the face of a harsh climate and foreign hostility, and the present Soviet position of influence in world politics, the Russians consider fitting the role assigned them in Soviet doctrine as the "elder brother" of all the other Soviet peoples. Even so, some privately admit to feelings of cultural inferiority to the Baltic peoples.

Russian nationalism has received varying degrees of official encouragement ever since the early 1930's, with the aim of counterbalancing minority nationalisms and the stresses imposed by the stratified social system. At the end of World War II, the Russians were officially recognized as having made the largest contribution to victory. The histories of the minority peoples have subsequently been rewritten to show that their contact with the Russians brought

them to a higher civilization and a better way of life. This indeed is a far cry from the Soviet propaganda of the 1920's, which condemned such "Great Russian chauvinism" as a tsarist device to keep down the minority peoples. Since the death of Stalin, the government has tended to play down Russian nationalism in the hope of preventing any spontaneous development which could promote anti-Soviet feelings. Instead, the concept of Russian cultural hegemony has been enunciated more subtly and skillfully, with greater emphasis on the alleged common desire of all Soviet people to build a new Communist society.

The attitude of the public toward people of other societies and cultures has been conditioned by Soviet propaganda, which claims that the capitalist states are unalterably opposed to the U.S.S.R. and represent a threat, even though they are a "dying" political form. This propaganda, while creating many misconceptions, does not seem to have instilled hostility among Soviet citizens toward most foreigners as such. This may partly be a result of their acceptance of the distinction Soviet propagandists have always made between the "clique of capitalists and militarists" ruling a foreign nation and that nation's "oppressed and poverty-stricken common people." At the same time the official line that only under the Communist system are people free has gained some credence because of the relative isolation of the Soviet citizen and his resulting ignorance of the rest of the world.

The popular attitude toward most European peoples is colored to a certain extent by traditional prejudices. The Poles, for example, are generally regarded by the Russians with distaste, if not contempt, and have been for centuries. This antipathy toward the sister Slavic state tends to be shared by the Ukrainians and Belorussians. Likewise, all three Eastern Slavic peoples tend to hold similar attitudes toward the Germans, with hostile feelings somewhat more marked among the Russians. Generally, there is respect for the Germans' presumed orderliness, technical efficiency, and ingenuity and dislike for their supposed pettiness, meanness, and pedantry. Since World War II these basic attitudes have been expanded to include respect for the efficiency, fighting quality, and might of a German army, and awe mixed with fear at the barbarities Germans demonstrated themselves capable of committing. Many Russians distinguish between "good" and "bad" Germans, and these categories are applied both to the Communist East and capitalist West Germans. As for the other peoples of Central and Eastern Europe, popular attitudes are ambivalent, ranging from mild

friendliness to apathy. Although most Soviet citizens are satisfied that their nation's ties to the Communist countries of Eastern Europe demonstrate that the U.S.S.R. is not isolated in the world, many doubt the durability of the loyalty of these nations in the event of war.

Despite more than 50 years of propaganda describing the "spiritual decadence" and predatory, anti-Soviet designs of the major Western capitalist countries, the present attitude of the great bulk of the Soviet peoples toward them seems to be a compound of admiration, apprehension, arrogance and pride, and, in varying degrees, a sense of inferiority. The Soviet people are impressed by the material progress of these nations, sensitive to their own country's shortcomings, and resentful of suggestions that they are in some ways a "backward" people. There is a fairly pervasive feeling that the U.S.S.R. represents a moral and spiritual force superior to the materialistic states of the West, and Soviet propaganda appeals to this feeling when it stresses the bizarre and alarming in its treatment of the affluent, consumer-oriented United States.

Nevertheless, a generally friendly attitude toward Americans persists among the people. This attitude exists partly because of the earlier geographical remoteness of the two nations and consequent lack of traditional conflicts of interest and partly because of the historical image of the United States as a haven for political refugees and a land of opportunity. Acts of friendship and collaboration, such as U.S. famine relief in the 1920's, and the alliance and Lend-Lease program during World War II, have also contributed to U.S. popularity. After World War II, the Soviet regime went to great lengths to destroy this legacy of good will, and during the Korean War it charged the United States with aggression, bacteriological warfare, and Nazi-style atrocities. Following Stalin's death and the end of the war in Korea, anti-U.S. propaganda subsided, but with the development and expansion of the war in Indochina it revived. Soviet society, however, is no longer as inaccessible as it was in Stalin's day. A cultural exchange program with the United States has been in effect since 1958, and American tourism is encouraged. The resulting sporadic personal contacts between individual Soviet and U.S. citizens, as well as the occasional U.S. exhibits in various cities of the U.S.S.R., limited as they are, have helped to correct, at least partially, some Soviet misconceptions.

The popular attitude toward the non-Western peoples of Africa, Asia, and the Middle East ranges from tolerance to condescension. The technical

backwardness of these countries is attributed to capitalist exploitation of these countries and neglect by reactionary, feudal rulers, and the picture of the peoples of these areas struggling to become masters in their own house has aroused some sympathy. Underlying such empathy, however, is a certain ambivalence. An increasing number of Africans, Arabs, and other third world peoples have taken up residence in the U.S.S.R. for work, training, or study. The Soviet people's reaction toward them has been decidedly negative, their attitudes paralleling those of Western Europeans exposed to an influx of "uncultured" aliens. Russians traditionally have been suspicious of Orientals, considering them untrustworthy and unreliable. As the People's Republic of China has come into its own, the popular attitude has developed into a mixture of fascination and growing anxiety. This anxiety appears to have increased as the rift between Moscow and Peking has deepened, expressing itself in the reality of public polemics and the possibility of military conflict.

Like other European peoples who fought World War II on their home ground, the Soviet people are anxious for their leaders to avoid war. In contrast to its earlier touting of the ideological premise of a hostile capitalist world, full of oppressed workers waiting impatiently to be liberated and set on the path of communism, the regime now prefers to present itself to the world and its own people as the leading exponent of peace and the creator of a peace bloc among nations. The Soviet people have responded to this line more positively than to ideological messianism, and it would be difficult for the regime to whip up enthusiasm for an openly aggressive war. In view of the vivid memories of the last war's terrible suffering and privation, as well as evidence of collaboration between some of the minority peoples and the enemy, there is even some question whether tried-and-true appeals along the line of "the motherland in danger" or "the yellow peril" would evoke a uniformly favorable response.

C. Population (U/OU)

With an estimated 249,962,000 inhabitants as of mid-1973, the Soviet Union is the third most populous nation in the world, ranking behind the People's Republic of China and India, but with nearly 40 million more residents than the United States. The population as of mid-1973 represented an increase of slightly more than 8 million over the 241.7 million reported by the census of 15 January 1970, and 41 million more than the 208.8 million enumerated in 1959.




FIGURE 7. Vital rates (U/OU)

Emigration and immigration being negligible, population growth in the U.S.S.R. is due almost wholly to natural increase. As in many European countries, in the Soviet Union the population had a spurt of growth in the immediate post-World War II years, followed by a period of rapid increase throughout the 1950's. By the early 1960's, however, the rate had begun to decline (Figure 7). In 1969, the rate of natural increase was 8.9 per 1,000 population, just half the level of 17.8 per 1,000 reported for 1960. It rose slightly in the years 1970-71 and will probably continue to rise during the remainder of the 1970's as a consequence of the entry into the prime childbearing ages of large cohorts of women born during the 1950's, but to a level far below that achieved in the late 1950's.

If fertility remains constant at the 1971 level, the total population of the U.S.S.R. is projected to be about 320 million on 1 January 2000, an increase of 70 million over the total estimated for 1 July 1973. If fertility declines, as it has over the past decade, the total is projected to be between 292 million and 306 million at the beginning of 2000. Under either assumption, the excess of females over males will continue to decline, and the population will slowly reflect an increase in the older age groups.

The most significant factor in the decline in the rate of natural increase during the 1960's was the decrease

in the number of births. The birth rate was fairly stable in the 1950's, and in 1960, the year of the peak number of births, stood at 24.9 per 1,000 population. Reflecting the declining number of births in the 1960's, the birth rate dropped by nearly a third—to 17.0 in 1969. For 1970, it was 17.4 and for 1971, 17.8. Of the two components of the rate of natural increase, the death rate has changed less since 1950 than the birth rate. Starting at the relatively low level of 9.7 per 1,000 population in that year, the crude death rate dropped to a low of 6.9 in 1964, then gradually increased to 8.2 in 1970—a decline of 15.5% over the 20-year period. It remained at 8.2 in 1971. The rise in the death rate since 1964 has been due to the aging of the population and to an increase in mortality rates for males in all age groups 25 and above.

Vital rates for the republics (Figure 8) offer clear evidence of the widely different patterns of population growth within the country. With the exception of Estonia and Latvia, where death rates are high because of the older age structure of the population, variations in the death rate among the republics are not great, and significant differences in the rate of natural increase result mainly from differences in birth rates. In 1971, the highest crude birth rate was reported for the Tadzhik S.S.R. (36.8 per 1,000 population). This rate was over twice the national rate and nearly 2 1/2 times the rates for the R.S.F.S.R., the Ukraine, and Latvia. Unlike the birth rates for all other republics, moreover, the Tadzhik rate did not decline between 1960 and 1971, but actually increased

FIGURE 8. Vital rates, by republic (U/OU)
(Per 1,000 population)

REPUBLIC	BIRTH RATE		DEATH RATE		RATE OF NATURAL INCREASE	
	1960	1971	1960	1971	1960	1971
R.S.F.S.R.....	23.2	15.1	7.4	8.7	15.8	6.4
Ukrainian S.S.R.....	20.5	15.4	6.9	8.9	13.6	6.5
Belorussian S.S.R.....	24.5	16.4	6.6	7.5	17.9	8.9
Uzbek S.S.R.....	39.9	34.5	6.0	5.4	33.9	29.1
Kazakh S.S.R.....	36.7	23.8	6.5	6.0	30.2	17.8
Georgian S.S.R.....	24.7	19.0	6.5	7.4	18.2	11.6
Azerbaijan S.S.R.....	42.6	27.7	6.7	6.5	35.9	21.2
Lithuanian S.S.R.....	22.5	17.6	7.8	8.5	14.7	9.1
Moldavian S.S.R.....	29.2	20.2	6.4	7.7	22.8	12.5
Latvian S.S.R.....	16.7	14.7	10.0	11.0	6.7	3.7
Kirgiz S.S.R.....	36.8	31.6	6.1	7.0	30.7	24.6
Tadzhik S.S.R.....	33.5	36.8	5.1	5.7	28.4	31.1
Armenian S.S.R.....	40.3	22.6	6.8	4.9	33.5	17.7
Turkmen S.S.R.....	42.4	34.7	6.5	6.7	35.9	28.0
Estonian S.S.R.....	16.6	16.0	10.5	10.9	6.1	5.1
U.S.S.R.	24.9	17.8	7.1	8.2	17.8	6.6

slightly. In general, rates for the Central Asian republics were much higher than those for other republics, and they fell less rapidly during the 1960's than those for the western and Transcaucasian republics.

The decreasing rate of population growth has induced concern on the part of Soviet planners, scholars, and the general public. Numerous studies have shown that the fertility behavior of Soviet women increasingly is being affected by factors operating to lower the number of children desired. These factors include urbanization, industrialization, increased demand for more education, greater participation in political, economic, and cultural activities, and the shortage of housing. The ready availability of abortion and the increasing availability of contraceptives have made it fairly easy for Soviet women to control births and accommodate to these new patterns of life. A nationwide survey in 1969 revealed the ideal number of children desired by Soviet women averaged 2.89; the range by republic varied from 2.60 for Latvia and 2.69 for the R.S.F.S.R. to 4.55 for Uzbekistan.

Although consideration is being given to the question of instituting a pronatalist population policy, to date explicit actions by the government relating to population policy have been limited, and there is no clear outline of a conscious and defined policy. Such action as has been taken relates to abortion and a system of allowances and awards to mothers with large families. Abortion, legal in 1920-36 and again since 1955, is available on request, and one estimate in 1968 placed the number of legal abortions at 6 million per year, a figure substantially higher than the number of births. Soviet medical authorities openly comment on abortion's harmful consequences on the health of women and they campaign to reduce its incidence, but it appears that abortion is still used as the surest method of preventing the birth of an unwanted child. Although oral contraceptives, the interuterine device, and condoms are available in the Soviet Union, the use of these seemingly is not widespread. The condom is more commonly used than any other kind of contraceptive, however.

Payments and allowances given to mothers (including unwed mothers) with large families was first instituted in 1936, but the program, altered at various subsequent times, has never been openly described by the Soviet Government as intended to stimulate an increase in the birth rate. Also, the average amount of the sums paid seems unlikely to be enough to spur an increase.

Life expectancy at birth for both sexes increased from 1954-55 until the mid-1960's and has since remained fairly constant, as shown below:

	MALE	FEMALE
1954-55	61	67
1955-56	63	69
1957-58	64	71
1958-59	64	72
1960-61	65	73
1962-63	65	73
1964-65	66	74
1966-67	66	74
1968-69	65	74
1970-71	65	74

The difference of 9 years between the values for the two sexes since the late 1960's is clear evidence of a much more favorable mortality pattern for females. Life expectancy at birth for females in the Soviet Union is comparable with that in the United States and the countries of Western Europe. That for males lags somewhat behind.

1. Density and distribution

Despite its large population, the Soviet Union had an overall density at midyear 1973 of only 28.9 persons per square mile, one of the lowest ratios in the world. Population density in the U.S.S.R. is one-half that in the United States and about one-eighth that in the People's Republic of China (Figure 9). Moreover,




FIGURE 9. Population and population density, U.S.S.R. and selected countries, midyear 1973 (U/OU)




FIGURE 10. Population density (U/OU)

because vast tracts of land east of the Urals are uncongenial to human habitation, the population is unevenly distributed, resulting in a marked disparity in density (Figure 10). In 1970, density ranged from less than one person per square mile in the Yakut A.S.S.R. and in Magadan Oblast (both in the R.S.F.S.R.) to 478 persons per square mile in Donetsk Oblast in the Ukraine. The average density in the European part of the U.S.S.R. was 85 persons per square mile; it was nine persons per square mile east of the Urals.

The distribution of the total population by republic shows that the R.S.F.S.R. continues to account for slightly more than half of the nation's inhabitants, although the proportion has been gradually declining for some years (Figure 11). Published results of the 1970 census reconfirmed long-term trends in the redistribution of the population among the various republics and regions. Movement from west to east continued. In 1959, there were 45,536,000 persons, or 21.8% of the total population, living east of the Urals. The population in this vast area increased nearly twice as fast as the total population in the 1959-70 intercensal period, and in 1970 numbered 58,153,000, or 24.1% of the total. This increase was due principally to high rates of growth in Kazakhstan and the four Central Asian republics, as only one of the economic regions of the eastern part of the R.S.F.S.R.—the Far East region—grew more rapidly than the nation as a

whole. It is of note that the heavily industrialized Urals region and the Western Siberia region grew at less than half the national rate. Despite plans to continue developing industrial capacity in these regions, the outflow of population, particularly from rural areas, held down the overall growth of population and labor force.

Continuation of another long-term trend in population distribution—from the western and central regions of European Russia to the southern republics and regions—was also substantiated by the 1970 census. Thus, the North Caucasus region of the R.S.F.S.R., the South region of the Ukrainian S.S.R., and the republics of Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Moldavia grew much more rapidly than the country as a whole. On the other hand, the Georgian S.S.R. barely kept pace with the national rate. Overall, of 160 principal administrative areas, 16 lost population during the intercensal period, 71 grew at a rate less than that of the nation as a whole, and 73 grew more rapidly, with 10 of these latter areas registering increases of more than 48% (Figure 12). Areas which experienced a net loss in population were primarily older rural regions where agriculture has stagnated and new industries have not been developed.

Migration has played a major role in the redistribution of the population. On the basis of total population figures and natural increase rates reported, by republic, for each year in the 1959-70 intercensal

**FIGURE 11. Population, by republic (U/OU)
(Thousands)**

REPUBLIC	POPULATION*			PERCENT CHANGE, 1959-70	PERSONS PER SQUARE MILE 1970
	1959	1970	1972		
R.S.F.S.R.....	117,534	130,079	131,771	10.7	19.7
Ukrainian S.S.R.....	41,889	47,126	48,048	12.6	203.2
Belorussian S.S.R.....	8,056	9,002	9,171	11.7	112.3
Uzbek S.S.R.....	8,119	11,800	12,731	45.3	68.9
Kazakh S.S.R.....	9,295	13,009	13,592	40.0	12.3
Georgian S.S.R.....	4,044	4,686	4,813	15.9	174.3
Azerbaijan S.S.R.....	3,698	5,117	5,375	38.4	153.0
Lithuanian S.S.R.....	2,711	3,128	3,219	15.4	124.2
Moldavian S.S.R.....	2,885	3,569	3,695	22.7	274.8
Latvian S.S.R.....	2,093	2,364	2,419	12.9	96.1
Kirgiz S.S.R.....	2,066	2,933	3,110	42.0	38.3
Tadzhik S.S.R.....	1,981	2,900	3,149	46.4	52.4
Armenian S.S.R.....	1,763	2,492	2,635	41.3	216.8
Turkmen S.S.R.....	1,516	2,159	2,328	42.4	11.4
Estonian S.S.R.....	1,197	1,356	1,395	13.3	78.0
U.S.S.R.....	208,827	241,720	247,451	15.8	27.9

*Figures for 1959 and 1970, deriving from the censuses of those years, are for 15 January; figures for 1972 are official Soviet estimates as of 1 July.




FIGURE 12. Percent change in the total population,
by administrative area, 1959-70 (U/OU)

period, it has been estimated that 11 republics had an excess of in-migrants over out-migrants, while the reverse was true in the other four. Growth through immigration was experienced in Kazakhstan, the Central Asian republics, the Baltic republics, Armenia, Moldavia, and the Ukraine. Decreases were noted in Belorussia, Azerbaijan, Georgia, and the R.S.F.S.R., where out-migration was particularly common in the central regions of the European part of the republic and in the Eastern and Western regions of Siberia.

Also revealing the continuing movement of population from rural to urban areas, the 1970 census confirmed the fact that the Soviet Union had become a predominantly urban nation. The urban population comprised 56% of the total in 1970, compared with 48% in 1959, and it increased by 36% during 1959-70, whereas the rural population declined by 3%. Of the 36 million increase in the urban population during the intercensal period, 14.6 million were added as a result of natural increase in urban centers, 5 million as a consequence of converting erstwhile rural communities into urban areas, and more than 16 million as a result of rural-to-urban migration.

Estonia, the R.S.F.S.R., and Latvia are the most highly urbanized of the republics, but the urban populations there, as well as in Georgia and the Ukraine, grew less rapidly than the urban population as a whole (Figure 13). As a result of both high rates of

natural increase and migration, the increase in the urban population was high in Kazakhstan, the Central Asian republics, Armenia, and Azerbaijan. Urban growth was also at a high level in Belorussia, Lithuania, and Moldavia, where rates of natural increase have been low. In fact, Moldavia registered the highest urban growth rate, although it remains the least urbanized of the republics.

There were 10 cities with more than 1 million inhabitants in 1970, compared with only three in 1959 (Figure 14), and these cities accounted for 15% of the urban population and 9% of the total population. Moscow and Leningrad are by far the largest of Soviet cities, but they grew less rapidly in the intercensal period than most other major urban centers. The official policy of limiting the growth of Moscow and Leningrad, however, has been only moderately effective, as both cities grew more rapidly than the nation as a whole. Of urban centers with populations of 250,000 or more residents, Tolyatti, site of a large hydroelectric plant on the Volga and of a new automobile plant constructed by Fiat, registered the largest intercensal increase (249%). Other cities which grew rapidly included Frunze (96%), Lipetsk (84%), Minsk (80%), Tyumen (79%), and Ulyanovsk (70%). Prokopyevsk, a coal mining center in the Kuzbas of Western Siberia, was the only major city to lose population during 1959-70.

FIGURE 13. Urban-rural population, by republic (U/OU)
(Thousands)

REPUBLIC	URBAN POPULATION		RURAL POPULATION			
	1959	1970	Percent change, 1959-70	1959	1970	Percent change, 1959-70
R.S.F.S.R.....	61,611	80,981	31.4	55,923	49,098	-12.2
Ukrainian S.S.R.....	19,147	25,688	34.2	22,722	21,438	-5.7
Belorussian S.S.R.....	2,481	3,908	57.5	5,575	5,094	-8.6
Uzbek S.S.R.*.....	2,759	4,362	58.1	5,502	7,598	38.1
Kazakh S.S.R.*.....	4,037	6,498	61.0	5,116	6,351	24.1
Georgian S.S.R.....	1,713	2,240	30.8	2,331	2,446	4.9
Azerbaijan S.S.R.....	1,767	2,564	45.1	1,931	2,553	32.2
Lithuanian S.S.R.....	1,046	1,571	50.2	1,665	1,557	-6.5
Moldavian S.S.R.....	643	1,130	75.7	2,242	2,439	8.8
Latvian S.S.R.....	1,174	1,477	25.8	919	887	-3.5
Kirgiz S.S.R.....	696	1,098	57.8	1,370	1,835	35.9
Tadzhik S.S.R.....	646	1,077	66.7	1,335	1,823	36.6
Armenian S.S.R.....	882	1,482	68.0	881	1,010	14.6
Turkmen S.S.R.....	700	1,034	47.7	816	1,125	37.9
Estonian S.S.R.....	676	881	30.8	521	475	-8.8
U.S.S.R.....	99,978	135,991	36.0	108,849	105,729	-2.9

NOTE—A minus (-) sign denotes a net decrease.

*Figures for the Uzbek S.S.R. and Kazakh S.S.R. have not been adjusted to reflect a boundary change between the two republics.

FIGURE 14. Population of cities with 1 million or more inhabitants in 1970 (U/OU)
(Thousands)

CITY	POPULATION*			AVERAGE ANNUAL RATE OF GROWTH, 1959-70
	1959	1970	1972	
Moscow.....	6,044	7,077	7,300	1.4
Leningrad.....	3,321	3,950	4,066	1.6
Kiyev.....	1,110	1,632	1,764	3.6
Tashkent.....	927	1,385	1,461	3.7
Baku.....	968	1,266	1,314	2.5
Kharkov.....	953	1,223	1,280	2.3
Gorkiy.....	941	1,170	1,213	2.0
Novosibirsk.....	885	1,161	1,199	2.5
Kuibyshev.....	806	1,045	1,094	2.4
Sverdlovsk.....	779	1,025	1,073	2.5

*Figures for 1959 and 1970, from the censuses of those years, are for 15 January; those for 1972 are official Soviet estimates as of 1 January.

2. Age-sex structure

The Soviet population is slightly older than that of the United States, the median age in the U.S.S.R. in mid-1973 being an estimated 29.2 years, compared with 28.0 years in the United States. Moreover, the median age of the Soviet population has been rising steadily since 1950, when it was 24.2 years.

At midyear 1973, an estimated 27.0% of the total population consisted of persons under age 15, and 12.9% were age 60 or older. Reflecting losses in World War II as well as the higher mortality rate among males, the female population has a markedly higher proportion of older members than the male population (Figure 15). During the period 1950-70, the population in the working ages—16 to 59 for males and 16 to 54 for females—increased less rapidly than did those in the other two broad age groups, and as a consequence it declined as a share of the total population. The proportion of persons under working age also declined slightly, while the share of the population in the older, pension ages increased, the number of such persons nearly doubling in the 20-year period. As a result of these shifts, the dependency ratio rose from 739 persons in the younger and older ages per 1,000 persons in the working ages in 1950 to 850 in 1970.

The profile of the 1973 Soviet population (Figure 16) clearly shows the effect of World War II. Casualties of that war, especially severe among males, account for the contractions in the pyramid in the 50-59 age groups. Contractions in the 25-34 age groups also stem from that conflict, family formation during

that period being uncommonly hindered. The age-sex pyramid also portrays the declining birth rate in the 1960's, there being more than 7 million fewer persons in the 0-9 age groups in 1973 than in the 10-19 age groups. Because fewer children in the population mean a smaller share of the nation's resources have to be allocated for schools, child-care facilities, and some consumer goods, the declining birth rate has provided the Soviet Union with some short-term gains. Moreover, because persons born during the baby boom years of the early 1950's have now reached adulthood, annual increments to the manpower pool are larger now than they were in the 1960's. After 1976, however, the effects of the declining birth rates in the 1960's will be manifest in declining annual increments to the manpower pool.

More than a quarter century of "normal" growth since the end of World War II has enabled the Soviet population partially to overcome the deficit of males created by that war, as well as by earlier wars, the revolution, and other catastrophic events. Thus the excess of 21.8 million females which existed in 1950 had been reduced to an estimated 18.5 million by




FIGURE 15. Estimated age-sex distribution, midyear 1973 (U/OU)




FIGURE 16. Age-sex structure, midyear 1973 (U/OU)

mid-1973. The process of rectifying an abnormal sex distribution is slow, however, and the sex ratio of 86.2 males per 100 females estimated in mid-1973 was still far from normal. At that time, males outnumbered females in all age groups under 30, but the reverse was true in all older age groups, with the disparity being especially pronounced among those age 50 and older. Of the total population age 50 and older in mid-1973, there were but 51.1 males per 100 females. The shortage of males has caused the Soviet Union to rely on the physical labor of females in jobs normally reserved for men, such as mining, construction, and heavy industry.

As determined by the 1970 census, sex ratios varied substantially by republic, being affected by the impact of World War II, which was considerably greater in some areas than in others, and by differential birth rates in the various republics since the end of the war. They were highest in the Turkmen S.S.R. (97.0) and the Tadzhik S.S.R. (96.8), lowest in the Ukrainian S.S.R. (82.5) and the R.S.F.S.R. (83.8).

D. Living and working conditions

Living conditions for the typical Soviet citizen, while improving, still lag far behind those for individuals in the United States and in most of Western Europe, a circumstance that can be ascribed partly to the regime's unwillingness to divert a greater share of its resources from investments in heavy industry and defense to those required for the more adequate provision of consumer goods and services.

Defying the egalitarianism which ostensibly underlies the social order, moreover, pronounced disparities exist in income distribution and in levels of living among the various societal groups. At one extreme, the elite enjoy many of the comforts and amenities associated with modern life. Certain material benefits and personal privileges also accrue to those who are particularly valuable to the regime. Better, more spacious dwellings are made available to highly skilled or productive workers, while automobiles are furnished to some industrial managers and other administrators. As a reward for a high degree of responsibility or outstanding performance, some workers are given access to special stores and to state-operated vacation resorts, the quality of which varies in relation to the status of the individuals concerned. At the other extreme, living conditions among some of the peasants are poor. In between, but at a level far below that of the elite, are the urban workers, a group that comprises those holding either blue-collar or white-collar jobs, and the remaining peasants and farm laborers. Within this intermediate group, the blue-collar workers are somewhat better off than the agricultural workers, while the white-collar employees live at a level not far above that of their blue-collar counterparts. (U/OU)

To a substantial degree, variations in levels of living stem from the regime's deliberate manipulation of earnings, pensions, and other benefits. Higher base wages and pensions, for example, are granted to workers in high-priority industries. Additionally, personal earnings are scaled according to a system of job classification that seeks to account for differences in skill and the difficulty of the task. In a measure designed to reduce labor turnover, workers having uninterrupted service in a single establishment are granted more generous social insurance benefits than those who change jobs. Irrespective of political status or job tenure, however, earnings for all workers have risen steadily since World War II. In the early postwar years, real incomes were mainly raised by reducing retail prices while holding the line on wages. In part to help improve living conditions for individuals in the lower income groups, the regime abandoned this policy during the mid-1950's, adopting one that has featured selective wage and salary increases and the stabilization of prices for consumer goods and services. Other methods for enhancing personal income have included pension increases, payment by the state of higher prices for agricultural products, abolition of school tuition fees, tax reductions, liberalization of tax-free allowances, and termination of compulsory bond purchases. (U/OU)

FIGURE 17. Average monthly earnings, by employment sector (U/OU) (Rubles)

EMPLOYMENT SECTOR	1940	1950	1960	1971
Construction.....	34.0	60.5	92.4	157.4
Transportation.....	34.8	70.7	87.0	144.0
Science and scientific services ..	47.1	93.7	105.3	140.9
Manufacturing.....	34.1	70.8	91.6	137.9
State cooperative institutions ..	39.0	68.8	86.4	123.8
Credit and insurance.. ..	33.4	66.8	70.7	114.6
Education and culture.....	32.3	66.8	69.6	107.4
State and industrial enterprise farms.....	22.0	38.3	53.8	106.3
Communications.....	28.2	52.9	62.7	99.2
Trade, supplies, and restaurants.	25.0	47.0	58.9	96.9
Housing and communal services.	26.1	49.2	57.7	96.8
Health services.....	25.5	48.6	58.9	92.9
All sectors.....	33.1	64.2	80.6	125.9

Having nearly doubled since midcentury, the monthly cash earnings of the typical worker in 1971 amounted to about 126 rubles (Figure 17). Because of the importance attached by the regime to industrial expansion and construction, persons employed in those sectors, together with transportation workers, generally earned incomes higher than the norm. Although remaining among the nation's highest, the earnings of workers in scientific and technical fields, who as recently as 1960 were the best paid, have increased at an appreciably slower pace than those of manual workers in high priority occupations; by 1971, in fact, the average earnings of construction and transportation workers surpassed those of scientific personnel. Irrespective of the type of occupation, workers receive a variety of noncash benefits, including free social insurance, medical care, and education, for themselves and their dependents. Also, many live in heavily subsidized, state-owned dwellings, paying rents that amount to only 4% or 5% of total earnings. Soviet sources claim that in 1971 the value of the noncash benefits received monthly by the typical worker was equivalent to 57 rubles. Provided the claim is valid, the monthly remuneration for the average worker in that year would have totaled 183 rubles, noncash benefits having accounted for some 31% of the amount. Although the average cash earnings of laborers on state and industrial enterprise farms have increased more dramatically than those of workers in any other major employment sector, and despite the fact that in 1966 the government guaranteed fixed monthly payments to members of collective farms, the family garden plot, usually about an acre in size, has remained an important source of

personal income among rural dwellers. During the mid-1960's, some 21% of the total family income among state farm workers derived from the sale of produce and livestock from such plots; among members of collective farms, the proportion of family income thus obtained was 37%. (U/OU)

The rapid increase in personal earnings in the agricultural sector reflects to a large extent the regime's implementation of a wage policy designed to reduce income disparities between urban and rural workers. Rather than being motivated solely by a desire for equity, however, the measure also is viewed as a means for curtailing the exodus of rural residents to the cities. Indicative of the government's continued commitment to the goal of comparability in pay, the 1971-75 Five-Year Plan calls for wage increases of 30% to 35% for collective farm workers, as against 20% to 22% for urban workers. While progress evidently has been made in equalizing incomes among members of the various employment sectors, less headway apparently has been made in realizing another official aspiration—that of greater sufficiency in consumer goods and services. On a per capita basis, in 1971 the cumulative worth of the goods purchased and of services utilized by Soviet citizens was equivalent to 35% of the amount recorded by their U.S. counterparts (Figure 18). (U/OU)

Although prices are high for most consumer durables, notably automobiles and household




FIGURE 18. Value of per capita consumption of goods and services, 1971 (U/OU)

appliances, as well as for some nondurables, including clothing and certain scarce foodstuffs, the costs of most essential items have remained stable, permitting a substantial increase in real personal income. In fact, while the cash earnings of the typical worker rose by about 56% during the years 1960-71, Soviet authorities claim that real wages actually increased by 166% during the period, making possible the increased acquisition of consumer durable goods (Figure 19), and thus contributing to overall improvement in the level of living. (U/OU)

Even though the basic necessities of life are accessible to the vast majority of inhabitants, there are chronic shortages of many goods, and long waiting periods or queues are commonplace at retail outlets. Because of their high cost, on the other hand, some

**FIGURE 19. Ownership of selected consumer durables (U/OU)
(Per 1,000 inhabitants)**

ITEM	1960	1965	1971
Bicycles.....	116	134	153
Cameras.....	49	67	77
Motorcycles.....	10	17	22
Radios*.....	205	320	**390
Refrigerators.....	10	29	106
Sewing machines.....	107	144	162
Television sets.....	22	68	160
Vacuum cleaners.....	8	18	33
Washing machines.....	13	59	161
Watches and clocks.....	794	885	979

*Licensed receivers only.

**1970.

FIGURE 20. Estimated worktime required for the purchase of selected consumer goods, 1971 (U/OU)

	MOSCOW	NEW YORK	PARIS	MUNICH
<i>Minutes</i>				
Aspirin (100).....	54	8	48	84
Cigarettes (20).....	12	8	15	22
Detergent.....	116	11	48	35
Gasoline (10 liters).....	57	19	117	61
Lipstick.....	410	25	102	95
Man's shirt.....	607	80	509	221
Nylon stockings (pair).....	82	14	15	36
Razor blades (10).....	41	13	19	52
Toilet soap.....	29	2	17	11
<i>Hours</i>				
Camera.....	69	5	11	13
Man's shoes.....	42	6	14	5
Man's suit.....	151	13	55	32
Refrigerator (small).....	289	29	77	31
Television (black and white).....	585	56	151	65
Transistor radio.....	39	8	13	5
Washing machine.....	178	62	194	92

goods are considered luxuries and, in effect, beyond the reach of the typical consumer. To the average Moscow worker, for instance, in late 1971 the purchase price of a small automobile represented the equivalent of 43.3 months' wages; this compared with 4.4 months' wages for workers in New York City, 7.6 for those in Munich, and 11.7 for Parisian workers. Despite the high cost of such vehicles in the U.S.S.R., there is a lengthy backlog of orders, the waiting period for delivery ranging from 2 to 3 years. Scarcities and high prices are not confined to durable goods, however. In relation to their counterparts in other major world cities, workers in Moscow must work considerably longer periods in order to be able to acquire various soft goods (Figure 20). Although Soviet citizens are able to buy sufficient clothing for protection from the weather, the average wardrobe is limited; in the early 1970's, a winter coat for an adult reportedly costs more than the legal minimum monthly wage of 70 rubles. Besides being expensive, most factory-made wearing apparel is poor in quality and unstylish by Western standards (Figure 21). (U/OU)

Notwithstanding the increased ownership of consumer goods and the general improvement in living conditions, most Soviet homes are simply, if not starkly, furnished, containing few household appliances or other amenities. Except for sewing machines, which are more widely owned in the U.S.S.R. than in the United States, the Soviet people possess only a fraction of the durables owned by inhabitants of many economically advanced nations (Figure 22). Indeed, such items as automatic washing



FIGURE 21. Contrasting dress styles are common in the Soviet Union, especially in the larger cities, but most of the population wear clothes that by Western standards are of poor quality and lack style (C)




FIGURE 22. Comparative ownership of consumer durables, 1970 (U/OU)

machines, clothes dryers, and freezers are neither manufactured nor sold in the U.S.S.R. On the other hand, both color and black-and-white television sets, radio-phonographs, transistor radios, and tape recorders are readily available. As with other durables, however, the inferior quality and high price of the domestically produced color television sets have turned Soviet consumers away from the product. Most consumer services also are markedly deficient. Laundry and drycleaning facilities, for example, are difficult to find, even in the larger cities. Because of a shortage of repairmen, residents are obliged to do many repairs themselves; individuals who are more competent in this regard are able to supplement their incomes by offering their services after regular working hours. Beauty shops exist but, because of high prices, their clientele is largely from upper income groups. Conversely, the prices for men's haircuts are low, perhaps because barbershops are plentiful. (U/OU)

Evidenced by urban dwellers who hire out for household repair services and by farming families engaged independently in cultivation, some forms of private entrepreneurship, once summarily regarded as anathema by the regime, have been allowed to flourish. Another example of this are the numerous farmers' markets which supplement the state-operated retail stores (Figure 23). The markets supply fresh produce, dairy products, meats, and even flowers in quantities that are disproportionately larger than the amount of farmland represented cumulatively by the family units. The quality of goods offered in the markets usually is far superior to that of the state stores, and demand for the homegrown produce remains high, even though prices are as much as three times higher than those for comparable articles in the latter stores. Although family plots and markets have played an important role in the domestic economy, numerous other economic activities considered legitimate in non-Communist states are banned in the U.S.S.R. In fact, "speculation," broadly defined as the "buying and reselling of goods by private persons for the purpose of obtaining a profit," is legally recognized as a form of economic crime and, thus, is regarded as a threat to the very foundations of socialist society. Together with theft, destruction, and misuse of state property, which also are considered economic crimes, speculation in some instances is punishable by death. (U/OU)

As with free private enterprise, social problems are regarded officially as the products of a "class society" and, therefore, alien to the U.S.S.R. Optimally, according to the adherents of socialism, there should be no competitive groupings in society and,

consequently, no "objective causes" for societal conflict or problems. The continued evidence of crime and other social problems in the Soviet Union, proclaimed a socialist state in 1936, has been ascribed officially to "survivals of capitalist mentality" and to the "infiltration of socialist countries by agents and spies of the capitalist world." Nonetheless, parents, teachers, party members, and organizations and institutions charged with the upbringing of youth, have been criticized for failing to cope with the various crimes, delinquencies, and other problems typically associated with modern life and rapid social change. The government has modified its earlier policy of banning or heavily censoring studies on social problems. Although still operating under considerable restraint, Soviet sociologists and the press have begun to shed some light on these manifestations of social ills. Because Communist doctrine maintains that criminal or otherwise deviant acts not only constitute a breach of law but also an offense against the whole political and social order, however, the views of Soviet academicians and journalists alike often are blurred as to gradations in the degree of seriousness of antisocial behavior. Likewise, clearcut distinctions often fail to be made between outright criminal behavior and simple nonconformity in personal lifestyle or outlook. (U/OU)

Besides economic crimes, Soviet law recognizes two other categories of crime, ordinary offenses and those committed against the state. The latter group consists of certain clearly defined crimes, such as treason, most of which are punishable by death. Other types of crimes against the state, however, are so vaguely defined that virtually any deed which meets the disapproval of the regime can be construed as a threat to the state simply on the word of the law enforcers. Ordinary crimes, such as homicide, rape, and burglary, are believed to constitute the bulk of criminal cases prosecuted in the courts. (U/OU)

Appearing to stem from the causes that prevail in most countries undergoing rapid urbanization and industrial growth, juvenile delinquency receives continuous attention from the authorities. Family solidarity and control over children have been weakened by regime policies, by overcrowding in housing, and by the high proportion of mothers working outside the home. Manifested by an increase in the incidence of drunkenness among youths, the sense of boredom and frustration afflicting many has been aggravated by the scarcity of recreational facilities. Because of the official belief that a new, socially conscious individual shall emerge in the U.S.S.R., juvenile delinquency has been a source of great concern to the regime. (U/OU)



FIGURE 23. A farmers' market (top) and a state-run food store (bottom) (C)

There is little information on vagrancy in the U.S.S.R., but local press reports indicate that some young people obtain cash by begging. These youths apparently are neither disabled nor destitute, but merely find it easier and more profitable to beg than to hold a steady job, taking advantage of the fact that they are seldom arrested if their identity papers are in order and they avoid engaging in "hooliganism." Vagrancy and begging probably are uncommon among the elderly, inasmuch as they are eligible for social insurance benefits. (U/OU)

According to Communist doctrine, prostitution results from the inequality of women in capitalist countries and cannot exist in a socialist society. Yet it is very much in evidence in urban areas of the U.S.S.R., where women readily are able to supplement their incomes by selling their favors. Casual prostitution also is carried on by peasant women during shopping excursions in town. Punishment for convicted offenders includes confinement in Siberian detention centers, but enforcement of the existing antiprostitution laws does not appear to be vigorous. (U/OU)

In accordance with Communist ideology, alcoholism, regarded as the product of a decadent society, has no place in the U.S.S.R. Notwithstanding persistent efforts by the regime to control chronic drunkenness (Figure 24), which is recognized as a major contributing factor in the commission of crimes and in absenteeism, per capita consumption of alcoholic beverages (mostly vodka) remains high, being nearly triple that in the United States. Hard work for long hours under strict discipline, the lack of household comforts, the shortage of recreational and amusement facilities outside the home, and the general drabness of life for the average worker are thought to be the main causes of heavy drinking and alcoholism. Paradoxically, the changeover to a 5-day workweek and the attendant increase in leisure time actually aggravated the problem, evidently because most cultural and recreational facilities, as well as many consumer services, either close or sharply curtail their activities on weekends. Even among members of the elite, there have been repeated instances of drunkenness, often leading to public scandal. In view of the high prices for vodka and other liquors and the existence of an insufficient number of sales outlets in relation to the demand, illegal distilling and bootlegging exist throughout the country. To buy a liter of beer or vodka, it was necessary in late 1972 for the typical Moscow worker to labor five or six times longer than his counterpart in New York City to make a comparable purchase. (U/OU)

Less is known about the use of narcotics and other dangerous drugs in the U.S.S.R. than about



ЦЕНА РЮМКИ

FIGURE 24. Poster used in campaign against alcoholism and excessive drinking. The "price of a shot" ultimately leads to the loss of jobs and possessions. (C)

alcoholism. Although Soviet sources report that the U.S.S.R. has been relatively successful in preventing smuggling, the transport of opium, heroin, cocaine, and hashish has been a longstanding practice along the country's boundaries with Afghanistan, Iran, and Turkey. Synthetic drugs, such as the various amphetamines, hallucinogens, and tranquilizers, have been introduced by Western tourists as well as by Soviet citizens returning from abroad; such substances also have been stolen from Soviet laboratories or manufactured illicitly. Judging from sporadic official comment, drug abuse, although far less serious than in most Western countries, has become a matter of some concern to authorities. It is essentially an upper middle class phenomenon and is particularly widespread among better educated young urbanites. Evidently prompted by the increase in drug abuse, the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the R.S.F.S.R. in August 1972

issued a decree calling for the commitment of drug-dependent persons who refuse treatment on a voluntary basis, or who continue to use narcotics while undergoing cure, to facilities operated by the republic's Ministry of Health; the measure provided for a period of confinement lasting from 1 to 2 years. (U/OU)

1. Health and sanitation

a. Health problems (U/OU)

Organic and degenerative diseases constitute the principal health threats to the people of the Soviet Union, as the incidence of endemic communicable illnesses has decreased markedly, particularly since World War II. Many of the remaining epidemiological problems are associated with overcrowded housing and environmental pollution, the latter stemming largely from the inadequate enforcement of sanitary regulations. Unsanitary living conditions, often arising from ignorance, also contribute to the prevalence of enteric infection, mainly in rural areas.

The principal causes of death are cardiovascular diseases and cancer. In 1970, the former accounted for 41.5% of all fatalities and had a mortality rate of about 385 per 100,000 inhabitants. Among the various forms of cardiovascular disorders, arteriosclerosis and hypertension are the most common and the leading killers. Cancer was responsible for some 16.5% of all deaths recorded in 1968; among males the mortality rate was about 135 per 100,000, among females about 119. Of the numerous forms of cancer, that of the stomach was the leading cause of death among both sexes, followed for males by cancer of the respiratory organs and for females by cancer of the reproductive organs.

With the application of effective control measures and widespread preventive and therapeutic practices, the incidence of many, if not most, communicable diseases has decreased. Diseases under control or virtually eliminated include malaria, typhus, diphtheria, poliomyelitis, trachoma, smallpox, plague, and typhoid and paratyphoid fevers. The decrease in the occurrence of malaria, which as recently as 1940 afflicted 1,637 out of 100,000 persons, has been especially dramatic; in 1971 the incidence of the disease was only 0.14 per 100,000 inhabitants. In that year, the incidence of three additional diseases—diphtheria, tetanus, and poliomyelitis—also was less than one case per 100,000 population. As indicated by the following tabulation of the incidence of selected

diseases (per 100,000 persons), substantial progress also has been made in controlling other illnesses:

	1960	1971
Measles	972	240
Scarlet fever	313	208
Infectious hepatitis	239	180
Whooping cough	259	17
Typhoid and paratyphoid fevers ..	22	8

Judging from the trend in infant mortality, the U.S.S.R. likewise has made strides in lessening the danger of death at this vulnerable age. Having been more than double that in the United States as recently as 1955, by the early 1970's the rate of infant deaths per 1,000 live births in the Soviet Union approached that prevailing in the United States, as shown below:

	UNITED STATES	U.S.S.R.
1950	29	81
1955	26	60
1960	26	35
1965	25	27
1970	20	25
1971	19	23

Despite progress made in curbing communicable diseases, morbidity rates for numerous such ailments remain high, occasionally attaining epidemic proportions. The leading communicable illnesses include respiratory infections, especially influenza, tuberculosis, and pneumonia; enteric infections, particularly gastroenteritis, salmonellosis, and dysentery; viral infections, mainly hemorrhagic fevers and encephalitis; and various protozoan and parasitic infestations, the latter usually involving tapeworms. In addition to respiratory ailments, the most frequent childhood diseases are measles, hepatitis, scarlet fever, chickenpox, and mumps; the danger posed to children by diphtheria has been all but eliminated, and the incidence of whooping cough and of tetanus has been sharply reduced. Local outbreaks of diseases thought to be under control, however, have occurred on occasions. In 1970, for example, inhabitants near the Black and Caspian Seas experienced an outbreak of cholera, at least 750 cases having been reported to the World Health Organization. Mental and other nervous disorders constitute major health problems, as do venereal diseases; while information is unavailable concerning the incidence of these afflictions, it is known that approximately one-tenth of the nation's hospital beds are for psychiatric patients.

Improved living conditions and better personal hygiene practices have been attended by a reduction in the incidence of louse-borne typhus, although cases still occur sporadically. Scrub typhus, however, occurs

in many parts of the country, being particularly troublesome in eastern Siberia. Other insect-borne diseases are essentially confined to the more remote rural areas. Rickettsiosis, which is transmitted by the north Asian tick, is prevalent in central and eastern Siberia. "Q" fever is the most widely distributed rickettsial infection, affecting both men and animals. Other animal diseases posing a threat to humans (especially livestock raisers, veterinarians, and meat packing plant workers) include trichinosis, hydatidosis, and brucellosis. Other animal diseases communicable to man and of concern to the public health authorities are tularemia, anthrax, tuberculosis, rabies, and leptospirosis. On the other hand, several animal diseases constitute a threat to work animals and to the nation's meat supply. These include foot-and-mouth disease, brucellosis, hog cholera, Newcastle disease, tuberculosis, equine encephalomyelitis, and various hemoprotzoal illnesses. From the standpoint of the economic losses it brings about, foot-and-mouth disease is the most serious of these, with brucellosis ranking a close second.

b. Medical care (U/OU)

The Ministry of Health formulates national health policies and is ultimately responsible for the operation of virtually all health care services, although the Ministries of Defense and Internal Affairs also engage in some medical activities. Besides setting and enforcing medical standards, regulating the training of medical personnel, and governing the production and distribution of pharmaceuticals and health care materials, the Ministry of Health oversees the activities and controls the budgets of health ministries of the constituent republics. Furthermore, it determines medical research priorities. Having gone into effect in July 1970, the Fundamental Principles of Health Legislation is the main decree governing public health and sanitation on a national scale. Avowing in its preamble that the "protection of the people's health is one of the most important goals of the Soviet State," the decree delineates administrative responsibilities in health fields and sets forth general goals and guidelines.

Disease prevention is emphasized by the public health system, although therapeutic care increasingly has become available. Each year millions of persons, especially children of all ages, expectant mothers, women over age 35, and industrial workers, routinely receive medical examinations at outpatient departments attached to hospitals and at other outpatient facilities, including some that operate outside the regular public health system. Follow-up casework and

preventive care also are carried out in connection with these services.

Soviet citizens ordinarily do not pay for medical services, and there are no payroll deductions for health care, most of the cost being borne by the government. Assessing the value of public medical care, Soviet sources have estimated that real wages for the typical worker are increased by about 7% by this factor alone. Since 1940, state budget allocations for health and medical care have increased more than tenfold, amounting to 9.6 billion rubles in 1971, or 5.9% of the state budget, a proportion that has not fluctuated appreciably through the years. In addition, other institutions, including cooperatives, trade unions, and collective farms, also contribute funds for the operation of medical programs; in 1971 such contributions totaled 2.4 billion rubles, making the cumulative expenditure for health care 12 billion rubles.

Having made dramatic progress in the field of medicine since World War II, the U.S.S.R. outranks most advanced nations in terms of the availability of medical personnel and health care facilities. There is, however, a substantial imbalance in the distribution of personnel and facilities among the various republics, with the residents of the European portion of the R.S.F.S.R. and those of the Ukraine, Latvia, and Estonia being appreciably better served than the others. Likewise, the quality of medical treatment varies widely, with that of urban residents being markedly better than that of their rural counterparts. In the countryside, much of the routine health care is entrusted to paramedical personnel; residents of the more remote areas are attended by "sanitation squads," mobile units which regularly visit localities providing on-the-spot care. Besides geographical disparity in the availability and quality of medical care, class considerations are evident. The bulk of the populace is served by a network of health care facilities administered by the Ministry of Health, but special facilities are reserved for high-ranking members of society—party officials, the technical and scientific elite, and leading artists and sports figures. Closed to ordinary citizens, these special facilities are more comfortable and better equipped and staffed than the general ones. Similarly, some military medical facilities provide better care than the public civilian ones. Preferring to pay for better or more personalized health care services, moreover, some wealthier individuals patronize those medical professionals who carry on a private practice after regular work hours.

As of 1 January 1972 there were 603,400 physicians and 94,400 dentists, stomatologists, and dental practitioners in the U.S.S.R., or 24.5 physicians and 3.8 dentists and other oral health specialists per 10,000 inhabitants. While the population increased by roughly 30% during the years 1940-72, the number of medical professionals more than quadrupled and that of paramedical or auxiliary personnel of all types increased almost fourfold as indicated in the following tabulation:

	NUMBER	PER 10,000 INHABITANTS
Physicians and dentists:		
1940	155,300	8
1960	143,700	20
1972	697,800	28
Paramedical personnel:		
1940	472,000	24
1960	1,388,300	64
1972	2,195,300	89

Despite the existence of overall favorable ratios of health care personnel to inhabitants, there is a shortage of surgeons and other advanced medical specialists, including anesthesiologists, pediatricians, radiologists, urologists, and psychiatrists. Certain paramedical personnel, namely pharmacists and dental, laboratory, and X-ray technicians, also have been in short supply. The paramedical personnel in service as of 1 January 1972 included 1,066,200 nurses; 485,700 medical aides, or *feldshers*; 306,300 midwives and obstetric *feldshers*; 141,400 laboratory, X-ray, and dental technicians; and 195,700 individuals trained in miscellaneous specialties. Contrasting to practice in Western nations, the Soviet medical profession is dominated by women, roughly seven-tenths of all physicians being of that sex. Most high-ranking positions in medicine, however, whether in administration, research, or clinical medicine, are held by men.

By and large, the performance of Soviet physicians is good, but their overall level of training is lower than that of U.S. physicians. Administrative duties and tasks, that could be delegated to specialized paramedical personnel, occupy an inordinate amount of the Soviet physician's worktime. They are nonetheless pressured by the authorities to keep industrial absenteeism to a minimum and to meet certain quantitative norms concerning the numbers of patients they attend and the length of their consultations per patient. Consequently, close and trusting relationships seldom are formed between doctor and patient. Most physicians are not accorded high social status, being placed on a level comparable with that of highly skilled industrial workers, and their

earnings are far lower than those of Western physicians. Compared with their counterparts in Western countries, the quality of Soviet dentists, nurses, and paramedical personnel in general is fair.

The U.S.S.R. has an adequate number of hospitals and other health care facilities, but the quality of services surveyed is inferior to that available in the United States. In contrast to custom in the United States, Soviet hospitals in providing inpatient care place more emphasis on physical therapy, exercise, and diet control than on diagnostic work. Although the newer hospitals are adequate, many of the existing ones are small and obsolete. Many of the small units are being replaced, however, by larger, modern facilities. As a consequence, although the number of hospitals has declined for several years, the total number of hospital beds has risen. There were somewhat over 26,000 hospitals with a total of 2,727,300 beds, or a ratio of 11.1 beds per 1,000 persons, as of 1 January 1972; in the United States, the corresponding ratio was about 8.0 to 1,000. About three-fourths of the Soviet facilities were of the general type, with tuberculosis, pediatric, and maternity hospitals being the most numerous among the specialized units. According to the type of use that was made of the beds, however, general purpose ones (for therapy and surgery patients) accounted for about one-third of the total and the majority were for specialized care, as indicated by the following distribution:

TYPE OF CARE	NUMBER OF BEDS	PERCENT
Therapeutic	562,900	20.7
Surgical	362,600	13.3
Pediatric	335,200	12.3
Psychiatric	274,500	10.1
Tuberculosis	265,500	9.7
Infectious diseases	205,300	7.5
Maternity	200,100	7.3
Gynecology	157,500	5.8
Nervous disorders	76,300	2.8
Skin and venereal diseases	55,300	2.0
Oncological	47,700	1.8
Otolaryngological	41,000	1.5
Ophthalmological	39,400	1.4
Other	104,000	3.8
Total	2,727,300	100.0

The bulk of public health care services are rendered on an outpatient basis, either through hospital departments established for that purpose or through networks of so-called polyclinics, *feldsher* posts, and dispensaries. In 1972 such facilities numbered about 40,000, including both independent units and those attached to larger medical institutions; similarly, over 21,000 maternal and child care centers were in

operation. Additionally, a large number of outpatient facilities, operated independently of the public health system, are attached to industrial establishments and collective farms. In 1971, these included approximately 1,500 so-called medical and sanitary units, 12,700 shop dispensaries, and 32,300 first-aid stations.

Responsibility for the construction of medical care facilities is largely decentralized, the cost being borne by local governments, trade unions, factories, and collective farms, which also staff the facilities. Funds for their operation, as well as directives and guidance, emanate from the Ministry of Health.

Patients are assigned to medical care facilities either on the basis of their place of residence or their occupation. Small district hospitals (25-50 beds) generally serve areas containing 7,000 to 12,000 inhabitants, supplementing the *raion* (county or borough) hospitals (100-200 beds), which contain wards for general medicine, surgery, maternity, pediatrics, and infectious diseases; many *raion* hospitals also have tuberculosis wards, clinical laboratories, and X-ray facilities. *Raion* hospitals, in turn, complement the services of *oblast* (province) or republic hospitals, the largest and most important medical facility in any administrative unit. Such hospitals (500-1,000 beds) are situated in the main cities and equipped to provide a wide range of specialized care. Additionally, specialized care is available at numerous clinics attached to research and medical training institutions.

The government has elaborate plans for the provision of emergency medical services, including those resulting from natural disaster and war. The Ministry of Health, in conjunction with the military and paramilitary forces, the national civil defense system, and voluntary organizations, are the main entities charged with meeting such contingencies. The Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies, which embraced more than 420,000 local affiliates having over 70 million members in 1968, is the most important voluntary agency; the organization's members, who are trained in rendering first aid and grouped into cadres, can be mobilized during emergencies. During normal times, however, members of the Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies assist the public health authorities in a variety of programs, including mass inoculation drives and public indoctrination campaigns concerning hygiene, sanitation, and accident prevention; health and safety inspections of living quarters and workplaces also are carried out. Other volunteer organizations, such as those associated with trade unions, the Committee for Soviet Women, the Pioneer organization, and the Komsomol, also participate in such activities.

c. Environmental sanitation (C)

The nation's water supply generally is adequate, except in the areas of permanent frost and in the deserts and steppes. Besides rivers, the chief sources of water for urban centers, water is obtained from lakes, springs, and wells. Additionally, some coastal cities receive desalinated water; 20 desalinization plants were in operation in 1967, with more being planned for construction. While all major urban areas and some of the lesser ones have water treatment installations, many of the facilities are inadequate. Treated water is piped to the central portions of cities and to industrial plants; inhabitants of outlying areas usually are served by wells. In the extension of piped water systems, industrial sites are given priority over residential districts. Nonetheless, in most of the newer apartment buildings, individual units have piped water; many of the older apartments, on the other hand, are served by community taps, as are most individual homes.

Construction of piped water networks has proceeded at a rapid pace, a growing percentage of the population being served by such systems each year. In 1970, all cities of 50,000 or more inhabitants were served at least partially by piped water, while more than half of the urban centers having 10,000 to 50,000 residents were so equipped. In smaller cities and towns devoid of such systems, wells are the principal sources of water. Rural residents generally rely on wells, either individual or communal, but also use surface water.

Most of the water supplied to urban residents is potable. Contamination, however, frequently occurs during distribution, particularly in the older systems, in which case water intended for human consumption must be boiled. Because of pollution from human, animal, and industrial sources, raw water supplies ordinarily are nonpotable, except in certain remote areas.

Sewage disposal methods in much of the U.S.S.R. are inadequate. The larger urban centers have waterborne sewerage systems, but these generally do not extend beyond the central city. According to a 1970 Soviet report, such systems served nearly three-fourths of urban dwellings. Most cities having central sewerage systems also are equipped with sewage treatment facilities, but a high proportion of the installations have insufficient capacities or are antiquated or poorly constructed. The construction of new facilities, moreover, has failed to keep pace with the increase in sewage loads. As a result, many cities discharge untreated or inadequately treated wastes into rivers and other bodies of water that also are used for water supplies. Suburban areas, smaller cities, and

towns generally have cesspools and septic tanks for the disposal of human waste, while outdoor pit latrines and cesspools prevail in the countryside. On many collective farms and in other rural localities, however, human waste is discharged directly into streams.

The disposal of solid waste and garbage is not a major problem in the U.S.S.R. because the per capita amount of refuse is much smaller than that in the United States or Western Europe. Disposable containers are uncommon in the Soviet Union, and citizens are obliged to save and reuse many items that ordinarily are discarded by Westerners. Refuse collection on a regular basis occurs only in Moscow and other large cities; disposal is by dumping, either in sanitary landfills or in open areas, or by incineration. Smaller cities have sporadic collections or provide dumping grounds where residents may dispose of garbage. The residents of small towns and rural areas either burn their refuse or dump it in open areas or into waterways.

Partly because of the inadequacy of existing methods for the disposal of refuse and human waste, the environmental problem of dominant concern in the U.S.S.R., as reflected in the nation's press, is water pollution, which is particularly severe in waterways west of the Urals. Wastes from heavy industry and processing plants are the major water pollutants. In addition to industrial effluents, other sources of water pollution include thermal and radioactive wastes from electrical generating plants, oil spills, and phosphates from detergents. Also, runoff from livestock raising enterprises has contributed pollutants, while the leaching of farmlands has added silt and pesticides to the waterways. In certain heavily industrialized cities, local geographical features and atmospheric conditions have been conducive to the formation of air pollution. In 1968, only 14% of industrial installations reportedly had complete air-purifying equipment; another 26% were partially equipped, but the remaining 60% had no devices whatsoever for reducing air pollution. Nonetheless, this form of environmental disruption is not nearly as serious as in the industrialized Western nations, in part because contamination of the air by automobile emissions is nominal in the U.S.S.R.

Formerly, legislative controls aimed at curbing the various forms of environmental pollution were initiated and implemented at the republic or local levels. Increasingly, however, nationwide guidelines and statutes have been passed. In August 1969, for example, the public health authorities issued a listing of the maximum permissible concentrations of harmful substances in the air of population centers; in

April 1970 a comparable list was released pertaining to the discharge of pollutants into bodies of water that serve as sources for urban water supplies. And, a statute known as the Principles of Water Legislation was approved in December 1970. While the need for centralized guidance and legislation had existed for many years, responsibility for implementing the air and water pollution guidelines, as well as the water antipollution law, was vested in various jurisdictions and penalties for noncompliance were mild. Apparently in recognition of the limited effectiveness of these measures, the Supreme Soviet resolved in September 1972 that provisions for environmental protection and for the rational utilization of natural resources should be strengthened, and it instructed the Council of Ministers to formulate new, more stringent controls. Arising from the commonality of interests concerning the biological and genetic effects of pollution, the United States and the Soviet Union in 1972 entered into an agreement on cooperation in the field of environmental protection.

As with antipollution measures, a lack of uniformity exists in the enforcement of food sanitation standards. Regulations provide for the inspection of all dairies, livestock farms, slaughterhouses, and food production and handling establishments. The most readily apparent violations occur in markets, particularly of the open-air variety, where food frequently is displayed on exposed counters, unprotected against contamination by insects and dust and subject to handling by shoppers. Storage and refrigeration facilities also are inadequate, limiting the distribution of many foodstuffs and often resulting in the spoilage of perishable items. Similarly, milk pasteurization is unsatisfactory in many areas, as is the handling of milk. In some localities, the use of night soil as fertilizer for fruits and vegetables results in contamination of the crops.

2. Diet and nutrition (U/OU)

Considerable progress has been made since World War II in increasing the quantity and upgrading the quality of the food consumed by the Soviet people. Except in years of severe crop failure, such as 1972, domestic agriculture provides an adequate quantity of foodstuffs, notable exceptions being tropical fruits, cacao, and coffee, which must be imported. Gaged by weight, the per capita consumption of food has risen by more than 60% since 1913, with over half of the increase occurring since midcentury. In 1971, per capita intake of food totaled about 2,160 pounds.

Potatoes and bread traditionally have been staple items in the Soviet diet. As recently as 1950, the

average person consumed some 530 pounds of potatoes annually, or nearly one-third of the cumulative amount of food. Partly as the result of agricultural diversification and the increased importation of foodstuffs, the average diet has become more varied. The overall rise in living levels, moreover, has enabled consumers to purchase a wider selection of foodstuffs. By 1971, per capita consumption of potatoes had dropped to 282 pounds, which represented 13% of the total amount of food eaten by the average person during the year. Bread and other cereal products, however, have remained dietary mainstays. Because of shortfalls in the domestic production of wheat and other cereals, the U.S.S.R. has been forced to purchase large quantities of these commodities from other nations, mainly the United States, Canada, and Australia. Other items in short supply, including meat, eggs, and butter, have been imported on occasion.

The diet of the Soviet people, although remaining somewhat monotonous, contains an adequate supply of calories and is not seriously lacking in essential nutrients. In 1971, the daily per capita caloric intake in the U.S.S.R. amounted to about 3,200 compared with 3,330 in the United States. Over one-half of the calories in the typical diet derived from grains, potatoes, and pulses, compared with one-fourth in the United States, while the consumption of meat, vegetables, and fruit was lower in the U.S.S.R. (Figure 25). There is no evidence of diseases associated with dietary deficiencies, although some people, especially in the cities, may not receive sufficient vitamins during the winter months, when fresh vegetables are in short supply. Despite a 14% increase in the per capita consumption of meat during the period 1965-71, in the latter year the average Soviet person ate less than half the amount of meat consumed by his U.S. counterpart and substantially less than many Europeans as well (Figure 26). Per capita daily intake of protein in the Soviet Union in 1971, however, was only slightly lower than the U.S. average of 101 grams.

Nearly half of the average Soviet worker's income is spent on food. Except for bread, potatoes, and cabbage, which are reasonably priced, most foodstuffs and beverages are expensive. In late 1971, for example, the typical Moscow worker had to work more than three times as long as his counterpart in New York City to purchase a cut of beef; the acquisition of pork loin in Moscow required seven times more labor. To purchase such scarce items as chicken, eggs, oranges, peaches, coffee, or tea, the Moscow worker had to work anywhere from eight to 11 times longer than the New Yorker.




FIGURE 25. Sources of daily per capita caloric supply, United States and U.S.S.R., 1971 (U/OU)




FIGURE 26. Comparative consumption of meat, 1971 (U/OU)

3. Housing (U/OU)

No other factor affects the quality of life of the average citizen as much as the chronic shortage of housing. Indeed, it is poor, overcrowded housing, more than anything else, that makes urban life in the Soviet Union dismal and tedious. Even families with an adequate income by Soviet standards live in one or two rooms, often sharing toilet and kitchen facilities with relatives or neighbors. The average young married couple has to wait years for a modest apartment. A survey of Ukrainian factory workers married 1 to 5 years revealed that only one-fifth occupied their own apartments, while most rented rooms or lived with relatives.

The housing deficit in large measure has been responsible for the prevalence of a low birth rate, which in turn has resulted in a growing labor shortage. Social tension and friction apparently have increased because of overcrowding, attended by such problems as juvenile delinquency, crime, and alcoholism. In addition, because of the housing shortage, the nation's socioeconomic disparities are more evident. In Moscow, for example, influential scientists reside in the high-ceilinged, roomy apartments of a cooperative belonging to the Academy of Sciences, while many ordinary citizens living in the center of the capital are crowded into old apartments, often one family to a room.

Because rents are low, the average Soviet citizen spends considerably less on housing than his Western counterpart. Lower housing costs, however, are more than offset by the smaller amount of living space, by the inadequacy of cooking, heating, and plumbing facilities, and by the general scarcity of furnishings and other amenities.

Regime efforts to improve housing conditions have been far from adequate. Soviet investment in housing construction is lower than that in most Western European countries, despite the greater need. According to U.N. figures, West European investment averages 20% to 25% of the gross national product, as compared with 17% in the Soviet Union. Planners failed to achieve the 1970 goal of at least 9 square meters of living space per person, a standard set by Soviet sanitation authorities; as of 1972 the average was 7.8 square meters, which was, nevertheless, an improvement over the 7.3 square meters reported 3 years earlier. Under the current Five-Year Plan, investment in housing is planned to rise by 15.7%, a smaller proportion than stipulated in the previous two plans.

Although most of the housing being provided by the government consists of plainly designed multistoried apartment buildings, a wide variety of dwelling types remain in existence, including some private units of prerevolutionary vintage (Figure 27). State-owned housing accounted for about seven-tenths of urban dwelling units in the early 1970's. Besides the multistoried apartment buildings, which are communally-operated and inhabited mainly by working class families, there are two other basic types of public housing: communal apartments and individually occupied, improved apartments. The first of these, generally found in older buildings, frequently consists of a three-room apartment which may be occupied by as many families, one to a room, all sharing the same bath and kitchen. The second, with ample room and modern conveniences, is restricted largely to the more privileged members of society. Additionally, there are dormitories and barracks, both of which accommodate unmarried persons, usually collective farm or state enterprise workers; the dormitories often are subdivided into rooms occupied by four individuals, while the barracks may accommodate 50 or more in a large, single room.


The remaining three-tenths of urban dwellings in existence during the early 1970's were privately owned, consisting largely of individual homes. Because of the proliferation of state-owned apartments, the proportion of privately owned dwellings has tended to decrease gradually. In the case of private home ownership, the land belongs to the state. Privately constructed houses generally are small, averaging three or four rooms. The homeowner may rent or lease part of his house, but terms are fixed by law, and the owner is responsible for maintenance. Although dormitories and barracks have grown in number, individual homes remain prevalent in rural areas.

Practically all state-owned urban housing is equipped with electricity. Gas, piped water, and connections to central sewerage systems, however, frequently are lacking, except in the more modern centrally located apartment buildings. The occupants of units devoid of piped water are supplied by public taps situated in courtyards, or by street hydrants. Similarly, common toilet facilities with cesspools are provided. Private housing is poorly served, if at all, by water and sewer lines and by electric power. In rural areas there is still little plumbing. The lack of running water in towns and cities has led to the development of a system of public baths and municipal laundries (Figure 28), both less than adequate in number and quality of service.



Apartment blocks in Riga (C)

Worker housing under construction at
the Kama River Industrial complex
near Naberezhnye Chelny (C)



New housing on the Snekhev Collective Farm,
near Kharkov (U/OU)



FIGURE 27. Representative housing



Worker housing on the Lenin State Farm,
near Riga (C)



Prerevolutionary wooden houses, Kazan (C)



Typical country dwelling (C)



FIGURE 28. Self-service cleaning and laundry shop, Moscow (C)

4. Work opportunities and conditions

a. The people and work

Young Soviet citizens entering the labor market are far less likely to become agricultural workers than was the case in the early postrevolution period. Since 1917, when peasants and farm laborers accounted for about three-fourths of the labor force and nonagricultural workers comprised the remaining fourth, the proportions have been almost reversed. Within the nonagricultural sector, the manufacturing and construction industries are more capable of absorbing new workers, a trend that has resulted from the regime's longstanding commitment to industrial development. Indicative of a maturing economy, however, service-oriented activities, including those related to public health, education, and welfare, as well as occupations associated with science and communications, have tended since 1960 to expand at an even faster pace than those in the industrial realm. Notwithstanding the emphasis on modernizing the economy, the dwindling size of the agricultural work force has been a matter of prime concern to the regime. Among agricultural laborers, roughly two-thirds are on collective farms and the bulk of the remainder are employed by state enterprises; a small number of peasants remain as private cultivators. Since 1966 the regime has adopted a number of measures designed to stem the flight of collective farmworkers, particularly young ones. Thus far, the measures have been unsuccessful. (U/OU)

Despite the rapid industrial expansion and the regime's efforts at overcoming disparities in pay among workers in the various branches of economic activity, traditional attitudes favoring white-collar over blue-collar work remain in evidence. Young

people, often at the urging of their parents, aspire to become members of the intelligentsia. Youths who lack the intellectual wherewithal and academic training to realize this ambition usually opt for white-collar employment. Perhaps emanating from the peasantry's traditionally low social ranking, agricultural pursuits generally are disdained. Similarly, occupations in the realm of trade and other service-oriented jobs are held in low esteem by youths. (U/OU)

To overcome the predilection for careers in the more prestigious fields, the regime increasingly has regulated the training of youths, endeavoring to channel them into occupations that are needed to fulfill economic goals. As a result, most new job seekers come directly from educational institutions. In order to satisfy the manpower needs of high priority projects, such as the Kama River industrial complex and the automobile plant at Tolyatti, youths of both sexes are offered private apartments and cultural and recreational facilities that ordinarily are unavailable to Soviet workers. Judging from the large number and youthfulness of workers employed at such installations, the incentives (especially the housing) evidently have been applied successfully. Among the 70,000 workers employed at the Kama River complex early in 1973, the average age reportedly was 23. At the Tolyatti plant, which employed 72,000 persons, 36% of them women, the average age was 25. (U/OU)

Irrespective of age, able-bodied persons willing to work have little, if any, difficulty finding employment, as a manpower shortage exists in the U.S.S.R. The shortage of workers has prompted the regime to adopt a number of measures designed to attract additional people into the labor force and to retain those already employed. Inasmuch as more than nine-tenths of all men of working age already are

employed, special emphasis has been placed on recruiting women. To this end, the minimum monthly wage was raised from 40 to 60 rubles in 1968, and pension benefits were increased as an inducement for retired middle-aged and older women to return to work so as to enhance their pensions through added years of service; by 1975, the minimum monthly wage is scheduled to be raised to 70 rubles. Nursery and kindergarten facilities have been expanded in order to free mothers from child-care responsibilities, and legislation authorizing the part-time employment of women gradually has been liberalized, making it possible for a growing number of housewives to obtain commercial employment on that basis. Approximately seven-tenths of the industrial development that occurred within the scope of the 1966-70 Five-Year Plan was in small- and medium-size cities, where the proportions of women remaining outside the labor force were higher than in the main urban centers. As indicated by the increasingly higher percentage of women in the labor force, the regime has had considerable success in mobilizing the female labor reserve. By 1971 women comprised 51% of all wage and salary earners, compared with 39% in 1940. (U/OU)

As a result of increased longevity and of the larger age cohorts that attain retirement age each year, nonworking pensioners have constituted a rapidly growing labor reserve. Numerous individuals possessing skills and experience badly needed by the economy have been represented among their ranks. Measures designed to draw pensioners back to work were instituted in 1964 and 1969. In the former year, selected retirees, such as those once employed in construction and light manufacturing, were authorized to collect full pensions if they returned to work; however, a ceiling of 200 rubles per month, inclusive of pension, was imposed over the amount that could be earned by each pensioner. In 1969, retired skilled workers, junior service personnel, engineers, and technicians were granted the right to receive full pensions in addition to their pay, regardless of the economic sector where employed. Certain other categories of workers were authorized to collect 50% of their pensions, or 75% if employed in the Urals, Siberia, or the Far East. The monthly income ceiling for working pensioners was raised to 300 rubles. (C)

To facilitate the employment of retired persons wishing to work, local job placement offices maintain lists of vacancies for which applications by pensioners are invited. Lists of pensioners who are seeking employment also are compiled, and openings of

possible interest to pensioners are advertised. In 1970, about 8 million pensioners held jobs. (C)

Despite the overall abundance of jobs, particularly for skilled manual workers, employment opportunities are not distributed uniformly throughout the U.S.S.R. In the Central Asian and Transcaucasus republics, for example, the proportion of persons in the working ages who actually hold jobs is lower (80% to 86%) than in the other republics (91% to 92%). The disparity evidently stems both from the lower levels of economic and cultural development in these republics and from the fact that the more prestigious positions are held by Russians. Because of strong ties to their ancestral localities and a lack of fluency in the Russian language, moreover, native residents of those republics tend to be less mobile, which limits their opportunities for migration to districts where jobs are more plentiful. (U/OU)

Largely because of the nation's chronic shortage of workers, particularly skilled ones, unemployment is virtually nonexistent. For several decades, the regime has disavowed the presence of joblessness and made no effort to gage its magnitude. Similarly, the regime's efforts at mobilizing greater numbers of persons into the work force, either on a full-time or part-time basis, and at reducing inefficiency while increasing productivity no doubt have reduced underemployment. However, frictional unemployment resulting from labor turnover has been a major impediment to the maximum utilization of manpower. Among every 100 industrial wageworkers employed during 1970, for example, 30 were separated from their original places of work; 21 of the 30 either resigned voluntarily or were fired for disciplinary infractions, often for reasons relating to dissatisfaction with living and working conditions. (C)

b. Labor legislation

An extensive body of legislation governing labor affairs has existed since 1922, when the first labor code was enacted. From that year until the death of Stalin, however, the code and supplementary statutes by and large were ignored. Motivated by the desire to raise productivity, in the post-Stalin years the regime has enforced the legislation more strictly and introduced new measures. Because many provisions of the basic law were obsolete, moreover, a comprehensive recodification, known as the Principles of Labor Legislation, was passed in 1970; when it went into effect on 1 January 1971, it superseded all previous labor legislation. Rather than introducing fundamental changes in the functioning of labor affairs, however, the new law emphasized procedural

modifications in the conduct of industrial relations. More importantly perhaps, it failed to provide adequate enforcement machinery, thereby severely limiting its efficacy as an instrument to protect workers' rights. (C)

Besides establishing the rights and obligations of workers, the 1970 labor code regulates all aspects of employment—labor contracts, worktime, remuneration, health and safety, and labor disputes. In the past, rules pertaining to these matters were loosely written, resulting in widespread confusion and discontent among workers and illegal practices by managers. The new statute failed to correct all ambiguities stemming from imprecise wording, but, by bringing all the rules of employment under a single act, the number of contradictions has been reduced. (C)

During the mid-1960's, the 5-day workweek gradually replaced the 6-day workweek which had remained in effect for about 50 years for most wage and salary earners. In terms of the total number of hours worked, however, the length of the normal workweek (41 hours) remained unchanged, as the length of the workday was extended from about 7 hours to about 8. For workers ages 16 to 18, as well as for those of all ages in occupations specified by law as arduous and hazardous, the length of the workday is 1 hour shorter than that for the bulk of the wage and salary earners; also, selected workers, such as teachers and doctors, put in shorter workdays. During 1971 the average length of the workweek among adult industrial wage earners was 40.7 hours, down from 47.8 hours in 1955 and 58.5 hours in 1913; taking into account all wage and salary earners, including young workers and professionals, the average workweek in 1971 was 39.4 hours. (U/OU)

Overtime work is forbidden without prior authorization by trade union officials and public authorities; even then, it is permitted only under special circumstances stipulated by law, each worker being limited in theory to 120 hours of such work annually. A maximum of 4 hours of overtime work within 2 consecutive days is allowed, with time and a half paid for the ninth and tenth hours and doubletime for all hours in excess of 10 during each work period. Workers under age 18, certain partially disabled persons, and expectant or nursing mothers are exempt from overtime labor. Refusal to work overtime when such work is deemed critical is considered to be a breach of labor discipline, and violators are subject to punishment. If the worker believes that management's request for overtime is unreasonable, he may lodge a complaint with his enterprise's trade union committee, with its labor protection commission, or with a public labor inspector. (U/OU)

Eight legal holidays are observed: New Year's Day (1 January), International Women's Day (8 March), International Labor Days (1 and 2 May), World War II Victory Day (9 May), Anniversary of the 1917 Revolution (7 and 8 November), and Constitution Day (5 December). If a rest day coincides with a holiday, workers are not entitled to a substitute day of rest. In 1968 the minimum amount of annual vacation with pay was increased from 12 to 15 days. The length of paid vacations, however, ranges anywhere from 15 to 48 days. Those receiving the longer periods are minors, holders of hazardous or arduous jobs, workers in the Far North, and professionals in scientific and educational fields. In 1971 the average industrial worker received 17.9 paid vacation days, while the typical construction laborer received 14.5 days. (U/OU)

Legislative provisions concerning the conditions of work for women and children are extensive. Among other things, the contemporary statute stipulates that women and youths cannot be employed in arduous or hazardous work, and they cannot perform nightwork. Pregnant women are entitled to maternity leave, amounting to 112 calendar days for normal childbirth and to a longer period if complications arise. In addition, nursing mothers are granted shorter workdays, and pregnant women are transferred, if necessary, to lighter duties at the same rate of pay. Soviet law stipulates that the basic working age is 16 years, but youths of 15 may be hired in exceptional cases provided approval is obtained from the appropriate trade union committee. Collective farming, however, is exempt from the minimum age regulation, and it is not unusual for youngsters ages 12 to 15 to be employed at such installations. (U/OU)

In accordance with the Principles of Labor Legislation, enterprises must maintain safe and hygienic working conditions. Management is required to provide special protective equipment for those who labor under harsh environmental conditions or who handle toxic or otherwise dangerous substances. Specific regulations governing the safety and hygiene of workplaces are drafted by the State Committee for Labor and Wages in conjunction with the Ministry of Health and the All-Union Central Council of Trade Unions (AUCCTU); they are enforced both through a system of inspectorates under the guidance of these organizations and through the public procurator's office. (U/OU)

c. Labor organizations (U/OU)

A trade union movement in the sense that workers freely choose representatives to champion their objectives does not exist in the Soviet Union. The

regime wields absolute control over wages, work hours, and working conditions, as well as over the social insurance system. Nevertheless, as of mid-1973, approximately 95% of eligible workers were reported to be trade union members. The largest group of workers remaining outside the unions are collective farmers, who, although constituting nearly one-fifth of the labor force, are not eligible for membership.

Soviet trade unions are organized along industrial rather than craft lines, and virtually all wage and salary workers, whether blue-collar or white-collar, are union members. Although membership in a union is not obligatory, the welfare benefits that accrue to members promote a high degree of participation. Trade union members, for example, receive twice the sickness benefits available to nonmembers; disability benefits also are higher. In addition, members receive priority in the allocation of housing and in obtaining passes to health resorts and sanatoriums. Children of members are more likely to be admitted to nurseries and summer camps. In addition, loans from mutual aid funds, free legal counsel, libraries, and recreational activities and clubs are available to union members. Union dues range from 0.5% to 1% of monthly earnings above 70 rubles.

Within the administrative structure of organized labor, the basic unit is the local trade union committee, nominally elected by the membership in any enterprise, institution, or economic unit having 15 or more union members. In fact, however, such elections frequently are dominated by factory officials, and the committee invariably receives orders and instructions from the trade union hierarchy, the party, and management rather than from its constituency.

Trade union locals send representatives to conferences, or congresses, held at the regional, republic, and national levels. The national conference of any given trade union represents in theory the highest authority for that organization. Each of the regional, republic, and national conferences in turn elects a central committee, which serves as a permanent administrative organ. The regional and republic trade union conferences of the various unions also elect representatives to interunion councils which coordinate labor matters at their respective levels.

The national conferences or congresses of the various unions choose delegates to the All-Union Congress of Trade Unions, which in turn elects the AUCCTU (Figure 29). As the highest ranking administrative entity within organized labor, the AUCCTU selects a presidium and a chairman. In theory, the All-Union Congress of Trade Unions meets every 4 years, but in fact the intervals have been longer, the maximum being 17 years between the




FIGURE 29. Trade union structure (U/OU)

ninth (1932) and 10th (1949) congresses. Between congresses, the AUCCTU implements the policies adopted by the last congress, exercises control over all trade union organizations and activities through inspectors and professional union organizers, and collaborates with the government on matters affecting labor. Party control is exercised through party members attached to union bodies; it is, however,

concentrated in the upper echelons of the trade union structure.

At all levels the organizational structure of the labor unions generally parallels that of the Communist Party, and changes in the latter usually are attended by similar changes in the former. In 1962, for instance, when the party apparatus was divided into separate organizations to control industry and agriculture, the AUCCTU formed separate bureaus for industry and agriculture in the various interunion councils at all levels. After the fall of Khrushchev, the party restored its pre-1962 structure, and the trade unions followed suit almost immediately.

Soviet trade unionism is founded on the general premise that the workers own the means of production and regulate the distribution of goods. Because of the workers' supposed commonality of interest with the state, the main functions of unions are directed at insuring fulfillment of the economic plan and at raising productivity as a means for improving the economic lot of the workers. Inasmuch as wages and conditions of work are regulated by law or by administrative fiat, trade union guardianship of the interests of their constituents is confined mainly to affording protection against infractions of established rules and to overseeing management's compliance with existing agreements. In a seeming paradox, however, an even greater share of union energies is expended in guarding management from disciplinary infractions by workers.

Nominally, each enterprise's local committee has the right to participate in drawing up production plans for the workplace and in determining a wage schedule. Production conferences, which bring together representatives of labor, management, and other interested parties, create the illusion that unions do, indeed, play a role in the control of production. Because of their responsibility for increasing production, one of organized labor's main responsibilities has been that of planning and encouraging various forms of competition and emulation among workers.

Notwithstanding the inability of Soviet trade unions to function as champions of labor in the Western sense, the unions are not without importance. By participating in the intricate propaganda machinery orchestrated by the Communist Party, they play a vital role in bending workers to the goals of the regime. The unions maintain 10 major newspapers, most of which are published jointly with a ministry or central board responsible for overseeing the corresponding industrial branch. Those having the largest circulation, however, are sponsored directly by the

AUCCTU. They include *Trud* (Labor) and *Sovetskiy Sport* (Soviet Sport), with circulations of 5.0 and 2.6 million, respectively, in 1972. In addition, the unions publish 11 mass-circulation magazines, the most important of which are *Sovetskiye Profsoyuzy* (Soviet Trade Unions), and *Sovetskaya Zhenshchina* (Soviet Woman); the latter contains significant political commentary and is issued in multilingual editions.

Soviet trade unions also are entrusted with certain functions which, in Western nations, normally are performed by the government. Thus, they administer most of the worker welfare programs, notably those pertaining to pensions, disability and maternity benefits, resorts and rest homes, and facilities for the care of members' children. So as to administer these activities at the various levels, the trade union system maintains an elaborate apparatus, which maintains a close relationship with various agencies of government. Although nominally independent, the trade unions have in fact become surrogates of the regime and are active instruments of governmental and party policy. Indicative of this, key decrees on labor policy normally are endorsed by the Central Committee of the Communist Party, by the Council of Ministers of the U.S.S.R., and by the AUCCTU.

d. Labor and management (U/OU)

In the U.S.S.R. labor and management alike are employees of the state and both operate under strict regulation by the regime. Management is required to obey the laws and directives governing wages, hours, sick and vacation leave, dismissals, transfers, and various other details of the day-to-day relationship with workers. The trade unions, in turn, act to some extent as a check on management to assure that their members are treated in accordance with the laws. Collective agreements between management and labor stipulate in detail the manner in which the laws and directives of the central authorities are implemented within each workplace. Disputes between the two groups arise primarily when management is accused by labor of either violating or misinterpreting the law or the terms of collective agreements.

Labor agreements in the U.S.S.R. do not evolve from free collective bargaining as practiced in much of the West. Soviet collective agreements, renewed on a yearly basis, serve primarily as a means of applying national policy at the enterprise level. About 100,000 such agreements are concluded annually between trade union locals and enterprise managers. Only a fraction of each year's agreements constitute revisions, however, as most contracts simply are extended from year to year.

Collective agreements stress the importance of fulfilling production goals prescribed by the authorities. Following a general statement concerning the obligations of labor and management, there are sections dealing with wage scales; with the organization and conditions of work, including provisions for health and safety; with labor discipline; and with the provision of housing, social welfare, and cultural facilities. While wage rates are not determined by collective agreement, the contracts stipulate that the employer is to adhere to official scales. In accordance with the agreement, management and the union jointly assume responsibility for adjusting norms in response to changing technology and so as to increase productivity.

The Soviet method for settling labor disputes differs markedly from that employed in the United States. Working conditions, hours of work, and remuneration, the dominant concerns of most Western trade unionists, are fixed by the regime in the U.S.S.R. Strikes and lockouts, although not explicitly prohibited by law, are considered "counterrevolutionary" by the regime and are swiftly suppressed. While the more punitive labor laws have been revoked since 1953, there remain measures designed to insure discipline among workers, with penalties of up to 3 years' imprisonment for organizing or taking part in "group actions" which impede the operation of state and public institutions or enterprises. Unauthorized absenteeism is punishable by disciplinary measures at the discretion of management. Nonetheless, sporadic, localized strikes and riots have occurred during the past decade, but they have been quickly suppressed and never officially admitted. Despite the heavy emphasis on labor discipline, disagreements over a number of issues occur regularly. The main causes of labor disharmony involve job classification; wage scales, overtime pay, and severance pay; vacations; time lost by work stoppages and layoffs; wage payments in connection with transfers; fines imposed for the infraction of rules; damage caused by workers and reimbursement therefor; dismissals; and the receipt of fringe benefits. The machinery created to handle such disputes serves to provide the worker with some sense of participation in management and, consequently, of influence over working conditions.

Three groups are involved in the handling of worker grievances: joint commissions on labor disputes, comprising representatives of the enterprise local committee and management, which operate within each workplace; the enterprise local committee itself; and the courts. Decisions of the joint commissions ostensibly are based on full consideration of the facts at issue and on the proper application of the pertinent

regulations or agreements. If a worker fails to obtain satisfaction before the joint commission, an appeal may be made to the enterprise local committee, which may sustain or modify the decision of the joint commission, or pass on issues on which the commission was unable to agree. If a worker remains dissatisfied, an appeal may be made before the courts. Management, on the other hand, may appeal to the courts only if it feels that the enterprise local committee's decision contravenes existing legislation or regulations. The worker is entitled to legal assistance from his union and incurs no financial costs in connection with a court appeal.

Even with this elaborate machinery, considerable effort is made to reach a consensus promptly and as close as possible to the source of the dispute. Grievances are not brought before the joint commission until a worker has tried and failed to get satisfaction directly from management. Often the chairman of the enterprise local committee discusses the matter with the foreman or other management representatives and settles the case informally. The great majority of such decisions are accepted and put into effect without appeal, so that decreasing numbers of cases reach the joint commissions or the higher bodies.

5. Social security (U/OU)

a. Social insurance

An extensive program of social insurance, in the sense that it covers both a wide range of contingencies and a large segment of the population, operates in the Soviet Union. In accordance with the Constitution, "citizens of the U.S.S.R. are entitled to material security in old age and in case of sickness and disability." Except for medical services, however, which are free to all, the benefits available under the social insurance program do not accrue in equal measure to all members of society. Urban residents, for example, receive more generous benefits than rural dwellers, and union members are entitled to more assistance, whether in cash or in the use of welfare services, than nonunion workers. The quality of welfare services, moreover, is better in the larger cities than elsewhere. Generally, the income maintenance provisions do not provide complete protection against losses. And, while pensions have been improved, they amount to about one-half of the average wage; for many if not most retirees, pensions are lower even than the legal minimum wage. As a result, many pensioners, and particularly their survivors, are obliged to live under substandard conditions. Consistent with the regime's position that joblessness is

nonexistent, unemployment compensation is not provided.

The pension law of 1956, a milestone in Soviet social security legislation, increased the number of persons eligible for benefits and also substantially raised the level of benefits. It extended coverage to nearly all workers, the notable exception being collective farmers, who were not brought under the system until 1965, and then only with partial benefits. In 1967 additional legislation liberalized the benefits granted to collective farmers. Nevertheless, retired wage and salary earners are entitled to markedly higher pensions—the average for such individuals being about 60 rubles per month, as opposed to approximately 17 rubles for collective farmers. Pension amounts are derived from a sliding scale based on earnings during the last year of employment. Although the base amount of pensions is subject to a ceiling of 120 rubles per month, supplements are awarded for length of service in a single workplace and for dependents.

Men normally become eligible for retirement pensions at age 60, with 25 years of service, and women at 55, with 20 years of service. Age and length of service requirements are reduced by 5 to 10 years for those engaged in difficult or hazardous work, as well as for mothers of five or more children, for the blind, and for dwarfs. Eligibility for invalidity and survivors benefits is established at 2 to 20 years of work for men and at 1 to 15 years for women, depending on the age of the insured worker at the time of invalidity or death and on the type of occupation. Pensions for invalids are based on the degree of invalidity and on the amount of previous earnings. Survivor's pensions can range from 21 to 120 rubles per month, governed by the number and relationship of the survivors, as well as by the amount earned by the insured. Regardless of the type of pension, the amount of benefits is reduced 15% for rural residents.

Disability benefits rank second to pensions as the largest social insurance expenditure. Temporarily disabled individuals receive 100% of earnings, subject to a minimum of 30 rubles per month, from the time the disability is incurred until recovery. Permanently disabled persons receive anywhere from 21 to 120 rubles per month, depending on the nature of the disability and the amount of earnings. Supplements are added for those disabled while engaged in arduous or hazardous work and for dependents. Medical care is provided by the regular governmental health agencies. The dependents of those who perish as a result of work injuries are eligible for benefits, which also range from 21 to 120 rubles per month, depending on the amount of the insured worker's earnings and on the number of

survivors. For rural residents, the amount of disability benefits is reduced 10% to 15%.

Cash benefits and medical care are guaranteed under the sickness and maternity coverage of the insurance program. Based on the length of employment, sick pay ranges from 50% to 90% of earnings and is payable from the day of incapacitation until recovery; the benefits are 10% lower for rural dwellers and 50% lower for nonunion workers. Maternity benefits are the equivalent of anywhere from two-thirds to the full amount of earnings, depending on the length of employment, and are payable 8 weeks before and 8 weeks after childbirth (10 weeks after in the case of complicated delivery). Nonunion workers receive only two-thirds of earnings in maternity benefits. Whether unionized or not, however, medical services are provided by the public health facilities. Pregnant women and nursing mothers are permitted to transfer to lighter work while retaining the same pay. Grants of 12 rubles for a layette and 18 rubles for baby food are provided if the monthly family earnings are under 50 rubles.

b. Welfare assistance

Technically outside the social insurance system, the state's family allowance program is, nonetheless, related to it. Under the program a flat grant of 20 rubles is paid to families upon the birth of their third child; for subsequent births, the amount of the stipend is increased progressively, the maximum sum being 250 rubles for the 11th child and for additional ones beyond that number. Also, a monthly allowance of 4 rubles is paid for the fourth child until age 5; for families having more than four children, the allowance is scaled upward to a maximum of 15 rubles for the 11th and all subsequent offspring. Unwed mothers receive monthly child support payments, beginning at the time of the child's birth and continuing until the 12th birthday; the payments rise from 5 rubles per month for the first child to 10 rubles for the third and all succeeding ones. An extensive network of nurseries, kindergartens, day schools, and boarding schools, most of which are free or charge nominal fees, accommodate the children of working mothers.

Besides pensions and other cash benefits, welfare assistance for the aged, disabled, and handicapped includes institutional placement and medical care. Additionally, those able to work are offered training, or retraining, and job placement assistance. Such services are administered by the ministries of social security (which operate solely at the republic level). For educable school-age youngsters who are disabled or handicapped, the national Ministry of Education operates a network of specialized schools, including

facilities for the visually impaired, blind, deaf, and mentally retarded, as well as for children with speech defects and orthopedic impairments. Children who are not trainable are placed in homes for the physically handicapped or mentally deficient; these facilities are managed by the social security ministries. Societies for the deaf and blind assist the government in supervising the training and working conditions of individuals who suffer such handicaps.

c. Administration and funding

The manner of administering the nation's social insurance and welfare services has remained basically unchanged since the 1930's. The entities involved include the republic ministries of social security, the Ministry of Education, the Ministry of Health, and the AUCCTU. Individuals requiring medical care are referred to an agency of the Ministry of Health. If the best approach to solving a person's problem is through training, referral is made to an agency of the Ministry of Education, and if long-term custodial care or economic assistance are called for, a social security agency is contacted. Workers in need of assistance, whether economic or social, arising out of temporary illness, or for rest and recreation, apply to their trade union. Of the four types of bodies, however, only the 15 ministries of social security devote their resources exclusively to public welfare, this being an auxiliary function for the remaining three.

Republic social security ministries are tied to the national administration through the bureau for state pensions, an entity of the State Committee for Labor and Wages. By contrast, the ministries of Health and of Education function directly at both national and republic levels. Thus, by being less important in the bureaucratic hierarchy, the social security ministries have fewer resources and are staffed by less competent personnel than the national ministries, and deficiencies exist in the coordination of welfare services.

Since 1933, when it became responsible for planning and administering the worker welfare benefits, the AUCCTU has played a major role in the social insurance system and in managing welfare activities. Trade union social insurance commissions are established in every state enterprise employing 100 or more workers. Besides processing pension and other social insurance claims, the commissions adjudicate whatever liability disputes arise between the workers and management, operate and issue passes to rest homes and sanatoriums, prepare social insurance budgets for the enterprise, and supervise programs designed to reduce the incidence of occupational illnesses and injuries. Regional trade union councils supervise the commissions, the AUCCTU being

ultimately responsible for overseeing the entire program. In this capacity, the AUCCTU disburses nearly three-fourths of all funds allocated for social insurance and welfare services. The remaining one-fourth is expended by health, education, and social security agencies, as well as by the ministries of Defense and of Internal Affairs and other organizations, including cooperatives and collective farms, which attend to the welfare needs of specialized occupational groups.

Largely as the result of the ever increasing number of pensioners² and of the expansion in welfare services that has attended urban growth, expenditures for social insurance and welfare activities have increased appreciably, as indicated by the following percentages of the state budget allocated directly for such purposes:

1940	5.4
1960	13.4
1965	13.8
1970	14.1
1971	14.3
1972	14.7 (preliminary)

Having more than doubled since 1960, when they totaled 10 billion rubles, the expenditures for social insurance and welfare services in 1971 amounted to nearly 25 billion rubles, 72% of the sum having been for pension programs (Figure 30). In 1972, 27.3 billion rubles were budgeted for such expenditures, with slightly over 73% of the amount being for pensions.

²Between 1940 and 1970, the number of pensioners, including civilians and military veterans retired because of advanced age or invalidity, plus their dependents, increased slightly more than tenfold, reaching a total of 40.1 million in the latter year. Of that number, 12.1 million were collective farmers and 4.4 million were veterans, both totals having included dependents.




FIGURE 30. Social insurance and welfare expenditures, 1971 (USSR)

E. Religion (U/OU)

1. Government and religion

Marx wrote that "religion is the opiate of the people," and Lenin subsequently made this idea a cornerstone of Communist dogma on religion. The Soviet regime has made it clear that it is implacably opposed to all religions and that its ultimate aim is their total destruction. In 1961 the 22d Party Congress set 1980 as the date when "religious prejudices" would be overcome, simultaneous with the expected achievement of communism in the U.S.S.R.

In the interim the regime has addressed itself not only to the combating of religious belief but also to the neutralization and control of existing church organizations. To these ends, the execution of its policy has vacillated between repression and toleration, the regime bearing down during periods of confidence and easing up when trying to win the support of the people. Since the fall of Khrushchev, pressure on religious expression has slackened somewhat, but the various churches have regained none of the ground lost in 1959-64, the latest period of severe repression.

The Declaration of the Rights of the Peoples of Russia, published by the Soviet regime within a week of its seizure of power in 1917, abolished all religious privileges and restrictions. It thereby did away with the traditional classification of the different religions in the country as "dominant" (Russian Orthodoxy), "tolerable" (Roman Catholicism, Lutheranism, Islam, the Armenian Church, and other religions professed by non-Russians), and "intolerable" (sects and schisms within Orthodoxy, missionary religions among the Orthodox, and Judaism). This declaration was followed early in 1918 by a decree which disestablished Russian Orthodoxy as the state church; stripped all churches of civil functions, such as registration of births, marriages, and deaths; banned religious oaths and public rites; nationalized the property of religious organizations without compensation; ended all state expenditures for religion and state support for the clergy, as well as the right of a church to tax members; removed religion from school curriculums; and closed down religious schools. Other measures allowed antireligious propaganda, reduced priests and other clerics to a socially inferior position, banned all religious instruction to persons under age 18, withdrew legal recognition of church marriages and divorces, and dissolved monasteries and convents.

In 1929 a decree was enacted to establish rigid rules for church activity, deal with the legal position of religious organizations, and codify earlier regulations.

According to this decree, the state recognized those religious denominations whose adherents registered as religious societies (more than 20 believers) or groups of believers (less than 20). Following registration with the local civil authorities, the religious society or group of believers was eligible to negotiate with these authorities for the use of buildings and objects of worship. The collection of funds by national or regional church organizations was banned, such activity to be carried on only by the registered local religious societies or groups of believers and only among their membership. Out of these donations the church buildings and clergy were to be maintained. Charitable activity on the part of the society or group was forbidden, as was the establishment of church-sponsored mutual aid funds, medical aid units, cooperatives, literary, handicraft, or study groups, and sports organizations. Registered societies and groups of believers were allowed to organize regional and national congresses, which could elect administrative bodies. The 1929 decree still largely determines church organization and activity in the Soviet Union, although some modifications have been introduced. For example, according to a 1945 decree, churches were given the right to build, rent, or acquire property and articles of worship.

All religious groups are under the supervision of the Council for Religious Affairs, a body attached to the U.S.S.R. Council of Ministers which exercises control over local church activities through officials at the local and republic levels. Government authorities approve the appointments of the hierarchies of all denominations. Religious works, like all other publications in the U.S.S.R., must be cleared by the state censor. Other practical problems, such as obtaining building materials for the construction and repair of churches and church-connected buildings, arranging for the manufacture of articles of worship, and obtaining foreign currency for churchmen traveling abroad, are handled by the appropriate state agencies once the Council for Religious Affairs has granted its approval.

In exchange for the official toleration of religion, the regime has extracted support for its "peace" policies from prominent religious leaders. Soviet church organizations have been the principal backers of the World Christian Peace Conference based in Prague and also have taken part in the Communist-front World Peace Council. From time to time, church organizations have also denounced U.S. and Israeli "aggression," concomitantly backing the "just" struggle of the Vietnamese, Arabs, and other peoples. The government has on occasion given support and material assistance to various denominations when

such efforts have aided Soviet foreign policy, and it has sanctioned and even prompted efforts by Soviet religious groups to exert influence or control over fellow communicants abroad. In 1970 there were 14 officially recognized religious groups: Russian Orthodox, Georgian Orthodox, Old Believer, Evangelical Christian Baptist (including Pentecostals and Mennonites), Seventh-day Adventist, Molokan (Spiritual Christian), Lutheran, Calvinist (Reformed), Methodist, Roman Catholic, Armenian Apostolic, Muslim, Buddhist, and Jewish.

Although the regime has, within limits, tolerated and made use of organized religion, it continues to sponsor atheistic propaganda to destroy religious belief. The basic outlines of the campaign against religion were set down in 1923 and included the following measures to be taken: 1) publication of scientific literature which would "seriously elucidate the history and origin of religion," and of pamphlets and leaflets which would "unmask the counter-revolutionary role of religion and the church;" 2) organization of "mass antireligious propaganda;" and 3) special training of party agitators and propagandists for the "struggle against religion," and organization under party supervision of "special antireligious study circles and seminars."

The first atheist newspaper, founded late in 1922, was *Bezbozhnik* (The Godless), and a League of the Godless was organized in 1925 as a mass organization to spread atheism. In addition to issuing atheist publications and conducting courses in numerous languages, the league opened and maintained antireligious museums, usually in confiscated church buildings, organized antireligious festivals coinciding with church holidays, conducted ceremonial burnings of icons and seizures of church bells, and carried out a campaign of church closures in response to "popular demand." After 1930 the intensity of the atheist campaign slackened—*Bezbozhnik* shut down temporarily from 1934 to 1938 and for good in 1941, the number of antireligious museums declined, antireligious festivals were discontinued, and the league itself was disbanded immediately after the German invasion in 1941.


A powerful revival of religion during the war persuaded the regime that the earlier blatant antireligious campaigns would have to be replaced by subtler methods. Beginning in 1944, the Central Committee of the Communist Party stressed the need for "scientific educational" propaganda in order to "overcome the revivals of ignorance, superstition, and prejudice." The All-Union Society for the Dissemination of Political and Scientific Knowledge, one of whose tasks was to conduct antireligious propaganda,

was organized in 1947. Maintaining its campaign against religion, it was renamed the *Znaniye* (Knowledge) Society in 1963. A new periodical devoted solely to atheism and religion, *Nauka i religiya* (Science and Religion), began to appear in 1959 under the society's auspices. At the same time, a network of Atheist Houses, Atheist Clubs, and Universities of Atheism was established at the local level to act as focal points for antireligious work. In 1964 an Institute of Scientific Atheism was set up in the Academy of Social Sciences attached to the Communist Party Central Committee to improve the level of atheistic propaganda and the training of propagandists, and to direct and coordinate antireligious work at all levels.


From 1954 to 1959 there was a lull in the antireligious campaign as a result of limitations set by the party on the ridicule of religious people and the use of "administrative action"—i.e., coercion. From 1959 to 1964, however, the antireligious campaign once again intensified by degrees, reaching a peak just before Khrushchev's fall. This period witnessed the forcible closure of many churches, monasteries, convents, and seminaries (Figure 31), and virulent attacks on ministers of religion. Since that time, in step with regime efforts to assure support for the leadership, antireligious propaganda has become somewhat less strident, although it is still much in evidence. Besides the usual methods of printed and visual propaganda, lectures, and courses, other devices have been resorted to with varying success. These include the introduction of secular ceremonies to replace baptism, confirmation, and religious marriages and funerals, or to obscure religious festivals.

Although severe repression and more than a half century of atheistic and antireligious propaganda have been mainly responsible for the decline of religion in the Soviet Union, the changes introduced by the increasing urbanization of the country have also been a factor. It has been estimated that the total number of professing believers for all religions dropped from approximately four-fifths of the population in 1914 to about one-fourth by the early 1970's. Along with this group should be cited the large number of nominal believers and even nonbelievers who persist in religious practices relating to baptism, marriage, and burial. Statistics on the extent of this custom are not known, but on the basis of a poll taken in the city of Gorkiy late in the 1960's well over three-fifths of the young couples interviewed had had their children baptized.

Most of the believers belong to one of the 14 recognized religious groups. There also exist a large number of religious bodies—perhaps 30 to 40—which are either ignored by the authorities or harassed as



Former Church of Simeon Stopnik (Russian Orthodox), Moscow, now an exhibition hall (C)



Former Muslim theological seminary, Tashkent, now an office building (C)

FIGURE 31. Edifices built for religious purposes now put to secular use

illegal organizations. This "religion of the catacombs" in the Soviet Union has many shapes and forms, ranging from Uniate churches recognizing the Papacy to small circles of Jehovah's Witnesses, and new groups are constantly forming.

In addition to those members of the population at large who have either remained loyal or returned to organized religion, there are notable individual examples within the intelligentsia, such as Alexander Solzhenitsyn, who have found in religion a system of values and ethics that serves as an alternative to that offered by communism. For a larger number of intellectuals motivated by an awakened nationalism,

the church is seen as the inheritor and transmitter of the traditions of the past, and as such its architecture, art, music, literature—and if necessary even its beliefs—must be preserved.

2. The Orthodox churches

Eastern Orthodoxy in its various forms has from 30 million to 35 million adherents in the Soviet Union. These include large numbers of Russians, Ukrainians, Belorussians, Moldavians, Georgians, Chuvash, Mordvins, Udmurts, Mari, and Komi, and smaller numbers of Estonians, Latvians, Tatars, Ossetians, Koreans, and other groups.

a. The Russian Orthodox Church

By far the largest group in Eastern Orthodoxy is the Russian Orthodox Church, whose fate and that of the Russian state have been interconnected for nearly a thousand years. The first contacts between the Eastern Slavs (Russians, Ukrainians, and Belorussians) and Byzantine Christianity were made through Bulgarian Slavs in the eighth century. The ruling class began to adopt Christianity in the ninth century, and the first mass conversion took place in about 860. Christianity and paganism coexisted until 988, when Vladimir, Grand Duke of Kiev (at that time the senior Russian ruler), declared Orthodoxy the official Russian faith.

The Russian church remained subordinate to the Patriarch in Constantinople for the next 500 years, but in the 13th and 14th centuries these ties were seriously weakened on the one hand by the Mongol invasion and isolation of Russia and on the other by the Western crusaders' seizure and temporary control of Constantinople. During this period the church rallied the squabbling Russian princes and persuaded them to accept the leadership of the Grand Duke of Moscow. At the same time it began a successful mission to the pagan Finnic tribes on the fringes of Russian rule. In 1448 the Russian church became autocephalous, determining its own affairs without reference to Constantinople and choosing its own Metropolitan (Archbishop). The fall of Constantinople to the Turks in 1453 convinced the Russians of the rightness of their decision. To their mind Moscow became the center of Orthodoxy and the last refuge of the unaltered faith.

A conflict arose early in the 16th century between advocates of a more spiritual religion and those of a centralized, power-oriented persuasion. The latter won out, and late in the century the Metropolitan of Moscow assumed the rank of Patriarch. However, the seeds were sown for schism. After a series of reforms were introduced in the mid-17th century in an attempt to bring Russian ritual into line with that of the Greeks, the church was split by the Great Schism, leading to the formation of the various sects of Old Believers. From this point on, the Russian Orthodox Church fought and lost a series of battles with the state. The office of Patriarch fell vacant in 1700 and was finally abolished by Peter I in 1721. The church was governed instead by a Holy Synod consisting of bishops named by the tsar and led by a high lay official. Throughout the rest of the imperial period the church functioned as a department of the government, and in the 18th century it lost to the state most of its economic wealth in the form of extensive lands. Concurrently its priests steadily declined in social status, so that by the 20th century their station in

Russian life was analogous to that held by petty officials.

Following the revolution of 1905, the Russian Orthodox Church underwent an intellectual and spiritual revival, and sentiment developed within it favoring separation of church and state. When the imperial regime collapsed, the church responded by calling a council for August 1917 and simultaneously democratizing its internal administrative structure. After 3 months of wrangling, finally terminated by the fact of the Bolshevik Revolution, the church council elected a Patriarch, Tikhon. The great revival of Orthodox Christianity, however, clashed head-on with revolutionary communism, and the church soon found that it was destined for annihilation. In swift succession it lost the remainder of its lands, its churches, monasteries and schools, its status as an established church, and its very corporate existence. Many of its leading clerics were arrested, exiled, and, in some cases, executed. Even the Patriarch was not spared, being jailed in 1922-23. At the same time, the regime promoted a schism within the church, leading to the creation of several groups to challenge the authority of the Patriarch. Following the Patriarch's release from jail, the church announced that it would no longer oppose Soviet power, and for this the regime withdrew its support of the various schismatic sects.

After the death of Tikhon in 1925, the office of Patriarch remained vacant for 18 years. At the height of World War II, Stalin allowed a council to be convened to fill the office. The new Patriarch, Sergey, died within a year, and in 1945 a successor, Aleksey, was elected. The latter served until his death in April 1970. Metropolitan Pimen of Krutitsy and Kolomna, whose see includes Moscow, filled the office as a *locum tenens* until June 1971, when he was elected Patriarch. The Patriarch exercises supreme church authority when the church council is not in session. The council, which consists of bishops, clerics, and laity and is convened only when necessary, is theoretically the highest church authority and is charged with electing a Patriarch when the office is vacated.

Regulations for administering the Russian Orthodox Church, drawn up by the council in 1945, vest governing power in a 10-man Holy Synod consisting of the Patriarch, the metropolitans of Leningrad-Ladoga, Kiyev-Galicia, and Krutitsy-Kolomna (including Moscow), three bishops drawn in rotation from the dioceses of the church, two administrators of the Moscow Patriarchy, and the chairman of the department of foreign ecclesiastical relations of the Patriarchy. Estimated to serve about 30 million more

or less active adherents, the church is divided into 73 dioceses whose boundaries coincide with Soviet administrative divisions. Each diocese is normally headed by a bishop who is elected by the Holy Synod and who administers the affairs of his diocese with the aid of a council consisting of from three to five persons. As of 1970 there were about 60 bishops in office; vacant sees are headed by temporary clerical administrators. The bishop ordains priests and deacons for his diocese and appoints various parish officials. Parishes are nominally headed by priests, but a church council elected by a general parish assembly serves as the actual executive body. The council is responsible for managing the church funds, which consist of voluntary offerings at divine services: payments for communion bread, candles, and other ritual accessories; and special donations. The antireligious campaign under Khrushchev resulted in the closing of a large number of Russian Orthodox churches. Of the 16,000 existing churches, only 6,000 reportedly survived.

A number of theological academies and seminaries have been allowed to function since 1944. In 1970 such institutions were operating at Zagorsk (near Moscow), Leningrad, and Odessa. Seminaries also functioned for varying intervals between 1944 and 1966 in five other locations.

The church has secured permission to issue a monthly review, the Russian-language *Zhurnal Moskovskoy Patriarkhiy* (Journal of the Moscow Patriarchate), but no provision is made for its sale or subscription, and the extent of its circulation is unknown. For propaganda purposes, a high proportion of its press run is sent abroad. Under the auspices of the Metropolitan of Kiev-Galicia, the church also issues the monthly Ukrainian-language *Pravoslavnyi Visnik* (Orthodox Herald).

Since the mid-1960's a number of Russian Orthodox clergymen, the most prominent among them being Metropolitan Yermogen of Kaluga, have addressed appeals to the Patriarch, the President of the Soviet Union, foreign church leaders and organizations, and the United Nations, detailing their discontent with the continued violation of constitutional guarantees of freedom of worship and other laws concerning religion. Increasingly this protest movement has joined its small voice with that of the intelligentsia, the principal link being church publicist A. Levitin-Krasnov, who made the initial connection by contributing material to the underground publication, *Phoenix* 1966, and who has subsequently taken part in several protests against specific acts of the regime. The official church response to this protest has been to

suspend the dissenting clergymen from their functions while denying the truth of the various charges.

The influence of the Russian Orthodox Church extends beyond the borders of the Soviet state, as the church has dioceses in France, Austria, Israel, Canada, and other countries. In an apparent change of policy, the Russian Church gave up its authority over its dioceses in the United States early in 1970, asserting that they should form the nucleus of a distinctly American Orthodox Church in conjunction with the other ethnic Orthodox bodies on U.S. soil.

Complicating the Russian Orthodox Church's relations with overseas Russian churches are the frequent conflicts between clergy loyal to the Patriarch and schismatics who have split away in the period since 1917; the differences arising between anti-Communist emigre laymen and representatives of the Patriarchate; and the process of de-Russification as the church has taken root outside the Soviet Union. From 1948 to 1956 the Moscow Patriarchate, with tacit government support, sought to establish its primacy not only over the scattered overseas church groups that have, or once had, connections with the Russian church, but also over the autonomous and autocephalous Orthodox churches in Eastern Europe and elsewhere. To this end, church leaders obtained permission for numerous trips abroad at a time when such opportunities were open only to a very small number of top government officials. In the process, representatives of the Russian Orthodox Church clashed with those of the Ecumenical Patriarchate in Istanbul, and subsequently with those of the Patriarchate of Serbia. In 1957 the Moscow Patriarchate announced its willingness to settle all canonical disputes with other Orthodox churches. At about this time the Russian church also made its first approaches to the ecumenical movement, abandoning first its strictures against Protestants and subsequently its denunciations of Rome. Contacts were established with the World Council of Churches in 1958, and the Russian church became a member in 1961. In the same year the church was permitted to accept an invitation to send observers to the opening session of the Second Vatican Council. Paradoxically, this acceptance came during the period when internal activity of the Moscow Patriarchate was at a postwar low because of official restrictions.

b. The Georgian Orthodox Church

The existence of the autocephalous Georgian Orthodox Church within the Soviet Union contravenes a basic principle of Eastern Orthodoxy—that the jurisdiction of each Orthodox church is based on

the state boundaries of the nation within which it functions. Thus, in the 1920's the Russian Orthodox Church fought and won a lengthy battle against autonomist and autocephalous trends which had arisen in the confused postrevolutionary years in Belorussia and the Ukraine. In 1940 and again in 1944, the Russian church reasserted its control over the autocephalous Orthodox churches in the formerly independent Baltic republics, in the formerly Polish-ruled areas of Belorussia and the Ukraine, in the formerly Czech-ruled Transcarpathian Ukraine, and in formerly Romanian-ruled Moldavia. The Russian church went one step further with respect to so-called Uniate churches in western Belorussia and the western Ukraine. These churches, recognizing the Papacy but using the Byzantine liturgy, were the subject of constant government and church pressure in the 18th and 19th centuries. The Uniate churches revived following the 1917 revolution but were again suppressed in the 1920's, and following World War II the Russian Orthodox Church, backed by the Soviet regime, presided over their liquidation in overt form on Soviet territory.

The Georgian Orthodox Church, which traces its origins back to approximately 330, became autonomous in the sixth century and autocephalous in the eighth. It developed its own Georgian liturgy and had only sporadic contact with Russian Orthodoxy before Georgia was incorporated piecemeal into the Russian empire in the late 18th and early 19th centuries. With this political absorption came a gradual Russification of the church, and the Georgians by degree drifted away from their traditional Orthodoxy. In 1917, however, a resurgent Georgian church again declared its autocephaly and elected a Catholicos (Patriarch) to lead it. The Russian church refused to recognize this step until 1943, when as part of the arrangement with the regime which resulted in a revival of its organization, it conceded the autocephalous status of the Georgian church.

Despite the normalization of its canonical status, the Georgian church has not returned to the same degree of health as the Russian church. With perhaps as many as 1 million communicants, it has fewer houses of worship and priests than an average Russian Orthodox diocese. There are seven bishops, only three of whom are in charge of dioceses. Publication activities are limited to a liturgical calendar, and although the church is reported to have a seminary, no recent information concerning it has come to light. Since 1960 the Georgian church has been headed by Catholicos Efrem II, who was elected by a church council, and since 1962 it has belonged to the World Council of Churches.

c. The Old Believers

Old Believers, or Old Ritualists, occupy a unique position, standing apart from both the Russian Orthodox Church and from the mass of groups usually termed "sectarians." They came into being in the Great Schism of 1666 as a conservative opposition to an Orthodox church which, under Greek influence, had supposedly distorted the ancient rites and liturgical books of Russian Christianity. The Old Believers are not a single church as they encompass a large variety of religious opinions. By the end of the 17th century they had split into two groups, the Priestists and the Priestless, over the question of whether to retain the priesthood and the other sacraments. Both groups subsequently underwent additional splits. Estimates of the total number of adherents vary widely, but most estimates fall between 1 million and 2 million. The bulk of Old Believers live in the European part of the U.S.S.R.

The largest group of Old Believers is the Church of the Belo-Krinitza Concord, a Priestist group formed in Austrian Bukovina (now part of the Ukrainian S.S.R.) in the mid-19th century. This group has a hierarchy with an archbishop in Moscow and five dioceses. It is governed by a council, and between sessions by an archepiscopal council. The Church of the Belo-Krinitza Concord owns its own printing press, but its publishing output is limited.

One group of Priestist Old Believers has persisted in resorting to dissident priests from the Russian Orthodox Church. This group is called the Church of the Fugitive Priests, or, more formally, the Old Believer Church of Ancient Orthodox Christians. In the confusion of the 1920's this church enlisted the aid of a defecting Orthodox bishop and created its own hierarchy. It is headed by an archbishop whose see is in Moscow, but little is known of its activities or strength.

The Priestless Old Believers have never inclined toward firm organizational ties, and the effect of religious persecution has been to encourage their natural tendency to split into ever smaller groups. The most important of these are centered in Moscow, Latvia, and Lithuania; the Lithuanian group sometimes being referred to as the Eastern Orthodox Church of the Ancient Rite.

3. Other Christian churches

a. The Evangelical Christian Baptist Church

Perhaps the most widespread of the non-Orthodox churches is the Evangelical Christian Baptist Church, the product of a "voluntary" union in 1944 of the

Evangelical Christians and the Baptists, with the Pentecostals joining in 1945 and the Mennonites in 1966. The union resulted from an attempt by the regime to establish a "clarification on the religious front" by the absorption of small groups and sects into larger bodies which would be easier to control. The Evangelical Christians trace their origins to English missionary work among the Russians in the latter half of the 19th century, and the Baptists derive from the adoption of German Protestant religious forms in the Ukraine somewhat earlier. The Mennonites in the union are descendants of a German group which was granted refuge in Russia in the 18th century, while the Pentecostal sect was introduced by Americans early in the 20th century.

In the 1920's, Evangelical Christians and Baptists benefited from official toleration aimed at undermining the dominant Orthodox church, and during this period both churches experienced substantial growth. Restoration of a working relationship between the regime and Orthodoxy brought a change in official attitudes toward the two non-Orthodox groups, but despite this they continued to grow. The most serious difficulty experienced by the church born of the 1944 merger occurred during the 1959-64 campaign against religion when various Evangelical and Baptist sects protested against policies adopted by the church under pressure from the regime. Among these groups were communities of "Pure" or "Free" Baptists, who maintained that they were free from submission to any religious hierarchy or to the Soviet authorities. In 1960 the church had been forced to issue new governing statutes calling for a sharp reduction in its activity. As a result, many of the Pure Baptist dissidents coalesced in an Action Group whose aims included removal of the restrictions, general decentralization and democratic reform. Despite government harassment and numerous arrests, the reformers had considerable success in winning a split from the parent church as well as from the population at large, and in 1965 they finally declared a schism. The Evangelical Christian Baptist Church, distressed at the split and alarmed by intensified governmental repression of the dissenters, sought to heal the division by making constitutional concessions and pressing for increased reform representation in its central bodies. However, the dissidents have remained convinced that there can be no accommodation, and several thousand have been jailed for their independent stance.

Estimated to comprise at least 3 million members, who conduct an active religious life as the law allows, the Evangelical Christian Baptist Church is governed

by an assembly of representatives which meets every 3 years. At each meeting the assembly elects a 25-member All-Union Council of Evangelical Christian Baptists which serves as the administrative body for the church. To keep in touch with the All-Union Council, presbyters (pastors) elect senior presbyters at regional meetings; presbyters in turn are chosen by the local congregations.

The Evangelical Christian Baptists do not maintain a theological seminary in the Soviet Union, but permission has been granted to set up a correspondence course for the training of clergy, and on occasion the regime has allowed individuals to study at Baptist seminaries in the United Kingdom, Sweden, West Germany, and Canada. The church engages in an active publishing program, issuing a bimonthly periodical, *Bratskiy Vestnik* (Fraternal Herald), as well as psalters and hymnals. It has also published an edition of the Bible. The Evangelical Christian Baptist Church has been a member of the World Council of Churches since 1962. Additionally, it belongs to the Baptist World Alliance, the European Church Conference, and the European Baptist Federation.

Smaller Evangelical groups influenced by the Evangelical Christian Baptist Church but not affiliated with it include Seventh-day Adventists and Molokans. Seventh-day Adventist beliefs spread to Russia from the United States via German settlements in the 19th century. The Molokans are an indigenous sect whose origins go back to the 18th century. They place great stress on the Bible and their beliefs draw some inspiration from the Quaker tradition.

b. The Evangelical Lutheran Church and other Protestant groups

The Evangelical Lutheran Church survives as the principal religion of Estonia and Latvia and as a minority religion in Lithuania. A large number of Germans and Finns in the Soviet Union are also Lutherans, but without a structural base for their religion many have tended to drift into the Evangelical Christian Baptist Church. The extensive network of the Lutheran Church existing in Russia before 1917 was gravely damaged following the separation of Finland and the Baltic republics from the disintegrating empire, and the subsequent identification of the church in the 1930's with ethnic Germans and Finns, whose mother countries were hostile to the U.S.S.R., was sufficient ground for the government to dissolve the Lutheran parishes. After the annexation of the Baltic republics in World War II, however, the Soviet Union found itself with a compact Lutheran community too large to extirpate

through exile. At present there are perhaps 1 million Lutherans in the Baltic area.

The officially sanctioned Estonian and Latvian Evangelical Lutheran churches are headed by a consistory and a supreme church council, respectively, and these bodies are responsible for electing members of the hierarchy. Lithuanian Lutherans also manage their affairs through a consistory but have no clerics above the local level. There is a severe shortage of Lutheran clergy because of the large-scale flight to the West or exile to Siberia of many pastors in the mid-1940's and the closing down of seminaries. As a makeshift substitute for theological training, the churches in the Baltic republics have instituted correspondence courses for pastoral preparation. Also, a few prospective pastors have been permitted to study in Western Europe. Publishing activity is limited. Both the Estonian and Latvian churches have been members of the World Council of Churches since 1962; they also belong to the Lutheran World Federation and the European Church Conference.

A few Protestant groups in the western border areas of the U.S.S.R. have managed to survive while most of their coreligionists in the interior have merged with the Evangelical Christian Baptists. Officially recognized among them are the Calvinists (Reformed), concentrated in the small Hungarian population of the Transcarpathian Ukraine, and minute Methodist communities in Estonia and the Ukraine.

c. The Roman Catholic Church

Through Russian acquisition of Polish territories in the 18th century, Roman Catholicism became one of the major churches within the empire. Previously it had been regarded by the Russians as the militant and hostile church of their dangerous neighbors to the west. The various attempts made by Rome to encroach on the Russian Orthodox Church, first through Crusades led by the Teutonic Knights in the 13th century and then through more or less compulsory unions enforced upon Orthodox dioceses under the authority of the Polish crown, combined with the centuries of estrangement between Rome and Constantinople, all made a deeply unfavorable impression on the Russian people and sometimes produced a profound hatred of what Orthodox believers called the "Latin Heresy." This heritage and the well-established hostility between Catholicism and communism placed the Roman Catholic Church at a marked disadvantage after the Russian Revolution. Having lost most of its territorial base following the separation of the Polish lands and Lithuania from Russia, the church found its adherents among

scattered upper class Russians, ethnic ~~Cossacks~~^{White} Poles, and Uniates of Ukrainian and ~~Polish~~^{Belarusian} nationality. None of these groups could ~~have~~^{is still} many friends in the Soviet regime, and an official split in the church in the 1930's led to its virtual liquidation.

Once again, territorial changes (1939-40 and 1944-45) resulted in Soviet acquisition of a large Catholic community, consisting of approximately 12 million adherents of the Latin and Byzantine rites concentrated in the western parts of the Ukraine and Belorussia, in Lithuania, and in southeastern Latvia, a development which changed the position of the church from a small and scattered group to the third largest religion (after Russian Orthodoxy and Islam) in the U.S.S.R. However, the subsequent forced reunion of the Byzantine Rite (Uniate) Catholics with the Orthodox Church, the repatriation to Poland of ethnic Poles, and the annihilation or exile of countless other believers, has reduced the number of Roman Catholics to an estimated 4 million, mostly in Lithuania and Latvia, with additional clusters in the western parts of Belorussia and the Ukraine and scattered groups in the R.S.F.S.R. Even though reduced by two-thirds, Roman Catholics reportedly still constituted the third largest religious group in the Soviet Union in 1970.

An accurate assessment of the situation of the Roman Catholic Church in the Soviet Union is difficult to make, but some of its dimensions can be gauged from a report made public by the Judiciary Committee of the U.S. House of Representatives in 1964. The report indicated that during the period from 1917 to 1959, in the U.S.S.R. and countries occupied by the Russians, almost 13,000 Catholic clergy were killed, more than 32,000 were imprisoned or exiled, and thousands of others were forced to abandon the priesthood and accept other jobs. In addition, seminaries and religious communities were dissolved, almost all churches were closed, and Catholic organizations were disbanded. Information released by Catholic sources in 1973 show a church structure which includes 10 dioceses (four in the R.S.F.S.R., four in Lithuania, one in Latvia, and one in the Ukrainian S.S.R.), and a hierarchy of eight bishops. Seven of the bishops are in Lithuania and one in Latvia; of the eight, three are known to be "impeded" in the exercise of their ministry and there is no evidence that the others are permitted to function with any effectiveness. Contacts with Rome are nonexistent. When the Vatican Council opened in 1961, no Roman Catholics from the Soviet Union were allowed to participate, although observers were sent by the Russian Orthodox Church. In addition to the Catholic ~~churches~~ that may be operating in Lithuania and Latvia, four are

reported to be open elsewhere in the Soviet Union—one each in Moscow, Leningrad, Odessa, and Tiflis. An American chaplain is stationed in Moscow to serve Catholics at the U.S. Embassy there.

Religious sentiment among Catholics in the Baltic region reportedly remains strong, despite restrictions on formal church organization and activities. When linked with nationalism, such sentiment can assume explosive proportions. For example, in May 1972, riots erupted in Kaunas, Lithuania, that were due at least in part to religious persecution, specifically the arrest and sentencing to 1 year's detention of two priests for violation of a 1966 decree banning religious instruction to children. During the rioting, buildings were set on fire, one policeman was killed, and 500 persons were arrested. Shortly after the arrest of the priests, an appeal for their release was signed by more than 17,000 Lithuanians and sent to Soviet leader Leonid Brezhnev and to the U.N. Secretary General.

d. The Armenian Apostolic Church

The Armenian Apostolic Church is perhaps the oldest Christian church on Soviet territory. Its origins go back to the beginning of the fourth century, when the King of Armenia was baptized and became the first monarch to decree Christianity as the religion of a whole nation. Actually, a Christian community had already been in existence in Armenia for nearly 100 years. In the fifth century the Armenian church refused to accept the decisions of the Council of Chalcedon, cutting itself off from the rest of Christianity, and from that point on its fate and that of the Armenian people and nation were identical.

The authority of the Catholicos of the Armenians, whose see is in Echmiadzin, was undivided until the mid-15th century when a second jurisdiction was founded in Cilicia, in what is now south-central Turkey. These two sees are independent of each other, but the Catholicos of Echmiadzin has primacy of honor over that of Cilicia (now resident in Lebanon), whose religious authority does not, in theory, go beyond the Middle East. The jurisdiction of the Echmiadzin Catholicos extends not only over the approximately 2 million Soviet members of the Armenian Apostolic Church but also over most Armenians of the diaspora. The Soviet Government is conscious that its treatment of the church can influence foreign Armenian communities, whose economic and political significance is not negligible, and repression of the Armenian church therefore has never been as rigorous as that of most other religious groups in the U.S.S.R.

The present Echmiadzin Catholicos, elected in 1955 by a national church assembly, is assisted by a

supreme council in the administration of church affairs. Only five of the 27 dioceses of the Armenian church are on Soviet territory, the others located in such disparate places as France, Indonesia, the United States, and Iran. Most of the church's followers in the U.S.S.R. outside the Armenian Republic are in adjacent Georgia and Azerbaijan and in a number of cities in the R.S.F.S.R.

The church runs a theological seminary which includes foreign Armenians among its student body and faculty. It is also allowed to publish a periodical, *Echmiadzin*, the bulk of whose press run is distributed abroad. Both divisions of the Armenian church entered the World Council of Churches in 1962, and the Armenian church of the Echmiadzin See also belongs to the European Church Conference. The Echmiadzin Catholicos has attended several conferences outside the U.S.S.R.

4. Islam

After the Russian Orthodox Church, Islam has the greatest number of followers, religious leaders, and places of worship within the Soviet Union. An estimated 15 million to 20 million Muslims are concentrated in the republics of Central Asia, adjacent Siberia, the central Volga regions, and the Caucasus. Approximately 10%, located mainly in Azerbaijan and Dagestan, are of the Shia branch of Islam; almost all of the remainder are of the Sunni branch. A small community of Ismailite Muslims loyal to the Aga Khan exists in the mountainous southeast border regions of Tadzhikistan. For the most part Turkic-speaking peoples, the Muslims of the U.S.S.R. came under Russian rule beginning with the conquest of Kazan in the 16th century and ending with annexation of the protectorates of Khiva and Bukhara early in the 20th century. The Russian conquest encountered fierce resistance, rooted in the doctrines of Islam which prescribe opposition to regimes of another faith. A particularly bloody struggle against the Russians took place in the Caucasus over a period of 80 years under the leadership of the fanatic Muridist sect. When it annexed the Muslim areas, the tsarist government declared the inhabitants subject to the laws of the empire, regardless of their national and cultural characteristics, but it left them their religion, which could be preached freely. The Muslim religious law, the Sharia, was left undisturbed, and Muslim religious schools (*madrasahs*) were preserved. Moreover, an ecclesiastical administration was formed to protect Muslim rights.

During the first 10 years of its existence, the Soviet regime was quite circumspect in its treatment of Islam.

By the late 1920's, however, the regime felt sufficiently confident to impose on the Muslims the same antireligious measures it had applied to others. Their schools were closed; religious law was abolished except in the narrowest ecclesiastical sense; the study of the Arabic language was banned; and religious endowment property was confiscated. In addition, numerous mosques were closed, Muslim clerics were arrested and exiled, and the central ecclesiastical administration was dissolved.

With the general revival of religion during World War II, Islam was able to recoup some of its losses. Four ecclesiastical administrations, selected by congresses of community representatives, were set up: in Ufa, covering the European regions of the U.S.S.R. and Siberia; in Tashkent, covering Central Asia; in Baku, covering the Transcaucasus; and in Buynaksk, covering the North Caucasus and Dagestan. Mosques were reopened, as were *madrasahs* in Bukhara and, for a brief time, in Tashkent. Editions of the Koran were printed in the 1950's, mostly for foreign consumption, and the regime began to allow a small number of believers to make the hajj (pilgrimage) to Mecca.

No specific information is available concerning the effect of the 1959-64 antireligious campaign on Soviet Muslims. In any case, Islam continues to survive within the Soviet Union, and it has been officially acknowledged that ritual practices such as circumcision and Islamic marriage and funeral ceremonies have persisted. The Soviet regime has found Islam to be much more firmly entrenched than it had initially believed, its basic staying power relatively unaffected by cultural regimentation, secular education, antireligious propaganda, and coercive measures.

5. Buddhism

Buddhism spread into the territories now occupied by the U.S.S.R. in the 17th and 18th centuries in the form of Lamaism, the so-called Yellow Cap sect of Buddhism, which was adopted by the Mongol Buryats and Kalmyks and the Turkic Tuvinians. The Russian Government recognized the religion as early as 1741 when it created the Bandido Hambo Lama to head the Buddhist hierarchy. The number of temples, monasteries, and clergy (lamas) grew rapidly throughout the next century, until the government became concerned about their proliferation and restricted further growth.

Following a period of relative toleration under the Soviet regime, the Buddhist religion suffered all the vicissitudes experienced by the other religious groups in the U.S.S.R., and on the eve of World War II organized Buddhism was on the verge of extinction.

The small (approximately 400,000) Buddhist community received a major blow when the Kalmyks were exiled to Siberia in 1943 and their cultural life snuffed out following charges of collaboration with the German invaders. During the war the remaining Buddhists did not seem to benefit from the general easing of conditions afforded other religions.

In the 1950's the Soviet regime decided to improve its image among Buddhist nations of the Far East by allowing a slight renewal of religious life to its own Buddhists. The Kalmyks were allowed to return home in 1958, but there were no traces of their traditional religion left in their home territory. Even the Buryats, who had been left relatively undisturbed, could not revive more than a remnant of their religion, as most of the monasteries and temples, as well as statues of Buddha and other religious artifacts, had been destroyed. One or two monasteries were reported to be functioning in the early 1960's. A Buddhist Central Council and a Soviet Buddhist Monks Society are said to exist, both headed since 1963 by Bandido Hambo Lama Jambal Dorji Gamboev, resident at Ivolginsk. There is some question as to what his functions are, other than to travel abroad to meetings of the World Fellowship of Buddhists or to be shown off to foreign coreligionists.

6. The Jewish question

No universal agreement exists on the definition of the term "Jew," that is, whether it connotes a religion or a nationality concept. In the Russian empire, Jews were considered both a religious group and an alien element ineligible for the civil rights granted other subjects. The traditional Russian attitude toward the Jews has generally been hostile. Groups of Jews have been resident on Russian territory from time to time throughout the nation's history, but many were expelled during one or another of the Orthodox Church's crusades carried on in the name of eradicating "Judaizing" tendencies alleged to be subverting Orthodox beliefs. When large communities of Yiddish-speaking Ashkenazi (Central European) Jews came under Russian control as a result of the partitions of Poland (1772-95), a Pale of Settlement was established along the 1772 frontier barring them from moving into the Russian interior. This restriction was later partly lifted in order to populate the Black Sea regions, however, and Jews with wealth and education were also allowed to settle in Moscow, Saint Petersburg, and other major cities. In the late 19th and early 20th centuries the government embarked on a campaign of conversion, expulsion, and extermination of the Jews. It was at this point that the Russian term

"pogrom" entered Western vocabularies. War and revolution dealt significant blows to Russia's Jewish community, both in terms of individual lives and the religious and communal structure, and when the Soviet regime came to power, promising an end to anti-Semitism, it had no difficulty attracting the loyalty of the exhausted Jewish remnant.

The Oriental Jews had been an exception to the general Jewish experience. Descendants of Jews who settled in the Caucasus, the Crimea, and Central Asia at least 1,500 years ago, they had become integrated into the surrounding societies, speaking only slightly Hebraized versions of the local languages. After coming under Russian rule in the late 18th and 19th centuries, they remained undisturbed by the central government, and they had little or nothing to do with the majority Ashkenazi community. Since the advent of the Soviet regime they have preserved their customs and institutions remarkably well, suffering little erosion in numbers (except for the small Crimean community, which was totally exterminated by the Germans in World War II), and in 1970 they accounted for approximately 190,000 of the 2.2 million Jews in the U.S.S.R.

In the early Soviet period the Jewish religion came under attack, as did other religions, but the Jews were allowed to preserve their group identity through the formation of national districts in the Ukraine and Byelorussia and an autonomous region in easternmost Siberia, and by means of Jewish collective farms, a Yiddish press, literature, and theater, a network of Yiddish-language schools, and other approved vehicles of national expression. Such currents as the Zionist movement and the Hebrew language renaissance, which began in Russia and were flourishing on the eve of the revolution, were disapproved, however, and quickly suppressed.

During the late 1930's many of the privileges granted the Jews as a nationality were withdrawn, and in the years after World War II the Jewish community had to endure a virulent revival of anti-Semitism lasting until the death of Stalin. Many prominent Jews disappeared, including loyal Communists of Jewish origin; Yiddish-language schools, theaters, and publications were shut down; and Jewish religious life was reduced to a new low. As with other religious groups, the Jews were allowed to repair some of the damage in the mid-1950's, although new waves of anti-Semitism burst forth in the wake of Israeli successes against the Arabs and the gradual adoption by the Soviet Union of the Arab cause. During the next decade, a trickle of Jews was allowed to emigrate as a means of removing troublesome individuals and

potential leaders in the Jewish community. At the same time, scurrilous anti-Semitic pamphlets and brochures, articles, and books were appearing, and a suspiciously high number of Jews were denounced in the press in the course of campaigns against "speculation" and other economic "crimes." Following the Israeli victory in the 1967 war against the Arabs, a strong outburst of anti-Zionism with anti-Semitic overtones occurred.

Although Soviet pressure has given rise to a highly vocal Jewish national movement, it has also stimulated some Jews to "disappear" into the Russian majority, judging by the decline in the number of Jews from 2,268,000 in 1959 to 2,151,000 in 1970, and a corresponding decline in the proportion of Jews claiming a "Jewish" language as their native tongue (from 21.5% to 17.7%). Meanwhile, the religious life of the Jewish community has been feeble. It is estimated that about 500,000 Soviet Jews conscientiously practice their religion. They are served by fewer than 70 synagogues, most of them without rabbis. A Jewish theological seminary (*yeshiva*) barely functioned from 1957 to 1964; after a 5-year closure it reopened in 1969, but the level of its functions has remained minimal. Circumcision and the kosher slaughter of livestock and fowl have been banned or discouraged sporadically since the 1920's, although both are still carried out surreptitiously. A small number of prayer books were allowed to be published in 1956 and again in 1968, but foreign visitors attest to their inadequacy in meeting congregational needs. The manufacture or import of religious articles such as prayer shawls and phylacteries continues to be banned.

In comparison with other religious groups, the Jewish congregations in the Soviet Union are quite isolated from each other. No central organization exists; except for a rabbinical assembly specially convened by the regime in 1971 to counter Western charges of Soviet anti-Semitism, conferences of rabbis have been banned since 1926. There is no Jewish religious periodical, and no contact is allowed with coreligionists in other countries. Occasionally, however, the Chief Rabbi of Moscow is permitted to go abroad in an effort to demonstrate the "well-being" of Judaism in the Soviet Union. Despite the disabilities, the various Jewish congregations manage to communicate with each other and with the outside world by means of an informal grapevine fostered by individual contacts.

As an organized religious community, the Jews of the Soviet Union have a bleak future. Of the many young Jews intensely interested in their culture and

history, few are religious believers. The crowds who dance in the street near the synagogues on the holiday of Simchat Torah do so not as an expression of religious faith but as an affirmation of Jewish identity. Paradoxically, the Soviet regime, which began by announcing its intention to destroy the twin "evils" of anti-Semitism and Jewish nationalism, thereby attracting to its cause many secular, Russified Jews, and which subsequently used one of these "evils" as a club against the other, has in the process kept both alive.

An enhanced sense of Jewish identity undoubtedly has been an important factor motivating large numbers of Jews to request permission to emigrate to Israel in recent years, and in 1971 the Soviet regime began to soften its restrictions against such emigration in the face of considerable international pressure. In that year, 14,000 Jews left the U.S.S.R., compared with an average of 1,000 to 2,000 per year over the entire postwar period preceding 1971. During 1972, Jewish emigration rose to about 31,000. In mid-1972, however, the regime instituted prohibitive exit fees based on the estimated cost of state-paid higher education received by a prospective emigrant. This move caused widespread protest outside the Soviet Union, most notably in the United States, and early in 1973 the regime unofficially "suspended" the exit fee legislation because of its adverse effects on Soviet-U.S. trade negotiations.

F. Education (U/OU)

1. Education in national life

Since its earliest days, the Soviet regime has attached great importance to the development of an educational system that will not only effectively educate the youth of the country but also imbue them with a loyalty to the regime and gain their acceptance of officially prescribed ideological, moral, and social standards. One of the chief goals of the educational system is the creation of the "new Soviet man," a skillful and tireless worker who views labor as a social duty and who values the public interest above his own. The process of molding the individual in the image of the "new Soviet man" continues long after the completion of formal education, through organizations such as the trade unions, and above all through constant pressure from an officially controlled information system. Even an informal group such as a collective is drawn into the education process through the social pressure it exercises to induce conformity to officially prescribed patterns of conduct.

Education in the Soviet Union provides a means of escape from the ranks of unskilled laborers, ordinary factory workers, collective farmers, and other groups among whom the material rewards of life are minimal. For the children of the privileged it is a means of preserving the social position and monetary advantage enjoyed by their parents. But whatever the benefits to the individual, utility to the state is the basic purpose of Soviet education. Prestige and rewards vary greatly with the level of schooling attained and with the importance attached by the state to particular fields of educational endeavor.

During the early years of the regime, when trained technicians were scarce and great stress was placed on political reliability, persons with little formal education but with great zeal for the Communist cause were frequently placed in positions of responsibility after hasty training in a given specialty. A number of the present party and government leaders are in this category, owing their progress to the successful handling of such assignments. However, as new generations of specialists have emerged from the educational system, key administrative posts have been filled increasingly on the basis of professional competence as well as political orthodoxy. And because advancement within the Communist Party usually follows achievement in such positions, the successful completion of higher education along approved lines has become highly important to the politically ambitious.

Until recent years, the educational system was able to meet the economy's minimum requirements for technical and professional personnel, but as Soviet technology has progressed, these needs have become greater and have placed increasing demands on the educational system. Under the current Five-Year Plan, institutions of higher education are expected to produce a total of 10 million specialists by 1975. In 1971, the first year of the plan, only about 670,000 were graduated, and in 1972, 700,000. Obviously, in order to meet the goal the number of graduate specialists will have to be greatly expanded. In an effort to solve the problem, the regime in 1973 eased the requirements for entrance to higher educational institutions by eliminating the need for both an oral and a written entrance examination; one or the other is now sufficient. The regime is also reported to be considering shortening the average period of study in postsecondary institutions from 5 to 3 years. Only a minority of high-ranking students would remain after 3 years for the purpose of gaining a broader theoretical knowledge of their subjects. The majority would have received the practical instruction necessary to enable

them to function adequately in positions of technical responsibility.

2. Government and education

On the surface there appears to be no central authority for education. In theory, the national Ministry of Education and the education ministries of the various republics share responsibility for elementary and general secondary schools, as well as for nurseries and kindergartens, while the Ministry of Higher and Specialized Secondary Education and corresponding agencies in the republics have joint responsibility for specialized secondary schools and institutions of higher education. Similarly, the Ministry of Culture and its republic counterparts theoretically share authority over educational institutions and activities outside the formal system, exercising jurisdiction over libraries, museums, theaters, etc., as well as general adult education. In fact, however, the ministries and equivalent agencies in the individual republics have little actual power. Constitutional authority for education rests with the Supreme Soviet and the Council of Ministers, which in turn are effectively controlled by the central organs of the Communist Party—the real source of policy in education as in other spheres.

It is at the national level that the requirements of the Five-Year plans are translated into specific goals for the educational system, and it is at this level that the educational budget is drawn up and the development of the system is determined. Republic and local authorities are responsible for the day-to-day administration of educational institutions and the enforcement of directives from the central authorities. At the actual teaching level, the area of personal discretion is very small; curriculum content, work schedules, and teaching methods are prescribed in considerable detail. The nationwide link and the overall coordinator in the administration of education is the Communist Party.

One result of this highly centralized system is a high degree of uniformity, extending to school plants, curriculums, textbooks, and teaching methods. In general, children in the same grade throughout the country study the same subjects from the same textbooks at the same pace, and when they complete their compulsory education at age 15, the alternatives available for the next stage are substantially the same nationwide. There are some variations, mostly having to do with language differences. Most schools provide instruction in the local mother tongue rather than in Russian, which in turn often leads to curriculum changes because of the extra burden of learning Russian. In the Baltic republics children remain in school a year longer than their Russian counterparts,

largely because of the language problem. Also, while most textbooks in the non-Russian republics are straight translations of those used in the R.S.F.S.R., official policy encourages the national cultures of the several minorities, and textbooks on such subjects as art, music, and literature are therefore oriented toward the particular nationality.

Other breaks in the picture of nationwide sameness emerge, although not officially acknowledged. Evasion of regulations is under constant fire in the educational press, implying a lack of strict uniformity in local administration and practice. For instance, some children are being allowed to leave school and take jobs before reaching the minimum legal age. There is also evidence that in the more remote areas full teaching programs are not always realized because of a shortage of facilities. In education as in living conditions, there is still a marked disparity between town and country. Rural schools are usually at a disadvantage in terms of buildings, equipment, and supply of teachers. Furthermore, the choice of educational facilities is much more limited in the countryside, where nearly half the population of the Soviet Union continues to reside.

Soviet education is free at all levels, although parents who can afford it are expected to pay for textbooks and school supplies. Financial support for the educational system is derived largely from the national budget, the funds being allocated roughly as follows: 5% to the national ministries of education and culture, 30% to the comparable agencies at the republic level, and 65% to regional and local authorities. Some contributions to education are made by various public enterprises and organizations, such as cooperatives, trade unions, and collectives.

3. Levels of literacy and educational achievement

According to the 1970 census, 99.7% of the Soviet population between ages 9 and 49 were literate. No figure was given for persons age 50 and older. Despite Soviet claims that the U.S.S.R. is essentially "a country of complete literacy," qualified observers have estimated that there may have been as much as 5% illiteracy among the adult population as a whole in 1970, a relatively small proportion in view of the disruption suffered by the citizenry in extended periods of war, famine, and terror in the 20th century. The official Soviet version of the growth of literacy among the population ages 9 to 49 since 1897 is shown below.

	MALES	FEMALES	BOTH SEXES
1897	40.3	16.6	28.4
1926	71.5	42.7	56.6
1939	93.5	81.6	87.4
1959	99.3	97.8	98.5
1970	99.8	99.7	99.7

In some of the western borderlands a high rate of literacy was achieved well before the advent of the Soviet regime. For example, as early as 1897 literacy in Estonia had reached 96% for the 9-49 age group, and the 1959 census revealed a rate of almost 100%. In contrast, the literacy rate for the same age group in the region now comprising the Central Asian republics was only 5% in 1897. By 1959, however, it had risen to 97%. Even allowing for some official optimism in the census-taking, literacy for the area was probably over 90% at that time, reflecting the notable success of Soviet authorities in expanding educational opportunity.

In 1930 the Soviet regime established 4 years of compulsory education for children aged 7 to 11, and in 1949 the number of years was raised to 7 for those in the 7-14 age group. The requirement was lengthened by 1 year in 1958 so that 8 years of education are now compulsory. Soviet educational authorities hope that by 1975 this can be extended to 10 years for all youth aged 7 to 17. The educational level of the Soviet population has been rising steadily, the drive to increase educational opportunity being accompanied by a considerable growth in the number of people acquiring higher and secondary education (Figure 32). As a general rule, urban people have a higher level of attainment than those in rural areas, and the people of the European regions of the U.S.S.R. have more education than those of the Asiatic regions. The 1970 census indicated that the median number of years of schooling for the population as a whole was 6.7.

4. The educational system

The Soviet school system is unified and continuous through all stages of education, encompassing preschool institutions, 8-year basic schools, general,

specialized and vocational/technical schools at the secondary level, and universities and other institutions of higher education (Figure 33). The various types of schools have been developed according to a plan which in theory precludes the existence of dead-end situations and makes it possible for the capable student to progress without hindrance from one level to another. In all sectors of the system the school year runs from September to June, classes meeting 6 days a week.

a. Preschool institutions

Preschool education in the U.S.S.R. is neither compulsory nor available to all. Nevertheless, it is expanding, and in some locations it can take in the majority of eligible children. Preschool institutions are of two kinds: nurseries for children aged 3 months to 3 years, and kindergartens for those aged 3 to 7. In 1970 there were about 102,700 nurseries and kindergartens, accommodating 9.2 million children. These figures represented a substantial increase over 1960 when the number of preschool institutions totaled 43,600 and enrollment stood at 3.1 million.

Many nurseries and kindergartens are run by factories, offices, collective farms, and other enterprises for the children of their employees. Some are sponsored by ministries of education and other entities. All come under the jurisdiction of the educational authorities and are subject to inspection and control. Parents of children attending preschool institutions are expected to pay fees, which vary from one locality to another and are adjusted to family income. All of the nurseries and kindergartens emphasize health care for the children, who are regularly examined by doctors and given medical treatment when necessary; those with serious physical defects are sent to special schools for the handicapped.

**FIGURE 32. Level of educational attainment, population age 10 and over, selected years (U/OU)
(Thousands)**

LEVEL ATTAINED	1950		1959		1970	
	Number	Percent	Number	Percent	Number	Percent
Higher.....	1,915	1.8	3,778	2.8	8,262	4.2
Incomplete higher.....	881	0.8	1,738	1.1	2,605	1.3
Specialized secondary.....	5,006	8.4	7,870	4.8	13,420	6.8
General secondary.....	6,300	4.8	9,936	6.1	23,391	11.9
Incomplete secondary.....	22,390	15.3	35,386	21.8	47,368	24.1
Primary and incomplete 7- or 8-year level.....	54,569	37.3	50,308	31.0	101,637	51.7
Less than complete primary.....	55,414	37.8	53,448	32.9		
Total.....	146,475	100.0	162,464	100.0	196,683	100.0
Median school year attained.....	5.0	5.7	6.7			




FIGURE 33. Educational system (U/OU)

Considerable attention is devoted to making the children health conscious by providing them with elementary instruction in hygienic habits.

Nurseries are primarily concerned with the physical care of the children enrolled, serving as institutionalized babysitters in order to release mothers for work. The activities consist largely of supervised play and rest. In the kindergartens the pupils are taught singing, dancing, drawing, and clay modeling; older children, in addition, learn the letters of the alphabet and work with simple numbers. The staffs of the kindergartens are supposed to include teachers qualified in preschool work. Some have taken a full course at a teachers college, but most are trained in specialized secondary schools where they receive a more modest preparation for the job.

b. Eight-year basic schools

Until 1958 the basic school was a 7-year institution divided into a 4-year elementary course and a 3-year

"incomplete" secondary course. But reforms in that year resulted in an 8-year basic school with a 4-year elementary and a 4-year secondary level. In 1966 the elementary course was reduced to 3 years and the secondary segment was increased to 5 years, the purpose being to give pupils more intensive instruction in academic subjects in preparation for general secondary school. In 1971, 14.6 million children were enrolled in the 3-year elementary course and 26.4 million in the five grades making up the incomplete secondary level. Comparable figures in 1960 for the same grade groupings were 14.2 million and 19.4 million, respectively.

Children in the elementary grades of the 8-year school have a single class teacher for all subjects except physical education. From the fourth year onward they are taught by subject specialists. Each grade has an adviser whose duty it is to keep an eye on the welfare, progress, and behavior of the pupils. The progression from elementary to secondary grades does not

normally involve any selection or transfer. Except for a few children who transfer to special schools or boarding schools, the pupils remain in the same building for the entire 8-year period. The courses are coeducational, comprehensive, and unstreamed throughout, and the general pattern is for the number of subjects to increase gradually from year to year. For children whose mother tongue is not Russian, teaching is usually carried out in the native language, Russian being introduced as an additional subject in the second year. A foreign language is taught beginning in the fourth year; most 8-year schools offer only one foreign language.

A major change effected by the 1958 educational reforms was a greater emphasis on vocational training in the 8-year school. Previously the curriculum had been highly academic, centered on language and literature, mathematics, history and civics, geography, and sciences. Today vocational training begins in the first year of the elementary course, with simple lessons in the manipulation of tools and materials. Carpentry and allied skills are introduced in the fourth year, and various mechanical skills are added later. In rural areas there is instruction and practice in the care of gardens and livestock. Girls as well as boys are required to take vocational classes since they almost certainly will be workers as well as wives and mothers. They are given less manual training than boys, however, and in the upper grades the vocational emphasis for girls is on home economics. It appears that boys are also required to have some instruction in home arts. The difference in the amount of time spent by the respective sexes on industrial and domestic skills is almost the only concession that Soviet education makes to sex differentiation.

Considerable emphasis is placed on tests and examinations. The results are graded on a 5-point scale, and those with year-end averages below "3" are given additional assignments and reexamined before the beginning of the new school year. Students failing this examination must repeat the grade. Approximately one-sixth of the students graduating from the 8-year schools take regular jobs thereafter. The others continue their education in various types of "middle schools"—general secondary, specialized secondary, and vocational/technical.

c. General secondary schools

The general secondary school, largely academic, provides a 2-year course comprising the equivalent of ninth and 10th grades. Total enrollment in such institutions stood at 8.1 million in 1971, more than triple the 1960 figure of 2.6 million.

About three-fourths of the student's time in the general secondary school is spent on academic subjects, including Russian language and literature, history, social science, economic geography, a foreign language, mathematics, physics, chemistry, biology, and astronomy. Nonacademic subjects include physical education, general technical subjects, and training in "production," both theoretical and practical. Throughout the course of study, 6 hours per week are allotted to electives. There is also an opportunity for accomplished students to adjust their curriculums so that special aptitudes may be developed. For example, those who elect to follow a mathematics specialization may reduce class time spent on literature, history, or economic geography in favor of mathematics. Such students are expected to make up for the reduced instruction in humanities courses on their own, however, and they must take the same year-end examinations as their classmates. Upon successful completion of the 2-year course, graduates receive a Certificate of Maturity which entitles them to apply for entry to an institution of higher education.

For the exceptionally gifted student in the ninth and 10th grades, there are a few special schools with curriculums favoring mathematics, the physical and natural sciences, foreign languages, or the performing and creative arts, e.g., music, drama, ballet, painting, and sculpture. The foreign-language and arts schools also offer specialized instruction to a rigorously selected number of elementary-level pupils. Competition for entry into the special schools is intense, and their graduates have a decided advantage over other children in competing for entry into higher educational institutions.

d. Specialized secondary schools

Specialized secondary schools offer a combination of academic and vocational training, but the vocational element predominates. These schools, sometimes known as *tehnikums*, provide courses for students wishing to enter semiprofessional fields, such as draftsmanship, clerical work, library science, bookkeeping, and nursing. Most preschool and elementary teachers still receive their training in schools of this kind, but the aim of the educational authorities is to phase out such programs in favor of training all teachers in institutions of higher education. Enrollment in specialized secondary school programs more than doubled in the 1960-71 period, rising from 2.1 million to 4.4 million. Many of the students work in the daytime and carry on their studies in evening classes and through correspondence.

Students may enter the specialized secondary schools directly from the 8-year schools, in which case they enroll in a 4-year course, or they may enter after completing general secondary school, enrolling in a 2-year course. As general secondary education becomes more widespread, it is the aim of the authorities to phase out the 4-year course and upgrade the 2-year course, tying it in more closely with postsecondary educational institutions and feeding graduates into them in much the same way that U.S. junior colleges feed into full-term colleges and universities.

At present, students graduating from specialized secondary schools receive both a professional certificate and a Certificate of Maturity and are eligible to apply for admission to institutions of higher education. The vocational bias of the school provides skills for those not proceeding to higher levels and furnishes a basis of practical training for those who do. Most of the students go straight into employment upon graduation.

e. Vocational/technical schools

Sometimes referred to as "trade schools," the vocational/technical institutions are much more specialized than the two other types of secondary schools. The main emphasis is on learning a particular trade. Class time devoted to academic subjects is limited, accounting for only 15% to 20% of the total, the remainder being spent on practical training and work in the shops or in agriculture. Types of training encompass about 800 different occupations, and students are paid at apprenticeship rates. Length of course depends on the trade involved, ranging from 1 year or less to 3 years. Admission is open to graduates of the 8-year schools; those with more education who enroll in such institutions usually take special short courses. On completion of a course, the trainee is awarded a trade diploma and usually proceeds to take a job in the field in which he has been trained. As in the case of the specialized secondary schools, enrollment in vocational/technical schools more than doubled in the decade of the 1960's. The number of students enrolled totaled 1.1 million in 1961; by 1971 the figure was 2.4 million. Like the specialized schools, the vocational/technical institutions are scheduled to be upgraded as general secondary education continues to absorb increasing numbers of students.

In theory it is possible for a student to go from vocational/technical school into higher education, but to do so with any degree of success he must first raise the level of his academic schooling. Some vocational/technical graduates accomplish this by taking "continuation" courses in their spare time, obtaining a

Certificate of Maturity. However, most students with aspirations for educational advancement select either a general or a specialized secondary school as a means of preparation.

f. Institutions of higher education

Of all the advances in education in the U.S.S.R., few have provided more cause for pride on the part of both the government and the people than the spread of higher education. In the early days of the Soviet regime it was difficult to find enough secondary school graduates to fill the institutions of higher learning. Today the problem is to cope with the rising tide of would-be entrants for whom there is no place. In 1940 there were 812,000 students enrolled in undergraduate courses in the various postsecondary educational institutions. By 1960 the total had risen to 2.4 million and by 1971 to 4.6 million (Figure 34). Over the years, a large proportion of the enrollment in higher education has consisted of "night and correspondence" students, a situation which is both financially and ideologically desirable from the standpoint of the regime since it avoids the expense of extra classrooms, laboratories, and libraries and at the same time helps




FIGURE 34. Number of institutions of higher education, students, and graduates, selected years (U/OU)

combat "academic exclusiveness" by keeping as many students as possible close to the realities of working life.

Soviet institutions of higher education are, on the whole, more specialized than their U.S. counterparts. A clear division is normally drawn between, on the one hand, the humanities and pure sciences, which are taught at the universities, and, on the other, practical and applied studies, which are taught at specialized institutes. Many disciplines, such as law, medicine, and engineering, which in the West are usually included within a single university, are more often than not studied in separate establishments in the U.S.S.R.

Theoretically, the universities and the institutes have the same standards and enjoy the same status. The universities have greater prestige among the population, however, partly because of their broader curriculums and partly because of a traditional respect for universities which predates the revolution. All higher educational institutions have the power of conferring diplomas, and most award advanced degrees and conduct research. The following tabulation shows the number and types of Soviet institutions of higher learning as of 1966, the latest year for which such a breakdown is available. By 1971 the total number had increased from 745 to 805.

Agriculture and forestry institutes	106
Economics institutes	26
Law institutes	4
Medical institutes	82
Pedagogical and related institutes	208
Performing and creative arts institutes	46
Physical culture institutes	16
Polytechnical institutes	59
Specialized technical institutes	156
Universities	42
	—
	745

Most of the specialized institutes were formed in the 1930's by splitting off the relevant faculties from existing universities. This process was not thoroughgoing, however, and to the present day some universities still offer courses in engineering, agriculture, economics, business, law, medicine, physical culture, and library science. Furthermore, since the mid-1950's there has been a trend to create new universities, using pedagogical institutes as a base. Nevertheless, the common practice of confining professional and technical studies to specialized institutes means that Soviet universities represent a small proportion of higher education. Together, the universities accounted for only 10% of total student enrollment in higher education in 1970.

The Moscow State University is the oldest and most prestigious Russian university, established in 1755. (The universities of Vilnyus, founded in 1579, and Lvov, founded in 1661, arose under Jesuit auspices on territory then under the Polish crown) Moscow State's main building, a massive 32-story skyscraper on the Lenin Hills overlooking Moscow, contains science faculties, lecture halls, laboratories, and a 5-million-volume library. The university's humanities faculties are housed in early 19th century buildings near the Kremlin.

All institutions of higher education are headed by rectors and are divided into faculties, each of which is headed by a dean who is selected from among the faculty's professors by the rector and the academic council of the institution. Faculties are subdivided into departments in charge of departmental chairmen, usually professors. Each department deals with a special field within its faculty. Assisted by prorectors, the rector of a university or institute is responsible to the Ministry of Higher and Specialized Secondary Education for the efficient operation of the institution. The chief body for planning and administration is the academic council, which is chaired by the rector and is composed of the prorectors, the heads of faculties and departments, some of the professors, and representatives of the Ministry, the Communist Party, the Komsomol, and the educational trade union.

Courses in institutions of higher education vary in length from 4 to 6 years, with part-time study taking 2 years longer. Competition for entry is sometimes fierce. All Soviet citizens under age 26 have successfully completed a full secondary course and obtained the Certificate of Maturity eligible to apply for admission, but the universities and institutes have room for only a fraction of these. Because the number of applicants has skyrocketed in recent years, the practice of automatic admission of students solely on the basis of their overall secondary school record has been dropped, and entry is determined instead by the applicant's performance in competitive examinations and by the priorities established to meet manpower needs in given fields. Other things being equal, preference is given to applicants who can produce references from party or Komsomol organizations, trade unions, or factory managers, and standards for admission are flexibly interpreted to benefit former servicemen and workers. Applicants may apply to only one institution each year; those who are not accepted may reapply repeatedly. Standards tend to be lower in some institutes than in others, and it is easier to enter a university in Alma-Ata or Dushanbe, for example,

than in Moscow or Leningrad. Once admitted, students receive all tuition free. The only fees payable are dormitory charges for those not living at home. Apart from the 10% to 20% of students whose parents' incomes are too high to qualify them for aid, students who maintain satisfactory progress are awarded stipends. Although the regime makes much of the system of student stipends, the average grant is insufficient for even the barest necessities. To meet expenses, students must rely on family assistance or part-time jobs.

Instruction consists of formal lectures, seminars, laboratory work, and practical studies, with a heavy burden of required reading in addition. Lectures and seminars are compulsory, although the cutting of classes is not unknown. All students, whatever their special field, have to take courses and pass examinations in Marxist-Leninist political theory. During the first 2 years there are classes in the history of the Communist Party, which is actually a survey of the history of the U.S.S.R. and of 20th century world events, from the approved political standpoint. Political economy and dialectical materialism make their appearance in the third year, and include a fairly detailed study of Marxist philosophy and economic, political, esthetic, social, and historical theory. These studies occupy a considerable part of the students' time and this side of higher education is taken very seriously by the authorities, but according to critical reports in the Soviet press, the material is often taught mechanically and dogmatically, with the result that many students regard it as something to be learned for examinations and then forgotten once the requirements have been fulfilled.

Apart from the political studies and a foreign language, a student's curriculum is confined throughout his course to his special area of study and allied subjects. Training in mathematics and the natural sciences is of high quality and has produced skilled mathematicians, engineers, and other technicians with good qualifications. Because of the high degree of specialization, however, graduates in technical and professional fields are not so versatile as might be desired. Education in the social sciences and humanities falls far short of Western standards, largely because of the enforced conformity to party dogma and its use as a vehicle for political indoctrination. All curriculums are subject to approval by the national Ministry of Higher and Specialized Secondary Education and are generally uniform throughout the U.S.S.R. for any given field.

Students are continually assessed throughout their coursework by means of tests and term examinations.

The final test is the diploma thesis or, as it is known in the technical institutes, the diploma project. This is a study of some particular aspect of the student's specialty in which he has to demonstrate his ability to use the basic material of his subject for research or experiment. If the work is accepted he is awarded his diploma. In 1971 the number of graduates receiving the diploma totaled 672,000. Graduates are subject to assignment for 2 or 3 years to any job in any part of the Soviet Union. At the end of that time they are free to seek employment wherever they wish. A graduate who fails to report to an assigned post is liable to legal penalties and in addition must forfeit his diploma. Certain categories of graduates are awarded a "free diploma," which releases them from the work assignments. The governing regulations are complicated, but they exempt such people as active members of the armed forces and those with dependents. Health considerations are also taken into account.

Of the more than 800 institutions of higher education in the Soviet Union, approximately 550 offer graduate courses. In addition, graduate programs and degrees are available through a number of "scientific institutions" attached to various "academies" of the U.S.S.R., including academies of the arts, medical sciences, pedagogical sciences, agricultural sciences, and economics. The advanced degrees are those of Candidate of Sciences and Doctor of Sciences. Both carry considerable prestige and economic advantage for those who acquire them. Despite their titles, these degrees are not limited to the scientific field. Few students are admitted to higher degree work directly from diploma courses; graduates usually have to work for 2 years or more before they can apply. The degree of Candidate of Sciences, roughly equivalent to the American Ph.D., requires at least 3 years of study after receipt of the diploma. In addition, the aspiring candidate must conduct research in his field with a view to publication and must defend the results before an examining board. The degree of Doctor of Sciences is comparatively rare and is regarded as an extremely high academic distinction. In addition to holding the Candidate's degree and completing several years of active work in his field, the student aspiring to a doctorate is required to conduct and publish major independent research which must eventually be accepted by an academic council. In 1969, a total of 25,810 persons were awarded advanced degrees in the U.S.S.R.

5. Teachers

Teacher training in the U.S.S.R. varies according to educational level. In general, elementary and preschool teachers receive their training in a secondary

school specializing in pedagogy, while secondary teachers are trained in a pedagogical institute or a university. The eventual goal of the authorities is to train all teachers at the level of higher education. In 1969, 72.9% of secondary school teachers had the benefit of higher education; the equivalent figure for teachers at the elementary level was 12.4%. Women dominate the teaching field below the university/institute level, comprising 71% of all educational personnel from elementary through secondary school in 1969.

Secondary pedagogical, or teacher training, schools provide 2-year courses for prospective preschool and elementary teachers, the curriculum consisting of educational methodology and psychology, instruction in the subjects to be taught at the respective levels, and prescribed political subjects. Practice teaching is part of the program in the second year. In 1971 there were 411 pedagogical schools at the secondary level, graduating a total of 100,300 students. Higher pedagogical institutes have been growing in number and importance since the mid-1950's. By 1971 they numbered 205, with graduates totaling 152,600. The course extends over a 4-year period and the curriculum is divided into three main areas: general and political subjects, educational theory, and subject specialties. The institute's main emphasis is on the trainee's specialty, the field in which he will presumably teach. Practice teaching begins in the first year and continues throughout the course. A university graduate may go directly into a teaching post with only a minimal background in educational theory and practice. In fact, universities are supposed to direct more than half of their graduates into teaching; the actual number of those who enter the profession is much smaller, however. On the average, the university graduate is about a year ahead of his institute-trained colleague as a subject specialist, but he is liable to be a less competent teacher. In 1971 there were 2,640,000 teachers employed in general education throughout the Soviet Union, resulting in a student-teacher ratio of about 18 to 1.

Soviet teachers are expected to keep abreast of the latest developments in their subject matter and teaching methods, and refresher courses are provided for this purpose. These are organized on a 1-day-a-week basis, the enrolled teachers being given "released time" to attend. All teachers are expected to take such courses at least once every 5 years. The pedagogical institutes, like other types of institutions of higher learning, have facilities for both full-time and part-time graduate study and research. The most prestigious center for educational research is the Academy of Pedagogical Sciences of the U.S.S.R.

Teachers generally find themselves obliged to work longer hours than the standard established for the different levels of schooling, and demands on their time go beyond actual classwork. All are expected to visit the homes of their pupils, attend meetings of various kinds, and take part in a variety of extracurricular activities. Salaries depend on a number of factors, including educational qualifications, length of service, and location. In general, a teacher's earnings are below those of a skilled industrial worker.

The staffs of the various institutions of higher education usually include a rather small number of professors, who in most cases hold the Doctor of Sciences degree; a large number of docents (equivalent to the associate professor in the United States), mostly with the Candidate of Sciences degree; and instructors. There are also research specialists and other assistants. Appointments are made by the institution's academic council after advertising in the press; confirmation by the Ministry of Higher and Specialized Secondary Education is required for the posts of professor and docent. All academic staff are appointed for a 5-year term, and in practice the appointments are usually renewed. The continuing threat of possible nonrenewal, however, serves as a strong incentive to achieve the utmost competence in one's post.

G. Artistic and cultural expression (U/OU)

Artistic and cultural expression in the Soviet Union is rigidly controlled by the state. According to official policy, all cultural activity must serve the cause of building communism and creating the "new Soviet man." The concept of "art for art's sake" is an alien one, and any book, painting, musical composition, or other art form that does not conform to official ideology is banned.

As it relates to cultural expression, official ideology is embodied in the concept of "socialist realism," defined as the "truthful, historically concrete presentation of reality in its revolutionary development which must be combined with the task of the ideological remaking and education of toilers in the spirit of socialism." According to Soviet ideologists, socialist realism requires a work of art to manifest three qualities: *narodnost*, or "people" quality; *ideinost*, or "idea" quality; and *partiynost*, or "party" quality. More specifically, *narodnost* means that any work of art must be both understandable to the people and capable of stirring them to some positive action or attitude. *Ideinost* is the quality that makes a work of art a vehicle of ideas, not merely an expression of "art for art's sake." Finally, *partiynost* requires a work of

art not only to express the party line but also to show the party as the guiding force in all positive activity in the U.S.S.R.

Thus, political content is of overriding importance. If a work of art has no political content, then it is of no value as art. On the other hand, if its content deviates from official ideology, it is worse than useless—it represents an act of political hostility toward the regime. Under certain circumstances, even the absence of political content is construed as an act of political "negativism" against the regime. Content, furthermore, must be concerned with the external world and the common goal of the masses. Portrayal of the inner world of the individual is regarded with suspicion as a distraction or an escape from this goal. Stylistic or esthetic concerns are equally suspect. Ideologists resent any form of expression not immediately comprehensible to the masses, who must be inspired to work, not think, while censors fear that ambiguity may contain hidden meaning. The constant party pressure to infuse works of art with an ideological message has, with few exceptions, crippled creative initiative. As a result, most Soviet expression is of minimal artistic value, although a substantial number of works, as well as performing artists, have received critical acclaim in the West.

To implement its cultural policy the regime has developed an extensive control apparatus. Ultimately, cultural affairs are controlled by the party Politburo, which acts primarily through the Central Committee's propaganda departments and to a lesser extent through the Council of Ministers. Below the policymaking level an intricate network of agencies screens the output of creative artists for conformity with official policy. On the governmental side the Committee for Cinematography has jurisdiction over motion picture studios and theaters, the Committee for the Press controls all aspects of printing and publishing and the book trade, and the Ministry of Culture concerns itself with the theater, illustrative art, sculpture, music, and a variety of cultural institutions. There are also "voluntary creative unions" of writers, composers, artists, architects, journalists, and motion picture personnel which act as professional associations and provide an additional control mechanism for the party.

The regime, however, did not assume control of the arts immediately after its accession to power. On the contrary, during the early 1920's it permitted considerable cultural diversity. As a result, this was the period of perhaps the greatest achievement in Soviet art. By 1928, however, with the introduction of the First Five Year Plan and the assertion of strong party

control over all aspects of society, creative artists were required to produce works which would promote industrialization. In 1932 the party further tightened its control when it abolished all existing organizations of writers, artists, and composers and called for the establishment of a single union in each of the arts. Shortly thereafter, socialist realism was enthroned as the official, obligatory, creative method for all branches of Soviet culture.

During the next two decades the quality of Soviet artistic works declined markedly in the face of insistent demands that they be solely propagandistic, praising above all the many qualities of Stalin. Those refusing to comply were eliminated in the purges of the late 1930's. During World War II pressure on the arts eased, and the quality of creative production showed a distinct improvement. These few years proved to be but a brief interval, however, for in 1946-48 a series of party decrees reminded creative artists of their obligation to hew to the socialist realist line.

With the death of Stalin, the regime slowly loosened controls over artistic and cultural activities, allowing limited experimentation in art forms and narrow access to foreign developments in the arts through participation in international exchanges, festivals, and congresses and increased distribution of foreign works within the nation. Encouraged by Khrushchev's denunciation of Stalin's "cult of personality," writers and artists became more outspoken, daring to submit books and articles for publication without official clearance and to organize exhibitions and concerts of works previously disapproved.

The "thaw," however, was brief, and beginning in 1957 some restrictions began to be reimposed. Nevertheless, a generally liberal trend continued, with the regime vacillating between relaxation and repression. This irresolute attitude stimulated debate between liberal and conservative factions, each camp equipping itself with its own journals, cafes, theaters, poetry readings, summer colonies, and other forms and modes of expression and activity novel to the Soviet experience. By 1964 liberal intellectuals felt sufficiently confident to predict that cultural life in the U.S.S.R. would soon be more diverse, since the conservatives had finally overreached themselves.

The fall of Khrushchev in 1964 swept intellectual debate under the rug momentarily, but disturbing signs soon became evident that the conservatives were, if anything, stronger than ever. The starker evidence of this change was the arrest of A.D. Sinyavskiy (Abram Terts) and Yu. M. Daniel (Nikolay Arzhak) late in 1965 and their trial early in the following year. Charging them with sending "anti-Soviet" manu-

scripts abroad to be published, the regime sought to demonstrate how it would henceforth deal with those intellectuals, usually young and not so prominent, who were discontented with official cultural policies.

The liberals, now on the defensive, refused to mute their protest; indeed, if anything, their desperation made them more daring. Many refused to sign denunciations of Sinyavskiy and Daniel circulated by the regime, distributing instead their own petitions and protests against the turn of events. Some of these were broadly phrased as denunciations of creeping Stalinism, to which many prominent intellectuals not involved in the earlier cultural debate freely lent their name. The regime refused to acknowledge these appeals, however, and persisted in picking off the members of the liberal coterie one by one. Thus, A. Ginzburg and Yu. Galanskov, publishers of the underground magazine *Phoenix 1966* and of an unofficial transcript of the Sinyavskiy-Daniel trial, were arrested early in 1967 and eventually sent to a prison camp in the far north. V. Bukovskiy, a writer who demonstrated on their behalf, was arrested and jailed in 1967, and P. Litvinov, a mathematician who distributed the minutes of the Ginzburg-Galanskov and Bukovskiy trials and took part in numerous protests, including one against the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia, was arrested and exiled in 1968. Retired military officer P. Grigorenko, who not only participated in the protests against the literary trials but also was an active supporter of the cause of the dispersed Crimean Tatars, was arrested in 1969 and declared insane in two separate inquiries. In 1970 the publicist and writer A. Amalrik, whose alienation from Soviet society was worn like a badge, was arrested and sentenced to 3 years in a Siberian labor camp. Due to be released in May 1973, Amalrik was abruptly tried again and sentenced to 3 more years in the camps. Apparently, the policy of detente with the West is being accompanied by increasingly strict internal discipline. Meanwhile, in 1968-69, such writers as A. Belinkov and A. Kuznetsov took the step of defecting, as did a number of performing artists, including ballet dancers and choreographers, instrumentalists, and acrobats.

More prominent liberals have been dealt with more discreetly. Thus, the poet A.A. Voznesenskiy was not permitted to travel abroad and his works were barred for brief periods; Ye. A. Yevtushenko was eased off the editorial board of the liberal youth magazine in 1969 and on occasion has had to resort to patriotic verse to get into print; the controversial author A.I. Solzhenitsyn ceased to appear in print in 1966 and was ousted from the Writers Union in 1969; and the

champion of liberalism, the late A.T. Tvardovskiy, was removed as chief editor of *Novyy Mir*, the principal liberal literary journal, early in 1970. As of mid-1973, the renowned Soviet cellist M.L. Rostropovich was still not permitted to travel abroad because of his sympathetic support of Solzhenitsyn, who was living and working at Rostropovich's *dacha* near Moscow.

In other ways, the regime has moved to tighten controls over the arts. Early in 1973, for example, the publication of *Soviet Culture* was transferred from the Ministry of Culture to the Central Committee of the Communist Party. As an organ of the Central Committee, the journal presumably will carry greater weight and authority and provide Soviet leaders with a vehicle for reprimanding those who stray from the ideological path.

For the most part, literary works that do not conform to the precepts of socialist realism can only find an outlet in underground *samizdat* (self-publishing) activity, although as of mid-1973 *samizdat* writings were appearing less frequently. Occasionally a work of above-average interest surfaces, a recent example being the play *The Ascent of Mount Fuji*, staged early in 1973 at Moscow's *Sovremenik* (Contemporary) theater. According to press reports, the play sharply condemns those individuals who by conventional standards are the most successful and respected members of Soviet society, dealing in essence with the issue of Stalinist repression as it affects citizens today. Despite its strong critical tone, the play was well received by the Soviet press. Such provocative works of art as the *Ascent of Mount Fuji* are a rarity in the usual cultural fare of the Soviet citizen who must satisfy his craving for culture by turning to the classics, both Russian and foreign, in preference to the pedestrian Soviet product.

Indeed, only an infinitesimal part of the Soviet population has ever heard of petitions and protests, and virtually all social classes continue to enjoy the arts, particularly literature and music. This popularity reflects partly the persistence of a traditional respect for culture and partly a desire to escape the drabness and regimentation of everyday life. The regime has encouraged interest in the arts and literature and fostered their development by rewarding approved creative and performing artists with material advantages as well as social prestige; by issuing large, low-priced editions of approved literary works, prints, and phonograph records; and by maintaining numerous museums, libraries, theaters, and concert halls.

Soviet museums range from the world famous to the woefully inadequate. In 1970 there were 1,444 such institutions, visited by some 103 million persons. Principal types included regional (493), memorial (235), historical (176), art (172), and natural science (36). The largest museums are the V.I. Lenin Central Museum (housing a general collection), the Museum of the Revolution, the Kremlin Armory (containing crown jewels, thrones, imperial robes, and carriages), the Historical Museum, the Polytechnic Museum, the A.S. Pushkin Museum of Decorative Arts (featuring a small collection of French impressionist paintings, Egyptian and Greek art, and 18th century, Western-inspired furniture and painting), and the Tretiakov Gallery (housing a superb collection of icons and 19th century Russian art)—all in Moscow; the Hermitage (featuring a collection of paintings, furniture, coins, gems, and other *objets d'art* comparable in quality and quantity with those of the Louvre), the Russian Museum (dealing with history and art), and the Museum of Anthropology and Ethnography in Leningrad; and the Historical Museum and the Museum of Ukrainian and Russian Art in Kiev. In the past, the regime limited the display of early modern art collections to approved individuals only, but of late, realizing the value of exhibiting them to the numerous foreigners shepherded through the galleries by Intourist, these works have increasingly been taken out of museum reserves and rehung.

In addition to its museums, the U.S.S.R. is dotted with "houses of culture," city and rural clubs, "houses of science and technology," "popular universities," parks of "culture and rest," and other institutions for "cultural-enlightenment." Their functions are to propagate political and scientific knowledge, to disseminate the achievements of science, technology, art, and literature, and to provide cultural activity for workers in their leisure time. In 1970 there were 134,000 such institutions—sponsored variously by the Ministry of Culture, the Komsomol, trade unions, and collective farms—which served as centers for lecture and study programs, motion pictures, and other activities.

1. Literature

According to official interpretation, contemporary literature is the offspring of the 1917 revolution. In fact, however, the Soviet literary tradition is to a great extent an extension of the Russian literary experience. The major period of world significance for Russian literature lies in the 19th century, but its origins can be traced back to the 11th century. For 600 years virtually all the literature was church related and

church produced and written in Old Church Slavonic, an ecclesiastical language which drew heavily on old Bulgarian and contained many Grecisms. Chronicles, lives of saints, tales, sermons, and letters were the principal forms of expression, many of them indebted to Byzantine models and subject to revision as they were copied and disseminated over time.

In the 17th century Polish and Latin influences were reflected in Russian literature, and a Russian secular language slowly began to take shape. The conscious effort made by Emperor Peter I to introduce Western culture early in the 18th century had a revolutionary effect on the language and subsequently the literature. A new, simplified secular alphabet was developed; printing and publishing independent of the church were inaugurated; vast numbers of words of Western European origin were incorporated into the Russian language; and a heterogeneous, literate audience concerned with affairs of state, commerce, fashion, technology, and, to a lesser extent, the intellect was rapidly assembled. Throughout the remainder of the 18th century Russian language and literature digested these changes. Russian poetry evolved through the efforts of M.V. Lomonosov and V.K. Tredyakovskiy; tragedy and comedy were developed by A.P. Sumarokov and D.I. Fonvizin; satire was introduced by N.I. Novikov; and a modern prose style was created by N.M. Karamzin.

Building on all these accomplishments and launching a uniquely Russian literature was A.S. Pushkin. Poet, dramatist, and master of prose fiction, Pushkin is one of the great figures of world literature and is universally regarded by Russians as their most illustrious national genius. It is from Pushkin's career that Russians date the onset of their literary Golden Age (1820-80). Pushkin was followed by a chain of literary masters (M. Yu. Lermontov, N.V. Gogol, I.S. Turgenev, F.M. Dostoyevskiy, and L.N. Tolstoy) whose works are an integral part of the Western literary heritage and about whom libraries of critical literature have been written. The emerging Russian school of realism was profoundly influenced by the literary criticism of V.G. Belinskiy, N.G. Chernyshevskiy, and N.A. Dobrolyubov, all of whom were deeply influenced in turn by contemporary radical Western philosophy and social thought and were stout advocates of literature as a socially useful tool rather than as a work of art. According to some observers, the uncritical acceptance of the principles of these thinkers led to the end of the Golden Age. There is no question that these men, through their influence on such Russian Marxist ideologists as Plekhanov and Lenin, are the godparents of socialist realism.

Even after the end of the Golden Age, new writers of international rank continued to appear. Among these were A.P. Chekhov, I.A. Bunin, and M. Gorkiy, all skilled realist writers of the short story, novel, or drama. Their success, however, marked an end to the initial realist phase in Russian literary history. At the beginning of the 20th century, partly under Western influence, a series of "modernist" movements, variously described as symbolism and futurism, appeared on the literary scene. The advocates of these modes stressed experiments in language, the perfection of form, and the creation of a new theory of esthetics. Their influence led to what is called the Silver Age of Russian poetry, during which such practitioners as A.A. Blok, A. Belyy, A.A. Akhmatova, and V.V. Mayakovskiy flourished.

During the years of war, revolution, civil war, famine, emigration, and political harassment Russian literary efforts temporarily ceased, but with the easing of pressure during the period 1921-28, creativity briefly resumed. These years are frequently characterized as the richest of the Soviet period in terms of the quality and variety of the literary product. Soviet writers had many points of contact with the West and shared an experimental approach to the medium of literature. Mayakovskiy, by virtue of his identification with the Bolsheviks, dominated the scene, although his self-assumed role as a propagandist for the regime cut into his literary output. Coming to prominence in this period were K.A. Fedin, B.A. Pilnyak, M.M. Zoshchenko, S.A. Yesenin, L.M. Leonov, and M.A. Sholokhov. Many of the best literary talents of the period were neither Communists nor consciously proletarian but, being sympathetic to the revolution, were dubbed "fellow travelers." Most were "modern" and favored experimentation, whereas the "proletarian" writers tended to be conservative and favored the traditional realism.

With the introduction of the First Five-Year Plan and regime efforts to narrow the diversity of literary expression, the Russian Association of Proletarian Writers was assigned the task of policing the field. In 1932, when all literary groups were dissolved, approved writers became members of the Writers Union and committed to the doctrine of socialist realism. The works produced in the next two decades were not only tendentious, but simple, direct, and traditional in language and literary form. Many of the more brilliant writers whose political credentials were suspect perished in the purges of the late 1930's, and in 1946 party control was made even more rigorous after A.A. Zhdanov, a close associate of Stalin and party spokesman on cultural affairs, denounced such leading figures as Akhmatova and Zoshchenko.

During the "thaw" which followed Stalin's death in 1953 a more critical tone was introduced into literary works, although traditional standards of language and form persisted. As noted above, the reaction of the regime to this trend has since been marked by vacillation, shifting from relative tolerance to reaction and reassertion of control. The movement for greater freedom of literary expression was embraced not only by such established writers as I.G. Erenburg (Ehrenburg) and B.L. Pasternak but also by such new writers as V.D. Dudintsev, Sinyavskiy, and Solzhenitsyn and such poets as Yevtushenko and Voznesenskiy. The works of these and many other writers have been received with great acclaim in the West, in some cases for other than artistic reasons. The resentment of the regime to these manifestations has ranged from refusal in 1958 to allow Pasternak to become the first Soviet and second Russian writer to accept the Nobel Prize for literature (the first was Bunin in 1933, at the time an emigre) to Daniel's imprisonment and subsequent enforced residence in the provinces, and of course bans on any publication of recent works.

If an author and his works are approved, however, nothing is too good for him. Thus, Sholokhov owns a large estate in the Don country and extensive property elsewhere, he is a member of the Supreme Soviet and the Academy of Sciences, and he went to Stockholm in 1965 with official blessing to accept the third Nobel Prize for literature proffered to a Russian writer. The regime's negative reaction to the fourth award of this prize to a Russian—Solzhenitsyn in 1970—bears out the difference in treatment of approved and disapproved authors.

With all his vacillations, Khrushchev attempted to control and use intellectual ferment. His successors have been more concerned with smothering it, and recent landmark events in the literary field have been trials, not publications. Instead of retreating to writing literature for the "drawer," without knowledge of the authorities and with no intention of publishing it, or sublimating their creative impulse by translating foreign literature, as was the case in the Stalin era, the active nonconformist writers of today engage in the traditional Russian practice of *samizdat*, circulating their works in manuscript among sympathetic readers, who risk arrest by reading such works and passing them on to others. As the political content of the dissident movement has increased in recent years, so has the nature of *samizdat*. In addition to literature, it now contains civil rights protests, political tracts and programs, and increasingly sophisticated analyses of Soviet society, even "internal Kremlinology." It is these *samizdat* "editions" which find their way to the

West, where many are promoted with great fanfare as the latest in Soviet protest. As of early 1973, however, a regime crackdown on the movement was beginning to have an effect. The chief *samizdat* publication, the *Chronicle of Current Events*, was being investigated and a number of suspects in the case had been arrested with others expected to follow. What this means for the future of *samizdat* as a vehicle for free literary expression is not yet clear.

2. Performing arts

a. Music and dance

As with literature, Soviet music ostensibly derives from the October Revolution, but in fact it is an integral part of the Russian musical tradition. There are two basic forms of Russian music whose influence persists, even though transformed, to the present day. The first is folk music, which took the form of songs intimately connected with natural forces and human emotions. Initially, the adoption of Christianity had little or no effect on this type of music, which continued to flourish, absorbing Oriental color from adjacent nomadic cultures. In addition to ritual songs connected with funerals, weddings, and changes of the season, the *bylina* (epic ballad) developed, along with numerous comic, humorous, and satirical folksongs played and sung by jesters and buffoons. In later periods lyrical, satirical, and historical songs commemorated important political and domestic events. In the late 18th and the 19th centuries many of these songs were collected and served as sources of inspiration for Russian composers such as M.A. Balakirev, N.A. Rimskiy-Korsakov, and P.I. Chaykovskiy (Tchaikovsky),

At the same time a rich tradition of church music evolved, based on the use of choirs in the Eastern Orthodox liturgy. Some of the longer masses, such as those performed at Easter, developed into a feast for the senses through the sound of the choirs, the sight of the heavily jeweled icons, and the scent of incense.

With this tradition of folksong, choral music, and spectacle, the Russians easily accepted the introduction of opera by Italian court performers in the mid-18th century and swiftly made the form their own. A series of Russian composers of opera, most of whose works were based on folk or historic themes, appeared in the last quarter of the century, their works being performed not only in the capital but throughout the country, wealthy landowners vying with one another to procure trained musicians. The influence of German romantic opera early in the 19th century brought about a general expansion of operatic forms

and ideas, and a series of major works were composed which remain standard items in the Soviet repertory but have only recently become familiar in the West. Among the better known composers in this field were M.I. Glinka, A.P. Borodin, M.P. Musorgskiy, Rimskiy-Korsakov, and Chaykovskiy.

Ballet was also introduced into Russia by Italian court performers in the mid-18th century but for many years remained essentially an alien art form. Most of the choreographers and many of the dancers were Italian or French. Indeed, for the entire latter half of the 19th century Russian ballet was influenced by the French choreographer and teacher Marius Petipa, who produced the standard versions of Chaykovskiy's ballets. The persistence in Russia of the French classical and Italian acrobatic styles long after they fell out of fashion elsewhere marked the character of Russian ballet and, despite a brief "national" period at the turn of the 20th century, these styles have been preserved to the present day. The leader of the national school was S.P. Dyagilev (Diaghilev) who, after working as a promoter in the fields of drama, painting, orchestral music, and opera, introduced the Ballets Russes to the Western world. Dyagilev benefited from the scene painting of L.S. Bakst and A.N. Benua (Benois), the choreography of M.M. Fokin (Fokine), the dancing of V.F. Nizhinskiy (Nijinsky) and T.P. Karsavina, and the music of Borodin, Rimskiy-Korsakov, and I.F. Stravinskiy. Following several successful seasons in Western Europe, the Ballets Russes became permanently established outside Russia, and the company's notably successful transition from a nationalist to a modernist ballet style after 1912 had greater impact on the West than on Russia.

The symphony and other forms of orchestral music did not emerge in Russia until after the works of Berlioz, Schumann, and Liszt had become known, although there had been some experimentation by Glinka using folk themes and fantasy. These influences were fused by a group known in Russia as "The Mighty Handful," commonly called "The Five" in the West, which comprised Balakirev, Borodin, C.A. Kui, Musorgskiy, and Rimskiy-Korsakov. Their intention was to create Russian orchestral music free of German influence. Chaykovskiy and S.V. Rachmaninov (Rachmaninoff) occupied a position in between "The Five" and the "Westerners," represented by A.G. and N.G. Rubinshtein (Rubinstein). By the early 20th century a modernist trend appeared, the principal representatives of which were Stravinskiy, A.N. Skryabin (Scriabin), and S.S. Prokofyev (Prokofiev).

In music as in literature, the revolution of 1917 led to the emigration of many leading figures. After a brief period of modernist experimentation, the regime encouraged and then ordered a return to music which would be more "comprehensible" and less "divorced from life." Folk music and dance were endorsed, and a number of groups have been formed to cultivate these traditions, including the Aleksandrov Red Banner Ensemble of Music and Dance of the Soviet Army, the Piatnitskiy State Russian Folk Choir, the Moiseyev Folk Dance Ensemble of the U.S.S.R., the *Berezka*

(Little Birch) Folk Dance Ensemble, and the Andreyev Russian Folk Instrument Orchestra (Figure 35).

Such traditional composers as N. Ya. Myaskovskiy, R.M. Glier (Gliere), and A.K. Glazunov put their talents at the disposal of the regime, turning out numerous operas, ballets, concertos, symphonies, and other forms of orchestral music in the approved socialist realist style. Despite the clampdown on musical experimentation, notable works continued to be produced, especially by Prokofiev, who returned to



Dancer from Georgia (U/OU)



Igor Moiseyev, the Bolshoi Theater choreographer and leader of the Moiseyev Folk Dance Ensemble (U/OU)



Girls performing the national Koryak dance in the far north region (C)



Yakuts playing the khomus, a local variant of the mouth organ (U/OU)

FIGURE 35. Folk dancers and musicians

the U.S.S.R. after a decade abroad, and by such new composers as D.D. Shostakovich and A.I. Khachaturian. At the same time the regime made great efforts to expand the network of theaters, concert halls, and music and ballet schools. A Soviet generation of performing artists became internationally recognized, including violinist D.F. Oistrakh, I.S. Bezrodny, and L.B. Kogan; pianists E.G. Gilels and S.T. Rikhter; cellist M.L. Rostropovich; and dancers G.S. Ulanova, O.V. Lepeshinskaya, M.M. Plisetskaya, and R.S. Struchkova.

Yet even such talented individuals as these could not avoid the strictures of the regime in the late 1930's and again in the late 1940's, once the party decided that the arts needed closer supervision. Existing works were withdrawn or rewritten, and many composers and performing artists sought refuge in banal styles or in the classics. During this period contact with developments in the West was broken off, and new forms and techniques were forbidden. Even after controls were relaxed following Stalin's death, dissonant and atonal music was frowned on, and most experimentation was discouraged. Nevertheless, individual Soviet artists and composers as well as whole troupes have made extensive tours abroad where their talents have been highly praised.

The regime has also made every effort to involve the masses in the performing arts. Thus, in 1969 there were nearly 2.5 million participants in more than 141,000 music, dance, or choral groups and numerous "people's" symphony orchestras. Several large-scale music festivals were held, mostly involving regional and national choral competitions. In addition, there were 40 theaters of opera and ballet, including the famous Bolshoi in Moscow and the Kirov (Mariinskiy) in Leningrad (Figure 36), 25 theaters of operetta and musical comedy, about 130 professional symphony orchestras, 19 conservatories, 190 music schools, more than 3,000 children's music schools, 19 schools of ballet, and other institutions.

b. Theater and motion pictures

Although considered primarily an art form in the West, the theater has been recognized by the Soviet regime as a powerful instrument of mass agitation and propaganda. The theater had been resisted vigorously by the Orthodox Church as a pagan practice from at least the 11th to the 17th century, but the subsequent introduction of Western cultural forms under the auspices of the court brought an end to church bans. Professional theaters were well established by the mid-18th century, chief among them the Malyi Theater in Moscow and the Aleksandrinskiy (now Pushkin)

Theater in Saint Petersburg, and such notable playwrights as A.P. Sumarokov and D.I. Fonvizin had become well known. In the 19th century A.S. Griboyedov and A.N. Ostrovskiy made notable contributions to dramatic literature, as did Pushkin, Lermontov, Gogol, Turgenev, Tolstoy, Dostoyevskiy, Chekhov, and Gorkiy.

Psychological realism had taken hold in drama as early as the 1840's, and from the demands of this form that the actor identify internally with the character he was portraying, the famous style of the Moscow Art Theater developed at the end of the 19th century under the aegis of K.S. Stanislavskiy and V.I. Nemirovich-Danchenko. The Moscow Art Theater went through several phases before the highly prized "Stanislavskiy method" crystallized in the early Soviet period. In the process, new directorial talent was developed, and many of the younger generation went on to form their own theaters and styles, including V.E. Meierkhold (Meyerhold), Ye. B. Vakhtangov, and A. Ya. Tairov.

All stylistic innovation was brought to a halt at the end of the 1920's, when the regime decided that only approved socialist realism could adequately serve its propagandistic purposes. In part the crackdown was a reaction to the flowering of highly experimental theatrical groups whose efforts to combine esoteric modern art forms with Communist ideology, as in the works of V.V. Mayakovskiy, were disliked by the less intellectual members of the party bureaucracy. A series of party resolutions demanded a break with "bourgeois-esthetic, decadent, formalist" styles and a return to the utilitarian realism characteristic of the mid-19th century Russian theater. Despite these restrictions, worthwhile plays were produced by such writers as M.A. Bulgakov, Yu. K. Olesha, A.E. Korneychuk, N.F. Pogodin, and K.M. Simonov. For the most part, however, although effectively staged, the works of the 1930's were characterized by monotony of theme and by a predictable conflict between "negative" characters (spies, secret enemies of Soviet power) and hackneyed "positive" images of Communist heroes. The curtain finally fell on Soviet theatrical originality during the purges of the late 1930's, when a series of theaters suspected of "formalism" were shut down and such great directors as Meierkhold and Stanislavskiy were arrested or retired.

Since that period the Soviet theater has been marked by high technical skill in production and acting, particularly of 19th century classics, but little thematic or literary ingenuity. During the "thaw" in the mid-1950's some of the previously banned works of

FIGURE 36. Major Soviet theaters

Bolshoi Theater, Moscow (U/OU)



Kirov Theater, Leningrad (C)



the 1920's were presented, but little original drama has been created. The theater arts by and large follow the party line, although there are exceptions, and even in officially approved presentations there are occasional veiled criticisms of the regime. Despite the decline in the quality of new Soviet productions, the theater in the U.S.S.R. continues to enjoy considerable popularity, partly because drama provides an escape from the drabness of everyday life.

As of 1970 there were 508 professional theaters—364 featuring drama and musical comedy and 144 catering to children, including puppet theaters. There were also innumerable amateur theaters. In addition to the Moscow Art Theater and Malyi Theater in Moscow and the Pushkin Theater in Leningrad, some of the better known Soviet theaters include the Vakhtangov Theater, the Pushkin Theater of Drama, the Theater of Satire, the Obraztsov Puppet Theater,

and the Mossovet Theater, all in Moscow, and the Gorkiy Dramatic Theater in Leningrad. Since the mid-1950's several new theaters have been founded in Moscow for young actors, directors, and playwrights whose productions are quite daring by Soviet standards. These include the Sovremennik Theater and the Moscow Theater of Drama and Comedy, locally known as the Taganka. Their audience is largely composed of students and intellectuals who find the older theaters smothered in tradition.

Lenin called the cinema "the most important of the arts" and fully appreciated its value as a medium of information and persuasion. For him and his successors entertainment was strictly secondary. Before the 1917 revolution the influence of motion pictures was slight, most people regarding them as an interesting novelty to amuse the literate urban population. In 1919 the Soviet Government nationalized the film industry and began to shape it into an implement of Communist propaganda. During the decade required for the process to become effective, enthusiasm for the revolution and a shortage of trained personnel and technical equipment stimulated a sustained period of innovation in cinematic technique and story method. By the mid-1920's a group of talented young directors had emerged, including S.M. Eizenshtein (Eisenstein), V.I. Pudovkin, G.M. Kozintsev, L.Z. Trauberg, and A.P. Dovzhenko. Among the classics of the period were *Strike*, *Battleship Potemkin*, and *October* by Eizenshtein and *Mother*, *The End of Saint Petersburg*, and *The Offspring of Genghis Khan* by Pudovkin. Eizenshtein in particular experimented extensively in the medium and is generally credited with creating the documentary film.

Yet no matter how much international acclaim the Soviet film industry received, it could not avoid denunciation by the regime for being overly "formalist," and by the 1930's socialist realist dogma had been superimposed on the medium. The authorities took an active interest in the industry, imposing an ever-narrowing political censorship, with the result that it took 40 years just to restore the number of feature films produced to the prerevolutionary level of more than 100 a year. In 1952 during Stalin's rule only five feature films were released out of 100 planned. The emergence of occasional masterpieces in the 1930's, such as M.S. Donskoy's *Childhood of Maxim Gorki* or Eizenshtein's *Alexander Nevsky*, made the decline in the field all the more poignant. During the purges of the late 1930's, many film workers were arrested and some were shot, and all signs of artistic independence were obliterated.

Eizenshtein took advantage of a brief easing of restraints during the war years to produce *Ivan the Terrible*, but in 1946 he and his fellow directors were attacked during Zhdanov's campaign to reestablish ideological conformity. The film industry, with its high proportion of Jewish personnel, was particularly vulnerable when the party began its "struggle against cosmopolitanism," a veiled form of anti-Semitism.

The film industry began to revive in 1956, and since then it has again been receiving international recognition. Works by older directors, such as S.I. Yutkevich's *Othello* and G.M. Kozintsev's *Don Quixote* and *Hamlet* have appeared, together with those of younger men, such as *The House I Live In* by L.A. Kulidzhanov and Ya. A. Segel, *I Am 19 Years Old* by M.M. Khutsyev, *The Cranes Are Flying* by M.K. Kalatozov, and *War and Peace* by S.F. Bondarchuk. Perhaps the most creative of present-day film directors is G.N. Chukhray, whose *The Forty-First*, *Ballad of a Soldier*, and *Clear Sky* are notable for their sensitivity in treating contemporary themes.

In 1970 the Soviet film industry produced 218 feature-length films (including films for television), of which 159 were art films and 37 were documentary and instructional. In addition, in 1969 1,187 short subjects were issued. Twenty-one movie studios were devoted to art films and 19 to documentary and instructional films. The largest of the former were the Mosfilm and Gorkiy studios in Moscow, Lenfilm in Leningrad, and Dovzhenko in Kiev. All studios are administered by the state, and their production is planned on the basis of ideological demands rather than box-office appeal.

Late in 1970 there were 157,000 motion picture theaters supplemented by more than 10,500 mobile film units which traveled about the country, mostly in rural areas. During the same year well over 4.7 billion tickets were sold, for an average attendance of about 19 per person. The following tabulation compares attendance per person in selected countries in 1970:

U.S.S.R.	19	Yugoslavia	4
Italy	11	United Kingdom ..	4
United States	5	France	4
Poland	4	Japan	2.4

Despite regime restrictions on self-expression, Soviet film directors and technicians have produced films that are acknowledged to be world masterpieces.

3. Art and architecture

In contrast to the worldwide renown accorded some of the performing arts, achievements in painting, sculpture, the applied arts, and architecture have for

the most part passed unrecognized. In part this is a reflection of Western indifference, but it also stems from the lack of any particular national genius in these areas. This lack may derive, not only from the iconoclastic tradition of the Orthodox Church which disapproved lifelike representations of the human form, but also from the absence of any deeply rooted secular tradition.

a. Painting

From the conversion to Christianity of parts of Russia in the 10th century until the reforms of Peter I in the 18th century, Russian pictorial art served almost exclusively the interests of the Christian religion and the Orthodox Church. Painters and craftsmen came to Kiev together with Greek priests and monks bearing Byzantine icons. Russian craftsmen soon assimilated the Byzantine tradition and in the course of several generations achieved a high degree of mastery (Figure 37). Churches were lavishly decorated with frescoes according to the principles of Byzantine iconography, and gradually, during 200 years of imitation, a distinctly Russian style of icon painting developed which was two-dimensional, ornamental, and brightly colored, in contrast to the three-dimensional, modeled, and subdued Byzantine style. A reintroduction of the latter style in the 15th century was manifested in the work of A. Rublyov (Figure 37), considered the master in the field of Russian icon painting. Other notable icon painters of the period were Dionisiy and the painters of the Stroganov school. By the mid-16th century, however, Russian icon painting had lost most of its vitality, largely because the church decreed that no further changes were to be made in the art.

An influx of foreign (chiefly Italian) artists in the mid-18th century introduced the baroque and classical styles; these were copied by Russian painters, many of whom were trained at the Academy of Fine Arts, founded in that period in Saint Petersburg. Portraiture was the first mode to develop, since it best suited the requirements of the court and nobility. The classical style of painting with varied subject matter persisted throughout the last third of the 18th and first third of the 19th centuries. It was followed by a romantic school in the middle third of the latter century as prelude to the realistic style which was to dominate Russian art for much of the next century (Figure 38).

In 1863 an open rebellion against academic styles and standards took place in Saint Petersburg. A group of painters, inspired by Chernyshevskiy's insistence that art should not be a matter of form but should


transmit a meaningful and realistic message, organized an artists cooperative, subsequently named the Society for Traveling Art Exhibitions, or *Peredvizhniki*. This group dominated Russian realistic art until the end of the 19th century. Among its more successful members were V.V. Vereshchagin, I.I. Levitan, and I.E. Repin (Figure 38).

In reaction to the realist style, a group of impressionists emerged in Moscow at the end of the century, and shortly thereafter a group which formed in Saint Petersburg around the journal *Mir Iskusstva* advocated the introduction of modern styles. The *Mir Iskusstva* group split into many schools including futurists, imagists, suprematists, constructivists, and produced such well-known modern artists as V.V. Kandinskiy, M. Chagall, V.A. Tatlin, and K.S. Malevich (Figure 39). This era of experimentation did not long survive the 1917 revolution, however, and many of Russia's better known painters emigrated.

By the end of the 1920's official policy maintained that art belonged to the people and must therefore be understandable to them. Socialist realism in painting turned out to be a revival of the late 19th century realist school but with a restricted choice of subjects (Figure 40). Art in the Stalin era reached an all-time low in esthetic style and quality with the production of many heroic portraits glorifying the leader, and the post-Stalin period has witnessed little improvement. Outside official art, however, younger painters have produced numerous "closet" paintings, many of which are in ideologically disapproved nonobjective styles. Although for the most part these works have not been shown in public, their existence is known to sympathetic members of the Soviet elite as well as to foreigners, and isolated examples have been purchased and received favorable publicity abroad. One of the largest collections of modernist and therefore underground Soviet paintings is found at the Dubna nuclear physics center. The community of interest between experimenters in the arts and the sciences probably has come about, not only because of their common recognition of concepts too complex to yield to conventional forms of expression, but also because the sciences, less rigidly controlled by the regime, have attracted some of the nation's most independent minds. Apparently, controls have eased somewhat in recent years. In mid-1973, for example, after 50 years in exile, Chagall was invited to return to the U.S.S.R. for an exhibition of his works.

b. Sculpture

By and large, sculpture has been a rather alien art form. Indeed, the Orthodox Church explicitly forbade



the embellishment of churches with three dimensional images. Sculpture was introduced in Russia only in the early 18th century under the auspices of Peter I. The marbles imported during this period were mostly of second-rate quality, as were many of the foreign sculptors who agreed to come to Russia to work and to instruct. A series of Russian sculptors of only local significance worked in the late 18th and the 19th centuries, fulfilling commissions for numerous monuments to rulers, generals, and other civic figures, as well as decorating the many classical-style buildings erected during this period. The painter M.A. Vrubel turned out some minor works at the end of the 19th century, apparently indebted to the style of the contemporary French genius Rodin, and the *Mir Iskusstva* movement produced one outstanding sculptor, A. Archipenko, who was greatly influenced by cubism. Archipenko, however, emigrated after

1917. Since the late 1920's the prevailing theme has been realism raised to heroic scale, and the Soviet landscape is littered with innumerable grandiose statues and busts of Lenin and other party greats, as well as muscular workers and peasants (Figure 41). Nevertheless, the experimental school in painting has to a certain extent been paralleled in experimental sculpture.

c. Folk and applied art

In the 1920's an effort was made to preserve existing folk arts and to establish an industry incorporating both folk themes and advanced Western design. Thus, the workshops of Fedoksino, Palekh, and Mstera producing lacquered miniatures were preserved, as were the centers of carving in Bogorodsk, the metalworking ateliers in Dagestan, the centers of leatherworking in the Caucasus and Central Asia, the



The Trinity by Rublyov, considered his masterpiece. Painted in 1411 in an ancient Byzantine form rooted in Orthodox doctrine, it is a flawlessly balanced composition portraying a mood of majestic calm. The subtle give to the heads and the slight forward bend of the bodies creates an impression of depth without the use of perspective.



The Virgin of Vladimir, probably painted by a Byzantine artist in the 12th century, is Russia's most revered icon. According to legend, it protected Moscow from invasion on three occasions.

cross created for Emperor Justin II. The Byzantine ideal of the opulence to mirror on earth the image of heaven—was adopted early Christianized Russia.

FIGURE 37. Russian religious art (U/OU)




FIGURE 38. Realistic art of the 19th century (U/OU)

Bleaching the Linen, painted by Vasily Serebryakov in 1884, is a late example of romanticized Russian realism.



A portrayal of Ivan's tragic murder in 1581 of his son and heir, by Ilya Repin whose precise renderings of Russian life made his work the epitome of 19th century Russian realism.

An 1893 painting of Leo Tolstoy at work in his study, one of many portraits of Tolstoy by his friend Repin.

ceramic art factories of Leningrad, and the art textile plants of Moscow and Ivanovo. Innovations in the design of furniture, interior furnishings, apparel, and textiles were introduced in the 1920's by Tatlin, A.M. Rodchenko, and V.F. Stepanova, under the influence of modern European design, but these failed to take root, and by the 1930's Soviet applied art was limited to superimposing folk motifs, appropriate or not, on nearly every type of consumer product. Since the mid-1950's the regime has encouraged better design, particularly in interior furnishings. As a result, artisans—mostly in the Baltic republics—have produced a series of good, if not great, designs in limited editions of textiles, ceramics, and glass which seem to draw inspiration from the more conservative prewar Scandinavian products. In the prerevolutionary period perhaps the most famous examples of Russian applied art were the imperial Easter eggs (Figure 42) and other delicate, jeweled articles created for the tsars by the Faberge firm in St. Petersburg.

d. Architecture and city planning

Because until quite recent times the principal building material in Russia was wood, frequent fires destroyed most early examples of architecture, the rest disappearing through decay. The oldest surviving buildings are the brick and stone churches which initially were built according to Byzantine models. In time, such local variations as the sloped roof (to shed snow) and the onion-shaped dome were introduced; the latter so caught the public imagination that multidomed churches became the standard. Wooden churches were quite different in appearance, being basically towers with tall, tent-shaped roofs covered with small, lantern-like domes. Wooden church designs were translated into stone in the 15th century and served as one of the inspirations for the famous 16th century Cathedral of Saint Basil the Blessed in Moscow (Figure 43).

In the late 15th and the 16th centuries Italian architects began to work in Moscow, bringing with them late renaissance and baroque styles which were blended with traditional Russian designs. One outcome was the Kremlin fortress, many of whose features were subsequently copied in smaller versions elsewhere in Russia. With Peter I the baroque style was introduced in a strictly Western version. The Emperor expended all his efforts on his new capital, Saint Petersburg, which, with the continued impetus provided by his successors and the talents of a series of Italian and French architects employing a succession of baroque, rococo, and classical styles, became one of the most architecturally impressive and beautiful cities in Europe (Figure 44).




Double Portrait with Wineglass by Marc Chagall (1917), one of a series commemorating his early years of wedded bliss, shows the artist swept off his feet by love. Chagall crowded his canvases with Jewish symbols, cows and chickens, fiddlers on roofs, and lovers in transports of joy.

FIGURE 39. Modern art of the early 20th century (U/OU)



Panel 3 by Vassily Kandinsky (1914), which expresses his subjective vision through spontaneous line and color. In 1911 Kandinsky produced his, and perhaps the world's, first truly abstract art.



Yellow, Orange, and Green by Kazimir Malevich (1915), founder of the suprematist school, whose nonobjective paintings were intended to free man from the shackles of natural forms.

FIGURE 40. Examples of socialist realism in painting (U/OU)



Romanian Peasants' Delegation at the Kharkov Tractor Plant, a painting emphasizing content rather than form in order to convey the socialist message.



Mother, by Paul Kuznetsov. But for the tractor and the peasant garb, the painting might have been an icon madonna.



FIGURE 41. Machine Tractor Driver and Collective Farm Girl, by Vera Mukhina, symbolizes the union of industry and agriculture under socialism. One of the most powerful of Soviet monumental sculpture, the statue stands at the entrance to the Economic Achievement Administration. (U/OU)

Classical design proved particularly attractive to the nobility, and all sorts of buildings in this style were constructed throughout Russia in the late 18th and in the 19th centuries. The leading architects of the late 18th century, V.I. Bazhenov, M.F. Kazakov, and I.E. Starov, are considered the originators of a distinctly Russian classic style, with an emphasis on simplified form and majestic scale. In the mid-19th century an

increasing eclecticism became evident in Russia, as elsewhere in Europe. This was followed by a romantic revival—parallel to the Gothic revival in the West—resulting in a none-too-successful, pseudo-Russian style featuring onion domes and pointed arches (Figure 45). At the turn of the 20th century, some interesting *art nouveau* structures were erected, but at the same time Russian architects plunged into the neoclassic revival sweeping Europe and the United States.

Following the revolution, Russian architects designed a series of structures in the international modern style which was considered appropriate for a new society. Many of the more ambitious projects, embodying elaborate adaptations of the "architecture of machinery," never were realized; nevertheless, until the 1930's, Moscow was one of the world's foremost centers of experimentation in architecture. The rapid urbanization and industrialization of the country produced many examples of modern architecture, including the town plan for Magnitogorsk, the rebuilt center of Kharkov, and the *Izvestiya* and *Pravda* publishing houses in Moscow.

Modern architecture went the way of all modern art tendencies in Russia in the 1930's, but there were no spectacular arrests, executions, or even rebukes of its architects. Modernism gave way to a socialist realist style which was really revived neoclassicism, at times either blended or merely decorated with native architectural motifs. Many of the facades built in the 1930's along the new *prospekts* (avenues) of Moscow were in this highly ornamented, neoclassic style, the Moscow subway stations (Figure 46) being perhaps the most thorough pre-World War II application of the approved style. After the war neoclassic design degenerated into what is sometimes called the Stalin baroque or wedding-cake style, the best examples of which are the skyscrapers built in Moscow housing the State University and the Ministry of Foreign Trade.

During World War II, the U.S.S.R. suffered extensive damage to its building stock, and for more than a decade afterward the regime devoted its energies to rebuilding apartment houses, factories, offices, and schools as quickly and extensively as possible. At the same time it lavished considerable care on the restoration or rebuilding of architectural monuments, many of them churches, damaged or destroyed in the conflict. Many of the rebuilding schemes were poorly executed, and following the death of Stalin the regime declared its intention to introduce a better quality of design and construction.

This intention seldom materialized. The decorative frenzy of the late Stalin period was dispensed with, but




FIGURE 42. The Imperial Easter egg known as the Chanticleer Egg, created by Fabergé. At each hour the rooster rises from within the shell, flaps its wings, crows, and retreats. (U/OII)



FIGURE 43. The Cathedral of St. Basil the Blessed, built for Ivan IV to commemorate his victories over the Tatars. Its oriental splendor has dominated Red Square for over 400 years. (U/OII)

fails architecturally because its designers neglected to take into account the architectural heritage and historical milieu of the heart of Moscow. On the other hand, there have been a few successes in the last decade, such as the Pioneer Republic complex in Moscow and the Bratsk Hydroelectric Station in Siberia.

Unlike the situation in the other arts, a "tame" modern style is tolerated and even encouraged in architecture, and there are signs that the increasing use of painting and sculpture as part of overall design, as well as more contemporary interior furnishings, may lead to a tolerance of similar tame modernism in the other visual arts. Recent criticism of architects has focused on what the regime terms "excessive modernism." As noted in *Pravda* late in 1972, this trend has involved—among other things—the use of too much glass (Figure 47). According to some observers, current modernism is viewed by the regime as an incorrect reaction to past criticism which maintained that architects were designing uninteresting buildings reminiscent of the Stalin era.

4. Minority expression

Regime controls over style and content pervade the artistic and intellectual life of the entire U.S.S.R. Except for differences in local color, many

in its place was substituted prefabricated construction of no character whatsoever. Extensive residential districts of five-story apartment buildings sprang up around the major cities, most soon displaying a pervasive shoddiness. In addition, many of these new districts had no provision for adequate public services or transport, leaving residents to their own devices to make life livable. Even such a well-built and fairly well-designed building as the Palace of Congresses



The archway of the former General Staff building opens on to the plaza before the Winter Palace, the imperial family's residence until 1917. Built by Catherine the Great, its facade is 450 feet wide, and the roof is ornamented with classical statues and urns.



FIGURE 44. The Winter Palace in Leningrad (U/OU)



FIGURE 45. Church of St. Nikolai on Komsomolsky Prospekt in Moscow, an example of the late 19th century romantic revival (C)



FIGURE 46. A Moscow subway station, built in the approved neoclassical style of the early Stalin period. The panels portray major events in the history of the Ukrainian people. (U/OU)

contemporary Russian, Estonian, or Armenian works contain the same stereotypes and are practically indistinguishable from one another. Among the major non-Russian ethnic groups, however, the memory of native cultural achievements and the survival of local folklore, traditions, and customs help to keep alive a sense of national consciousness and a desire for national recognition.

In addition, the regime has sought to harness the folk arts for the promotion of Soviet objectives. Periodic national art festivals, replete with folksongs and dances, are staged to emphasize such themes as the brotherhood of the Soviet nations. By manipulating national forms and symbols, the regime seeks to transform local solidarity into loyalty to the larger Soviet society. While much in the content of native cultural life in the Baltic region has been emasculated, folklore and song continue to provide a focus for national feelings which the regime has been unable to eradicate.

a. Ukrainian

The Ukraine is the cradle of Eastern Slavic culture, as it was in Kiev that Byzantine literature, music, art, and architecture were introduced and took root. In the 14th and 15th centuries the temporary seizure of the Ukraine by Poland led to the introduction of Western forms of art, but these did not reach beyond the Westernized ruling class, while the peasantry clung

stubbornly to Eastern Slavic traditions. After 19th century European romanticism produced a national awakening and the Ukrainian idiom was elevated to the status of a literary language, Ukrainian writers drew on the large fund of folklore which abounded with fairy tales, legends, proverbs, ballads, and songs.

The leading Ukrainian poet of the 19th century and still the chief symbol of the nationalist movement was T.G. Shevchenko, also a locally distinguished painter. Writing poems similar to Ukrainian folksongs, Shevchenko protested against Russian oppression and called for the casting off of Russian rule. Nationalism was restricted to a relatively narrow section of educated society, however, and some Ukrainian writers, notably N.V. Gogol, preferred Russian as their literary medium. By the beginning of the 20th century the Ukraine had produced a number of locally prominent poets, novelists, and dramatists, among them I. Ya. Franko and L. Ukrainska, while a number of literary journals attracted leading talents and facilitated familiarity with trends in the West.

After 1921, however, artistic expression in the Soviet Ukraine was made a tool of the regime, and during the 1930's many leading Ukrainian writers, scholars, and scientists were silenced or liquidated. At the same time, those aspects of the native tradition that could profitably be used for propaganda purposes were preserved and cultivated. The officially approved Ukrainian arts have shown little vitality or originality and have not attracted many new talents. Even so noted a Ukrainian writer as A.E. Korneychuk has preferred to write in Russian and figures prominently as a "Soviet" author.

In recent years, however, a reversal has been noted. O. Honchar (Gonchar), for example, head of the Ukrainian Writers Union and recipient of a Lenin Prize in 1964 for his faithful reproduction of the standard Soviet production novel, surprised the critics in 1968 with a novel idealizing the Ukrainian past and the Eastern Orthodox tradition, and denigrating the quality of modern urban life, identified in Ukrainian eyes with the Russians. Even more outspoken have been literary critics I. Dzyuba and V. Chornovil, who have frequently denounced Russification and literary conformity. For their efforts they have suffered arrest, as well as repeated denunciations from the conservative Ukrainian literary establishment.

b. Belorussian

Belorussia has no outstanding artistic and intellectual tradition. The beginnings of the written language can be traced to the 13th century, when it was used as the official tongue of the Lithuanian



FIGURE 47. The Comecon Building in Moscow, a modern skyscraper. In the background is a typical example of the "Stalin baroque" or "wedding-cake" style of architecture. (C)

kingdom, which at that time included the Belorussian lands. Following the union of Poland and Lithuania in the 16th century, Belorussian lost its favored position, and the area was subjected to extensive Polonization.

Belorussian folklore never became a force for rallying national sentiment. Folk tales were usually concerned with specific events in specific localities and conveyed no sense of social or ethnic cohesion. Folksongs expressed a spirit of melancholy defeat over the general lot of man but engendered no sense of defiance or national resistance. A vague nationalist movement began to emerge late in the 19th century, when a few writers chose to use the Belorussian language as their literary medium. Concentrated within a thin layer of educated gentry, these literary activities met with practically no response from the masses. At the turn of the 20th century a new generation of writers, some of them representing the lower stratum, attempted to foster a national revival by creating myths about the Belorussian past. Of these efforts, the works of Ya. Kupala and Ya. Kolas are considered classics by Belorussian literary historians.

During the 1920's and 1930's artistic and intellectual expression was subjected to censorship and repression. In Soviet Belorussia, the leaders of the national movement were eliminated and replaced by

Communist-oriented persons. Native literary, theatrical, and musical activities were encouraged but given a new direction. Anything emphasizing the national aspirations of Belorussia was quickly stifled. Since World War II Belorussian writers and scholars have been charged with finding elements in the national literary tradition which will emphasize its similarity to both classical Russian literature and the "multinational literature of the U.S.S.R." The use of the Belorussian language in the schools, the radio, and the press, as well as in literary works, continues as part of official policy but is increasingly subject to the pressures of Russification.

c. Baltic

Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania possess a modern literary and artistic tradition which has its roots in a common 19th century awakening. The spread of literacy and the impact of the European romantic movement gave impetus, in these countries as elsewhere, to a nationalist revival and clarified the desire of the Baltic peoples for self-expression. In all three countries written languages had evolved in the 16th century, and separate religious and secular literatures had developed in the 17th and 18th centuries, respectively. In the 19th century an immense number of folk tales, epics, legends, poems,

and songs suffused with nationalist sentiment were collected and published. Native customs, dances, and such crafts as wood and metal carving, ceramics, weaving, and embroidery enjoyed a popular revival. Each of the three Baltic peoples exhibited a particular love of lyric poetry and song and had a strong penchant for group singing. Hundreds of town and country choirs assembled periodically to participate in national singing festivals, which became one of the principal expressions of national solidarity. At the beginning of the 20th century, heavy emphasis was placed on the use of the national language and on the development of a national spirit. During the period of their independence (1918-40), each of the countries produced poets, novelists, dramatists, and musicians, along with numerous scholars and scientists. Although nationalism and local color continued as important theme; in the arts, Western movements, such as symbolism, expressionism, surrealism, and other modern schools, had a profound influence. In both quality and range, Baltic literature and art far surpassed the merely provincial.

Under Soviet domination, literature and the visual and performing arts have been placed in the service of Soviet propaganda. In consequence, the Baltic republics have produced no outstanding literary or artistic works since the Soviet occupation. As a form of passive resistance, many writers have turned to translation as their major occupation or at times have been upbraided in the local press for writing about personal concerns or impressions instead of contemporary social problems. Artists and architects, on the other hand, after a period of withdrawal during the late 1940's and early 1950's, have cautiously resumed working in the modern style prevalent in the Baltic region in the 1930's. Because their efforts have proved particularly attractive to the Soviet public, the regime is encouraging the dissemination of Baltic design throughout the U.S.S.R.

d. Georgian and Armenian

Georgia and Armenia have a cultural tradition stretching back to the second millennium B.C. Gold, silver, and bronze ornaments from the period survive along with numerous examples of small sculpture, ceramics, wood and stone carving, and painting, while scattered ruins of forts and temples display a conscious architectural style. Furthermore, the oldest literary epic in the area, preserved as oral literature, dates back to the second millennium, and much of the folk music is believed to predate the introduction of Christianity in the fourth century.

The conversion of the Georgians and Armenians caused a profound redirection in their culture. For the next 600 years all their energies were devoted to building numerous churches and cathedrals in a distinctive style, decorating them with sculpture and painting, composing a rich body of church music and, following the introduction of national alphabets, writing vast amounts of religious literature. In the 10th and 11th centuries, however, the religious impulse declined, and the Georgians and Armenians concentrated instead on writing various forms of secular literature; creating highly sophisticated portrait sculpture and miniatures, along with jewelry and embroidery; and constructing numerous palaces, bridges, and forts.

A decline set in during the 15th century, following the conquest of the area by Turkey and Persia. Although worthy examples of the old style in Georgian and Armenian art continued to appear from time to time, the native peoples readily adopted Russian cultural styles in the early 19th century when most of the area was brought into the Russian Empire. The Georgians in particular tended to follow the Russian pattern of development, passing through classical, realist, symbolist, and futurist periods in succession. The Armenians, on the other hand, maintained ties with their fellow nationals in the Middle East and other areas and thus were able to sustain a more distinct cultural image.

After a brief interval of independence between 1918 and 1921, the Caucasian areas fell under the control of the highly centralized Soviet regime, which soon compelled the adoption of the socialist realist style, varied only to allow fragments of local color. Many of the oral tales and epics were transcribed and translated into Russian, however, creating a stream of imitations. Indeed, the regime has frequently criticized the readiness of Caucasian writers to resort to historical novels and tales in preference to descriptions of socialist reality.

The authorities have encouraged the development of Russian and European art forms in the Caucasus. In addition to all the performing arts, painting, sculpture, and architecture are given generous support and have developed along typically Soviet lines. As a result, contemporary artistic life in the region is losing much of its indigenous character, and prominent Caucasian writers, artists, and composers (e.g., Khachaturian) have achieved recognition as Soviet rather than as strictly national artists.



FIGURE 48. A view of fabled Samarkand, once Tamerlane's capital, in Russian Turkestan (U/OU)

e. Muslim

The peoples of Azerbaijan and Central Asia, like those of the Caucasus, have an ancient heritage. Architectural monuments still extant date back to the second and third millenniums B.C.; some of the present cities, such as Samarkand (Figure 48), and Mary, have been in existence since the first millennium B.C. The area experienced a great artistic and intellectual flowering following the introduction of Islam in the seventh and eighth centuries which was parallel to Persian and Arabic cultural development occurring immediately to the south.

The area was subsequently swept by several waves of conquerors (Turkish, Chinese, Mongol), whose deeds were the raw material from which numerous tribal epics were created. The Turkic complexion of the region was finally established between the 10th and 12th centuries A.D. Persian remained the language of culture for a protracted period, however, being used to produce notable religious and secular literature from the 11th to the 16th century, a Golden Age of Turkestan literature occurring from the mid-15th to the mid-16th centuries. During the latter century, the Turkic peoples began to use the Turkic Chugatai dialect as their literary language, although Persian remained in use among the Tadzhik peoples.

As with literature, the art and architecture of the region were heavily influenced by Persia and the Arab world. Numerous fortresses, mosques, mausoleums, and palaces were built from the sixth to the 10th centuries in adobe and clay. Between the 11th and 13th centuries brick replaced these materials, spurring a new wave of construction. In the other creative arts a

high level of accomplishment was achieved in stone carving, mosaics, metal ornamentation, ceramics, and rug weaving, all of which date from the 11th to the 13th centuries, and in the Persian style of miniature and decorative painting introduced shortly thereafter.

Once Russian rule was established in Muslim areas, a process beginning in the 16th century and continuing into the 20th century, Muslim culture tended to stagnate. At the end of the 19th century, however, some Turkic imitations of Russian novels and plays appeared, as well as secular Turkic poetry. These did not find an audience, however, because most of the native population were illiterate. Following the revolution the Soviet regime made great efforts to increase educational opportunity and at the same time to transcribe the existing mass of oral folklore. As much of this literature was in the form of heroic epic poetry, serving as a repository of patriotic sentiment and group loyalty, the regime paradoxically can be considered the foster parent of modern nationalism in the area. As a national spirit has developed, however, the regime has attempted to soften or expunge passages in the literature which could be interpreted as anti-Soviet or anti-Russian and has encouraged the creation of new epic poems incorporating approved socialist realist themes. It has also encouraged the substitution of the Soviet-style novel for native poetry.

In the visual arts as in literature, most traditional Muslim forms have been refashioned in the past half-century to fit Soviet patterns and Russian tastes. Native inspiration is used only for embellishment. In architecture local variation is allowed in the ornamental design of woodwork, mosaic, or brick tile.

The ballet and opera, introduced by the Russians, conform to the standard Soviet style, although local motifs in song and dance are permitted. Even with the best efforts of the regime to create a Soviet culture in the region, however, local traditions persist, encouraging group loyalty and pride in the native cultural tradition.

H. Public information (U/OU)

The Soviet regime has developed one of the largest and most complex systems of public information in the world, and the Communist Party has forged a parallel system of control more elaborate and thorough than any other in existence. Justified in terms of Marxist-Leninist theory, both the system and the control apparatus are oriented toward mobilizing the mind and will of the population and strengthening the Communist Party in its self-assigned role as leader, teacher, and guide of the people. There are other goals, it is true. The media, for example, disseminate a considerable amount of educational and cultural material, but even these "nonpolitical" activities are far from being ends in themselves. They are justified to the extent that they facilitate the prime task of ideological indoctrination and effective party rule.

Although freedom of speech and press are guaranteed by the Soviet Constitution, they may only be exercised if they "strengthen the socialist system," the sole arbiter being the Communist Party. Mass communication is not based on the pursuit of profit, nor does it provide a vehicle for the expression of individual opinion. The right to issue information via any legal public medium is accorded only to the party, the government, and public organizations ultimately controlled by the party, such as trade unions, cooperatives, and scientific societies. No individual or unofficial group has any legal means of presenting information to the public.

All media are closely controlled and guided by the appropriate national, regional, or local party organization. Personnel are carefully selected, trained, and supervised by the party. Key positions on editorial boards and in other offices of authority are filled only by party members or by persons considered reliable by the regime. Important professional people, such as editors, publishers, writers, and producers, are well rewarded in terms of salary, prestige, and privileges, but their function is strictly circumscribed by the imperative that they communicate only the party line. By virtue of their position alone they have no voice in setting this line.

The indoctrinal line used by the media is formulated in the party Politburo, subsequently translated into directives drawn up by the responsible departments of the Central Committee, and implemented by the governmental bodies associated with the various media at all administrative levels. Committees for the press, radio, television, and cinematography, as well as the Ministry of Culture or the Ministry of Communications, carefully control the substance and form of media activity. The committees and the Ministry of Culture deal with ideological matters and organization, while the Ministry of Communications handles the technical aspects.

All public information is closely censored in advance. The Main Administration for Safeguarding Military and State Secrets (GLAVLIT) is the chief governmental censorship body. Attached to the Council of Ministers, GLAVLIT insures that all publications, manuscripts, radio and television broadcasts, still and motion pictures, lectures, and exhibits intended for the public are in keeping with the party line and do not disclose any economic or military secrets. Representatives of this body—an estimated 70,000 censors—are attached to all publishing houses, printing plants, radio and television stations, telegraph agencies, customs houses, and central post offices in all districts throughout the U.S.S.R. and also work closely with the Committee for State Security (KGB).

In general, the public has adopted a cautious and skeptical attitude toward official information. Aware of the numerous shifts in the party line, most people realize that false, contradictory, and misleading information is disseminated, while other information is suppressed. The public is especially skeptical about media interpretations of internal events, as contradictions in this area are frequently visible to the average citizen. The regime has had more, but by no means complete, success in communicating its version of external events, largely because of the paucity of competing foreign sources of information.

Only a few such sources, mostly from Communist countries, are available to the Soviet public. A handful of U.S. and West European newspapers and journals are sold only to foreign visitors at In Tourist hotels in Moscow and Leningrad, but some of these find their way into the hands of Soviet citizens, as do occasional copies of publications brought in directly by foreign tourists. Some Western books and periodicals are available for use by trustworthy members of the intelligentsia, but all subscriptions to Soviet and foreign newspapers and periodicals are controlled by the Ministry of Communications, which issues a

catalog of foreign publications available to Soviet readers. Few nontechnical publications are listed. The U.S. Information Service is permitted to distribute the magazine *Amerika* in the U.S.S.R. under the terms of a reciprocal agreement which allows the Soviet Union to distribute the magazine *Soviet Life* in the United States. The number of copies of each issue of *Amerika* was limited to 62,000 in 1973, but deliberate Soviet mishandling of distribution reduces the number actually sold to well below that figure. Foreign radio broadcasts are sporadically jammed, but those programs which do get through—reinforced to a small extent by increased tourism and occasional cultural exchanges—afford the population, particularly in the major metropolitan areas of Moscow, Leningrad, and Kiev, supplementary means with which to judge the outside world.

1. Printed matter

As a pivotal party weapon, Soviet publishing activity has increased rapidly. Theoretically, the public information channels are considered an integral segment of Soviet society, intimately linked with the arts, literature, and music and closely synchronized with the economy and all other institutions and systems of the state. Indeed, in terms of actual growth, Soviet publishing efforts have been remarkably successful (Figure 49). Between 1913 and 1971, for example, the number of newspapers increased six-fold with an annual circulation in the latter year of \$2.4 billion.

The number of newspapers, periodicals, and books and pamphlets issued by some 220 publishing houses is quite large, partly because of the multilingual character of the Soviet population. As of 1971, newspapers were published in 57 native languages and nine foreign languages; periodicals in 44 native

languages and 23 foreign languages; and books and pamphlets in 65 native languages and 42 foreign languages.

Of the publications in foreign languages, those appearing in German, Polish, Hungarian, Finnish, Greek, Romanian, Bulgarian, and Korean, to name the major examples, are frequently also directed to the large groups of native speakers resident within the Soviet Union. Native Russian speakers are greatly "overrepresented" if their share of the total population (58.7% in 1970) is compared with the number of printed items appearing in Russian (roughly 80% of all newspapers, periodicals, and books and brochures). Of the other Soviet nationalities, only the Estonians, Latvians, and Lithuanians are overrepresented, a testimony to their ability to maintain a high cultural level and to resist the pressures of Russification.

a. Press and periodicals

The earliest periodical in what is now the Soviet Union appeared in 1621 under the title *Kuranty* (Chimes), a handwritten document circulated for the benefit of the tsar and his court. The first Russian newspaper, *Russkiye Vedomosti* (Russian Gazette), appeared in 1703 under the auspices of Peter I, and privately sponsored newspapers and magazines came into being in the mid-18th century. Gradually, over the next 150 years, the Russian Empire developed a varied and, for the time, lively press. Although experiencing censorship from time to time, for the most part it freely published the news. Even the Marxists were able to disseminate their ideas, first by smuggling tracts and journals into the empire from the West in the late 19th century, then by publishing illegally within Russia for a decade or so, and finally by publishing legally after the 1905 revolution.

Lenin was the editor of the first Marxist newspaper, *Iskra* (Spark), printed in various Western European

FIGURE 49. Production of newspapers, periodicals, and books (U/OU)

	1913	1940	1960	1971
Newspapers:				
Number.....	1,065	8,806	*6,804	*6,878
Annual circulation (millions).....	na	*7,528.1	*14,977.1	*32,418.9
Periodicals:				
Number.....	1,472	1,822	3,761	5,967
Annual circulation (millions).....	116.5	245.4	778.6	2,572.3
Books and pamphlets:				
Number (thousands).....	30.1	45.8	76.1	85.5
Editions (millions).....	99.2	462.2	1,239.6	1,581.3

na Data not available.

*Excludes collective farm papers which appear less than once a week.

cities after 1900, but following the split between the Bolsheviks and Mensheviks in 1903 he founded his own organ, *Vpered* (Forward). The revolutionary events of 1905 and the fluctuations caused both by intraparty feuds and by changing governmental press policies led to a swift and confusing succession of Marxist newspapers, many published within Russia. In 1912, Lenin fostered the establishment of *Pravda* (Truth) as the chief editorial voice of the Bolsheviks. Stalin was its first editor, followed by Molotov. Although the Russian government made several attempts to close *Pravda*, the paper persisted, using a variety of different names, until 1914, when the outbreak of war gave the tsarist regime a perfect excuse to clamp down.

Pravda resumed publication in early 1917 after the February Revolution, this time initially under the editorship of Molotov and then of Stalin. The Bolshevik press flourished throughout Russia during the 8 months of democratic rule, assuming many of the characteristics of style, content, and makeup which have persisted to the present day. Following the October Revolution the Bolsheviks closed the papers of the other political parties and turned the assets over to their own publishing houses. Out of the confiscated media facilities a hierarchical press system was organized, with a small nucleus of party organs, such as *Pravda*, at the top, followed by such government newspapers as *Izvestiya* (News), and with the workers' journals, such as *Trud* (Labor), at the bottom.

Despite the proliferation of newspapers through multilingual versions, the industry is highly concentrated. Thus, of 6,878 newspapers published in 1971, only 647 fit the UNESCO definition of a daily, i.e., a paper published four or more times weekly.

Daily circulation of such papers amounted to about 336 copies per 1,000 population. Of the 647 daily newspapers, 186 were published six or more times weekly, 10 of which were officially defined as national in coverage (Figure 50).

Pravda is the most important newspaper in the U.S.S.R. and the only one to appear 7 days a week; the other 185 dailies omit one day, usually Monday. Except for 30 separate evening newspapers issued in major cities (e.g., Moscow, Leningrad, Kiev), and an early edition of *Izvestiya* which appears in Moscow on the evening preceding the date of publication, Soviet newspapers issue only morning editions. Most newspapers are four to six pages in length and cost 2 or 3 kopecks.

The majority of papers use essentially the same makeup techniques, and all use the same stories. Often several papers will print identical stories in identical positions, often under identical headlines, and accompanied by identical pictures. Journalistic language is highly stylized. In discussions of certain questions on which there has been no final decision, subtle variations may be used to signal controversial opinions. A typical Soviet newspaper is arranged as follows: page 1 carries government notices, official bulletins, and usually a long editorial; pages 2 and 3 generally contain national news, letters, special articles, and sometimes a *feuilleton* (a semifictional feature story with a political moral); and page 4 is given over to foreign news provided by TASS, athletic events, and a potpourri of other items. Advertising is supplied by the government or concerns public events such as sports competitions and theater offerings. A clutter of small personal advertisements about such events as marriages, divorces, and deaths also appear—items required by law to be published.

FIGURE 50. National newspapers, 1973 (U/OU)

NAME	FOUNDED	PUBLISHED BY	SINGLE ISSUE CIRCULATION
PRAVDA (Truth).....	1912	CPSU.....	Millions 10.0
IZVESTIYA (News).....	1917	Supreme Soviet.....	8.0
GUDOK (Whistle).....	1917	Ministry of Communications, Railway Transport Workers Union.	*0.6
TRUD (Labor).....	1921	AUCCTU.....	6.0
KRASNAYA ZVEZDA (Red Star).....	1924	Ministry of Defense.....	2.65
KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA (Komsomol Truth).....	1925	Komsomol.....	8.4
SELSKAYA ZHIZN (Rural Life).....	1929	CPSU.....	7.0
SOVETSKIY SPORT (Soviet Sport).....	1933	AUCCTU, Union of Sports Societies and Organizations.	3.45
SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA (Soviet Russia).....	1956	CPSU.....	2.5
SOTSIALISTICHESKAYA INDUSTRIYA (Socialist Industry)...	1969	...do.....	0.85

*1971.

Soviet newspapers do not attract readers by sensationalism, brashness, or popular feature articles common to most Western journals. Furthermore, ideological correctness of interpretation rather than speed in reporting news events is the guiding criterion. Nevertheless, the content of Soviet newspapers, perhaps dull from a Western perspective, is not without personal interest afforded primarily by the extensive use of readers' letters criticizing the lapses of petty officials.

In recent years, makeup and typography have improved significantly. Most papers take great care to achieve esthetic layout and harmonious typography, and the use of pictures has increased. *Izvestiya*, for example, employs some of the best layout practices in the world, the paper presenting what Westerners might term an attractive package. It is probable, however, that newspaper readers in Scandinavia, the United Kingdom, or the United States would still find the Soviet press colorless and staid, perhaps even dull in format.

With editorial offices in Moscow (Figure 51), the press leader is *Pravda*, which sets the standards not only in ideological questions but also in general editorial and technical matters. In 1971 *Pravda* distributed daily approximately 9.2 million copies nationwide from printing plants in Moscow and 15 other cities. It rushes page mats to the more distant of its printing sites each night by jet plane. Distribution of *Pravda* texts was facilitated in 1970 by the introduction of a photoelectric process transmitted by communication satellite. *Pravda* is packed with serious news, announcements, and speeches; occasionally the newspaper engages in some heavy-footed humor in its

feuilletons. Most of its foreign news comes from the Telegraphic Agency of the Soviet Union (TASS), but the paper also maintains some 60 correspondents abroad. Within the U.S.S.R. *Pravda* has about 40,000 correspondents, both professional and amateur, whose function is not only to channel any important news back to Moscow but also to check on local newspaper operations.

Pravda sets a magisterial journalistic tone. It does not write down to its readers. Editorials are always prominently displayed, usually in the left-hand column, although on occasion the whole front page comprises one long editorial. The usual emphasis is on foreign and internal policy, with items devoted to industry, propaganda, party organization, agriculture, cultural affairs, and military policy following in that order. These articles are reprinted throughout the Soviet press, usually being sent by TASS via voice radio to be copied down simultaneously in various newspaper offices. Through such means, as well as through its elaborate publishing and distribution network, *Pravda* is the most truly national newspaper in the U.S.S.R.

In 1971, 1,208 magazines were published comprising more than 76% of total periodical circulation. An additional 4,759 periodicals were divided among small-circulation publications such as "agitators' notebooks" designed for party propaganda, scientific and scholarly proceedings, and bulletins. As a rule Soviet magazines range in price from 10 to 30 kopecks, with glossy and literary journals ranging from 60 to 80 kopecks. Within the magazine category, there are several fairly distinct groups: party journals such as *Partiynaya Zhizn* (Party Life) dealing with questions




FIGURE 51. Editorial offices of *Pravda*, located in Moscow (C)

of organization, propaganda, agitation, current policies, and other practical matters; ideological or theoretical journals such as *Voprosy Filosofii* (Problems of Philosophy) dealing with current policy or historical approaches to ideological questions; literary journals such as *Novyy Mir* (New World) and *Oktjabr* (October) publishing new fiction and literary criticism, respectively, and serving as forums for debate between "liberals" and "conservatives"; trade or professional journals such as *Zhurnalist* (Journalist); health and sports journals, such as *Zdorovye* (Health); magazines oriented toward a subsection of the population, particularly youth and women, such as *Rabotnitsa* (Woman Worker); humor magazines, such as *Krokodil* (Crocodile); journals for foreign distribution, such as *Sputnik*; popular science magazines, such as *Tekhnika Molodezhi* (Technology for Youth); digests of translations from foreign publications, such as *Za Rubezhom* (Abroad); academic and scholarly journals, such as *Vestnik Akademii Nauk* (Herald of the Academy of Sciences); and general popular magazines such as *Ogonek* (Little Flame). In 1973 estimated single issue circulation of selected major magazines ranged from 12.5 million (*Rabotnitsa*) to 170,000 (*Novyy Mir*) (Figure 52).

While the format and content of Soviet magazines have become much livelier in recent years, they are

still staid when compared with Western styles. More than 90% of all periodicals are still printed on paper roughly equivalent to newsprint stock. Layout and design suffer not only from the general backwardness of Soviet commercial art but also from the poor quality of materials available. Despite an improvement in appearance, the basic purpose of magazines and newspapers in Soviet society—to indoctrinate the people and mobilize them for assigned tasks—is not likely to change.

There are two Soviet news agencies, TASS and News Press Agency (APN), often referred to as *Novosti*. The former concentrates on official government and political information, while the latter is more apt to report offbeat propagandistic items.

TASS was founded in 1925, taking over most of the functions of an agency called ROSTA, which operated from 1918 to 1925 as the chief national news agency. From 1925 to 1935 there were five internal wire agencies in the U.S.S.R., including ROSTA which covered the R.S.F.S.R., but in 1935 all were consolidated and incorporated into TASS. The agency's leading position in the news field is reinforced by its attachment to the Council of Ministers. In 1970, from its headquarters in Moscow (Figure 53), the agency maintained "feeder" services in all 15 republics and averaged over 3 million words

FIGURE 52. Selected magazines, 1971 (U/OU)

NAME	FOUNDED	PUBLISHED BY	SINGLE ISSUE CIRCULATION
			Millions
RABOTNITSA (Woman Worker).....	1914	Pravda.....	12.5
PARTIYNAYA ZHIZN (Party Life).....	1919	CPSU.....	1.1
KRESTYANKA (Peasant Woman).....	1922	Pravda.....	6.2
KROKODIL (Crocodile).....	1922do.....	5.5
OOGONEK (Little Flame).....	1923do.....	2.2
PIONER (Pioneer).....	1924	Pioneer organization.....	1.5
KOMMUNIST (Communist).....	1925	CPSU.....	0.9
NOVYY MIR (New World).....	1925	Union of Writers.....	0.2
VOKRUG SVETA (Around the World).....	1927	Komsomol.....	2.5
TEKHNIKA-MOLODEZHI (Technology for Youth).....	1933do.....	1.7
NAUKA I ZHIZN (Science and Life).....	1934	Znaniye Society.....	3.0
SEMYA I SHKOLA (Family and School).....	1946	Academy of Pedagogical Sciences.....	*9.8
ZDOROVYE (Health).....	1955	Ministry of Health, Union of Medical Workers.	10.2
AGITATOR.....	1956	CPSU.....	1.3
POLITICAL SAMOOBRAZOVANIYE (Political Self-Education).....	1956do.....	1.9
YUNOST (Youth).....	1956	Union of Writers.....	2.1
SLUZHBA BYTA (Public Service).....	1962	Ministry of Public Service, R.S.F.S.R., Union of Local Industry and Municipal Public Service Workers.	**1.5

*1969.

**1968.

daily to and from its offices in some 95 countries and territories. Nevertheless, the Soviet public receives only a carefully selected segment of foreign news. Many major events are never made public, while minor incidents which support the regime's position are publicized.

Some 5,000 Soviet newspapers, as well as major radio and television stations, subscribe to TASS, paying for its service on the basis of their circulation or listening audience. Within the Soviet Union TASS news is supplied in Russian, while service to foreign subscribers is transmitted in Russian, English, French, German, Spanish, and Arabic. Agreements have also been concluded with some 30 foreign news agencies, including Reuters, Associated Press, United Press International, *Agence France-Presse*, *Deutsche Presse Agentur*, and Kyodo News Service, as well as the agencies of Communist countries.

APN was founded in 1961 under the sponsorship of the Union of Journalists, the Union of Writers, the

FIGURE 53. TASS facilities in Moscow



Znaniye Society, and the Union of Soviet Societies of Friendship and Cultural Relations with Foreign Countries. The agency provides feature stories, commentaries, news items, interviews, and photos. Service to foreign subscribers deals with various aspects of life in the Soviet Union, while the domestic service to Soviet subscribers mainly concerns the way of life of foreign nations.

According to its charter, APN is a completely autonomous body, cooperating with official information services but not affiliated with them. In 1969 it was providing feature copy to more than 600 Soviet newspapers and was contributing to some 6,000 newspapers abroad. It maintains bureaus or correspondents in 73 countries. Foreign correspondents in the U.S.S.R. must rely on APN for their stories. It is also responsible for some of the glossier Soviet publications for foreign readers, including *Sputnik* and *Soviet Life*, issuing altogether some 52 magazines, eight newspapers, and more than 100 press bulletins with a circulation of 2.7 million copies. In addition, APN publishes books and pamphlets and produces films for television. In effect, the purpose of the agency is to counteract whatever the regime believes is hostile propaganda about life in the U.S.S.R. Its function as a public relations agency is facilitated by its "public" rather than state sponsorship.

b. Books and libraries

In 1970, after the United States, the U.S.S.R. was the largest producer of books and pamphlets in the world, publishing a total of 78,899 titles, roughly a thousand less than the number issued in the United States. Major subject categories included industry (8,101 titles), literature (6,379), political science (6,137), natural sciences (3,477), and agriculture (2,026).

In technical quality Soviet books are generally inferior to those printed in the United States. Thinner paper is used which frequently turns yellow and becomes brittle after a few years. The quality of printing is also low by U.S. standards, the impression often being uneven and visible through the page. Because of frequent misprints, errata slips in books and journals are common. The binding is also weak and easily torn from the book.

Soviet books are relatively inexpensive in comparison with other consumer goods. The price of a book, as well as the size of its edition, is determined by its subject matter. Those on political subjects, for example, are cheap and plentiful; others, for a more restricted readership, cost more. Publishing houses can offer books at low prices because they are exempt from

all taxes and are subsidized by the state, although they are often unable to satisfy consumer demand because of the limited quantity of paper available. Frequently, a would-be purchaser must order well in advance of publication. On the other hand, unsold books are a chronic problem. Each year thousands of volumes remain on the shelves, while others issued in smaller editions disappear from the stores within hours of their appearance. Second-hand books are an important means of filling the gap, usually being bought back from the public at approximately 80% of their original cost and, if in reasonably good condition, resold as new. Although no analysis of the categories of books which remain unsold and those which sell well has been made public, the speed with which certain "controversial" works disappear from the shelves suggests that many of the unsold volumes follow the party line so slavishly as to promise only boredom for the reader.

The U.S.S.R. has an extensive library system which has grown substantially under the Soviet aegis (Figure 54). The number of libraries increased from 76,000 in 1913 to 360,000 in 1971, while the size of their collections climbed from 46 million volumes to 3.3 billion volumes. Major libraries include the V.I. Lenin State Library of the U.S.S.R. in Moscow (founded 1862), comparable in status with the Library of Congress, with more than 23 million volumes as of the late 1960's; the M.E. Saltykov-Shchedrin State Public Library in Leningrad (founded 1795) with about 14 million volumes; the Library of the Academy of Sciences of the U.S.S.R. in Leningrad (founded 1714), with more than 8 million volumes; the State Public Library of the Academy of Sciences of the Ukraine in Kiev, with about 8 million volumes; and the A.M. Gorkiy Research Library of Moscow State University, with about 6 million volumes.

FIGURE 54. Libraries and collections (U/OU)

	1913	1940	1960	1971
Public libraries:				
Number (thousands).....	14	95	136	128
Collections (millions).....	9	185	845	173
School and children's libraries:				
Number (thousands).....	59	164	196	173
Collections (millions).....	22	68	277	1,593
Technical and other specialized libraries:				
Number (thousands).....	3	18	50	59
Collections (millions).....	15	274	768	1,558
All libraries:				
Number (thousands).....	76	277	382	360
Collections (millions).....	46	527	1,890	3,324

Although quantitatively impressive, the Soviet library network is less than adequate qualitatively. Literature in the collections is often out of date, and cataloging usually is far behind acquisitions. Because of low-quality book production, the libraries are faced with a nearly insuperable problem of deterioration in their collections. The premises of individual libraries, moreover, are frequently rundown, with wornout furnishings and outmoded equipment. Many are crowded, poorly lit, inconveniently arranged, and frequently cluttered and unpleasant. Some buildings are even critical fire hazards. On the other hand, the major collections named above are housed in capacious quarters and have facilities comparable with the best in the West.

2. Radio and television

Radio and television broadcasting rank with the press as a major source of political, cultural, and esthetic indoctrination. Wireless telegraphy was invented in Russia in 1896 by A.S. Popov simultaneously with, and independently of, Marconi. Broadcasting began in 1922 from a transmitter in Moscow, and 2 years later three additional transmitters were functioning in Leningrad, Kiyev, and Nizhniy Novgorod (Gorkiy). Television transmissions began experimentally in 1931; the first studios opened in Moscow and Leningrad in 1938, the third opening in Kiyev in 1951. By the end of 1972 there were approximately 470 radio stations in operation, of which approximately 250 were FM, an increase from 132 in 1965. There were also 130 television stations (103 of which were capable of transmitting in color), supplemented by some 1,280 retransmitting stations.

Radio and television transmission has been facilitated since 1965 by 23 *Molniya-1* communication satellites launched into high elliptical orbit. Since 1971, 5 *Molniya-2* satellites have supplemented the satellite network.

Radio and television coverage is quite comprehensive. According to Soviet statistics, in 1973 there were 195.5 million radio-receiving points, a term which includes wired and wireless radios and television sets. The following tabulation outlines the growth in the number of radio-receiving points since 1940 (in millions):

	1940	1960	1965	1970	1973
Wireless radios . . .	1.1	27.8	38.2	48.6	52.0
Wired radios . . .	5.9	30.8	35.6	46.2	48.5
Television sets . . . insig		4.8	15.7	34.8	45.0
Total	7.0	63.4	89.5	129.6	195.5

In 1970, 390 radio sets and 143 television sets per 1,000 population were in use.

Radio Moscow, the central broadcasting station, transmits five simultaneous programs, four of which are directed to listeners throughout the Soviet Union. The first program is the basic one, transmitting political, cultural, and economic information 20 hours daily. The second program, called *Mayak* (Beacon), broadcasts light music and hourly newscasts around the clock. With a more serious content, including radio plays and classical music, the third program broadcasts 14 hours daily to the central regions of the European part of the U.S.S.R., the Transvolga, and the Urals. The fourth program is beamed over the AM and FM bands to the population of the Moscow region, transmitting 8 hours daily during the week and 13 hours daily on weekends. Transmitted around the clock, the fifth program is directed to Soviet citizens abroad, seamen of the commercial and fishing fleets, and foreigners knowing Russian. In addition, 1 hour of stereo is broadcast daily on FM. Overall, *Radio Moscow* broadcasts approximately 650 hours weekly, while local stations transmit for an additional 6,000 hours. Music occupies 55.3% of total broadcasting time, news 16%, social and political items 10.6%, literature and drama 9%, programs for children and young people 6.6%, and other programs 2.5%.

Radio Moscow and *Radio Peace and Progress* (the stations bear essentially the same relationship to each other as do TASS and APN) broadcast programs for listeners abroad on short and medium wave in 84 languages. The programs were beamed to all parts of the world, as of 1973, for an estimated 1,900 hours a week, second only to the combined efforts of the Voice of America (VOA), *Radio Free Europe*, and *Radio Liberty*. According to a Soviet source, the goal of these programs is to describe the life of the Soviet people, explain the foreign and domestic policy of the Soviet state, reveal the aggressive policies of imperialism, and discuss the worldwide struggle of the working class and the movements for national liberation.

Operating out of Moscow, the Central Television Network transmits four simultaneous programs. The first program, on channel 1, lasting 10 hours daily during the week and 15 hours daily on weekends, is devoted to "important events of national and international life." The second program, on channel 3, transmitting 5 hours daily during the week and 6 and 7 hours on Saturdays and Sundays, respectively, is directed to the city of Moscow and its environs. Devoted to educational television, the third program, on channel 8, transmits 1 hour and 15 minutes 5 days a week. The fourth program, also on channel 8,

telecasts in color 2.5 hours daily. Altogether, Moscow transmitters are on the air approximately 160 hours per week, while local stations transmit an additional 4,800 hours weekly. In the four programs films occupy 22% of total transmission time, literature and drama 19%, music 18%, news 17%, programs for children and young people 14%, social and political material 8%, and miscellaneous programs 2%.

Moscow television programs are also relayed to local TV stations throughout the rest of the U.S.S.R. by communication satellite and microwave systems. Satellite transmissions are beamed to 42 receiving *orbita* stations over a fifth program on a daily basis. Twenty-one additional *orbita* stations are either under construction or in the planning stage. Microwave transmissions of Moscow programs are beamed to the southern portion of U.S.S.R. over a sixth program, also on a daily basis.

Experimental telecasting in color was begun in 1959 but proved unsuccessful. In 1965, however, the U.S.S.R. and France agreed to pool their efforts to develop color transmission on the basis of the French SECAM-4 system. To facilitate this operation, one of the largest television centers in the world was built in Ostankino, near Moscow. It is capable of broadcasting on five television channels (four VHF and one UHF) and six FM stations simultaneously.

Soviet radio and television networks belong to the International Organization of Radio-broadcasting and Television (OIRT). Soviet networks are tied to those of Eastern Europe, and a network called *Intervision*, sponsored by OIRT, facilitates the exchange of programs of international interest, such as soccer matches and the May Day and 7 November celebrations. The link between Soviet and Western radio and television networks is made between Tallin and Helsinki. The Soviet Union engages in the exchange of programs with some 90 countries. In mid-1973 the regime signed an agreement with the U.S. National Broadcasting Company to exchange radio and television programming.

In the unauthorized penetration of Soviet airspace, however, the regime is less cooperative. The government maintains an extensive system of radio jammers, numbering between 2,000 and 2,500, capable of blocking reception by wireless radios. Since World War II, jamming has varied in accordance with the tensions of the cold war. During the Berlin crisis in 1948 the Russians started jamming the broadcasts of the VOA in the various Soviet languages (Russian, Ukrainian, Armenian, Georgian, Estonian, Latvian, Lithuanian), and a year later those of the British Broadcasting Corporation (BBC). Jamming was soon

extended to almost all Western broadcasts to the Soviet Union and its allied countries, as well as to some other countries. Beginning in 1956, jamming of BBC and VOA Soviet-language transmissions was reduced and finally halted in 1963 following the signing of the nuclear test ban treaty. On the other hand, heightened tensions between the Russians and Chinese after 1963 led to systematic and heavy jamming of Chinese Communist transmissions by the late 1960's. Jamming of BBC and VOA transmissions to the Soviet Union resumed after the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia in 1968, but it has not returned to the peak pre-1963 levels. Jamming of *Radio Liberty* and *Radio Free Europe* has continued without letup.

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Glossary (u/ou)

ABBREVIATION	RUSSIAN	ENGLISH
APN.....	<i>Agentstvo Pechati Novosti</i>	News Press Agency
AUCCTU.....	<i>Vsesoyuznyy Tsentralnyy Sovet Profes-sionalnykh Soyuzov</i>	All-Union Central Council of Trade Unions
GLAVLIT.....	<i>Glavnaya Upravleniya Po Okhrane Vojennykh i Gosudarstvennykh Tain v Pechati</i>	Main Administration for Safeguarding Military and State Secrets
KGB.....	<i>Komitet Gosudarstvennoy Bezopasnosti</i>	Committee for State Security
TASS.....	<i>Telegrafnoye Agentstvo Sovetskogo Soyusa</i>	Telegraphic Agency of the Soviet Union
ZAGS.....	<i>Zapis Aktov Grazhdanskogo Sostoyaniya</i>	Government Civil Registry Office

Places and features referred to in this chapter (u/ou)

	COORDINATES		COORDINATES
	° 'N. ° 'E.		° 'N. ° 'E.
Armenia (regn).....	40 00 45 00	Lithuania (rep).....	56 00 24 00
Armenian SSR.....	40 00 45 00	L'vov.....	49 50 24 00
Azerbaijan (regn).....	39 00 48 00	Magadan Oblast.....	65 00 160 00
Azerbaijan SSR.....	40 30 47 30	Magnitogorsk.....	53 27 59 04
Baku.....	40 23 49 51	Mary.....	37 36 61 50
Baykal, Lake (lake).....	54 00 109 00	Minsk.....	53 54 27 34
Belorussia (regn).....	53 00 25 00	Moldavia (regn).....	46 30 27 00
Belorussia SSR.....	53 00 28 00	Moldavian SSR.....	47 00 29 00
Black Sea (sea).....	43 00 35 00	Moscow.....	55 45 37 35
Bukhara.....	39 48 64 25	Murmanskaya Oblast.....	68 00 34 00
Buynaksk.....	42 49 47 07	Naberezhnye Chelny.....	55 42 52 19
Caspian Sea (sea).....	42 00 50 00	Nizhniy Novgorod.....	56 20 44 00
Caucasus (regn).....	42 00 45 00	North Caucasus (regn).....	43 00 45 00
Crimea (regn).....	45 00 34 00	Novosibirsk.....	55 02 82 55
Dagestan (regn).....	42 00 47 00	Odessa.....	46 28 30 44
Dagestan ASSR.....	43 00 47 00	Pamirs (mts).....	38 00 73 00
Donetsk Oblast.....	48 00 37 30	Prokopyevsk.....	53 53 86 45
Dushanbe.....	38 33 68 48	Riga.....	56 57 24 06
Echmiadzin.....	40 10 44 18	Rostov.....	47 14 39 42
Estonia (rep).....	59 00 26 00	R.S.F.S.R.....	60 00 100 00
Estonian SSR.....	59 00 26 00	Samarkand.....	39 40 66 58
Georgia (regn).....	42 00 43 30	Siberia (regn).....	60 00 100 00
Georgian SSR.....	42 00 43 30	Sverdlovsk.....	56 51 60 36
Gor'kiy.....	56 20 44 00	Tadzhik SSR.....	39 00 71 00
Helsinki, Finland.....	60 10 24 50	Tadzhikistan (regn).....	38 00 72 00
Ivanovo (famous for art textile industry).....		Tallin.....	59 25 24 45
Ivolginsk.....	51 45 107 14	Tashkent.....	41 20 69 18
Kaliningradskaya Oblast.....	54 45 21 30	Tiflis.....	41 42 44 45
Kaunas.....	54 54 23 54	Tol'yatti.....	53 31 49 26
Kazakstan.....		Transcaucasus (regn).....	42 00 45 00
Kazakh SSR.....	48 00 68 00	Transvolga (regn).....	55 00 50 00
Kazan.....	55 45 49 08	Turkmen SSR.....	40 00 60 00
Khar'kov.....	50 00 36 15	Turkestan.....	45 00 70 00
Kiev.....	50 26 30 31	Ufa.....	54 44 55 56
Kiev.....	50 26 30 31	Ukraine (regn).....	50 00 32 00
Kirgiziya (SSR).....	41 00 75 00	Ukrainian SSR.....	49 00 32 00
Kuybyshev.....	53 12 50 09	Ul'yanovsk.....	54 20 48 24
Kuzbas (regn).....	54 00 86 00	Urals (mts).....	60 00 60 00
Ladoga, Lake (lake).....	61 00 31 30	Uzbekistan (regn).....	43 00 60 00
Latvia (rep).....	57 00 25 00	Vil'nyus.....	54 41 25 19
Latvian SSR.....	57 00 25 00	Volga (strm).....	45 55 47 52
Leningrad.....	59 55 30 15	Yakut SSR.....	65 00 130 00
Lipetsk.....	52 37 39 35	Zagorsk (near Moscow).....	56 18 38 08
Lithuanian SSR.....	56 00 24 00		

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